D2) What is your mother's highest academic qualification?
1) Elementary
2) Secondary school diploma
3) University degree
4) Ph.D. or other advanced degree

D3) Your father is:
1) Self-employed
    1.1) He works alone
    1.2) He employs other people
2) An employee
3) Unemployed – searching for a job
4) Unable to work because of illness
5) Retired
6) Other (please specify) _____

D4) What is your father's current occupation? _____

D5) Your mother is:
1) Self-employed
    1.1) She works alone
    1.2) She employs other employees
4) An employee
5) Unemployed – searching for a job
6) Unable to work because of illness
7) Retired
8) On maternity leave
9) Housewife
10) Other (please specify) _____

D6) What is your mother's current occupation? _____

D7) Is your father satisfied with his job?
1 1) Very satisfied
    2) Quite satisfied
0 3) Not unsatisfied
    4) Quite unsatisfied
    5) Very unsatisfied

D8) Is your mother satisfied with her job?
1 1) Very satisfied
0 2) Quite satisfied
    3) Not unsatisfied
    4) Quite unsatisfied
    5) Very unsatisfied

E) LANGUAGE ABILITIES

E1) How would you assess your knowledge of written Czech? (Use grades like those used in Czech schools):
1 1) Excellent
    2) Very good
0 3) Good
    4) Just sufficient
    5) Fail

E2) How would you assess your knowledge of spoken Czech? (Use grades like those used in Czech schools):
1 1) Excellent
    2) Very good
0 3) Good
    4) Just sufficient
    5) Fail

E3) How would you assess your knowledge of your mother's written language? (Use grades like those used in Czech schools):

1 1) Excellent
2) Very good
0 3) Good
4) Just sufficient
5) Fail

E4) How would you assess your knowledge of your mother's spoken language? (Use grades like those used in Czech schools):

1 1) Excellent
2) Very good
0 3) Good
4) Just sufficient
5) Fail

E5) Do you any other foreign language?

1) Yes
2) No

E6) If yes, which languages and how well do you know them? (Use grades like those used in Czech schools):

_____

E7) What language do you speak most often and with whom?

	A) Czech	B) Mother's language	C) Another language	D) Depends on the situation
1) Mother				
2) Father				
3) Siblings				
4) Friends				

F) FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

F1) How often does your father devote his spare time to you – helping with your homework/ preparing you for school?

1) Very often
2) Often
3) Sometimes
4) Rarely
5) Never

F2) How often does your father devote his spare time to you – doing housework together?

1) Very often
2) Often
3) Sometimes
4) Rarely
5) Never

F3) How often does your father devote his spare time to you – discussing your personal problems?

1 1) Very often
2) Often
0 3) Sometimes
4) Rarely
5) Never

F4) How often does your mother devote her spare time to you – helping with your homework/ preparing you for school?

1) Very often
2) Often
3) Sometimes
4) Rarely
5) Never

F5) How often does your mother devote her spare time to you – doing housework together?

1) Very often
2) Often
3) Sometimes
4) Rarely
5) Never

F6) How often does your mother devote her spare time to you – discussing your personal problems?

1 1) Very often
2) Often
0 3) Sometimes
4) Rarely
5) Never

F7) How close is your family?

1 1) Very
0 2) Quite close
3) Somewhat close
4) Not very close
5) Not close at all: we are largely indifferent to one another

F8) Do you argue with your parents?

1) No
2) Yes, but our arguments are small and rare
3) Yes
4) Yes, our arguments are large and frequent
5) Yes, our arguments are so large that we almost do not communicate with each other

F9) Do you argue with your grandparents?

1) No
2) Yes, but our arguments are small and rare
3) Yes
4) Yes, our arguments are large and frequent
5) Yes, our arguments are so large that we almost do not communicate with each other

F10) Where do your relatives live at the moment?

	A) In Prague	B) Elsewhere in the Czech Republic	C) Abroad (please specify)
1) Father			
2) Mother			
3) Sibling			
4) Sibling			
5) Sibling			
6) Sibling			
7) Grandfather			
8) Grandmother			
9) Grandfather			
10) Grandmother			
11) Other (please specify)			

F11) How often do you see your relatives?

	A) Daily	B) Weekly	C) Monthly	D) Yearly	E) Less than once a year
1) Father					
2) Mother					
3) Sibling					
4) Sibling					
5) Sibling					
6) Sibling					
7) Grandfather					
8) Grandmother					
9) Grandfather					
10) Grandmother					
11) Other (please specify)					

F12) How often do you visit your mother's country of origin?

1 1) Several times a year
0 2) Once a year
3) Once every _____ (number) years
4) Never

F13) What are the main reasons for such visits? _____

G) RELATIONS

G1) Who is your best friend (besides family members)?

1 1) A Czech person
0 2) A member of your mother's ethnic group
3) A member of another ethnic group

G2) Where did you meet your best friend?

1) At school
2) In a hobby group, interest group, or social organization
3) Close to home
4) Other (please specify) _____

G3) How many really close friends do you have among…

1) Czechs?
2) Members of your mother's ethnic group?
3) Members of other ethnic groups?

G4) Does your family follow the customs and traditions (including: eating habits, holidays, clothing, music, art, etc.) of your parents' country of origin?

1 1) Yes, very much
0 2) Yes, to some extent
3) Sometimes
4) No, never
5) No, my family is strongly against following traditions

G5) Please briefly describe the customs and traditions that you do stick to:

_____

_____

G6) For you personally, following such traditions is:

1 1) Very important
2) Important
0 3) I feel indifferent
4) Unimportant
5) Totally unimportant

G7) Does your family keep contacts (socialise) with Czechs?

1 1) Yes, very often
2) Yes, quite often
0 3) Sometimes
4) No
5) Never, and we do not think of it

G8) Does your family keep contacts (socialise) with other immigrants?

1 1) Yes, often (please specify country of origin) _____
2) Yes, quite often (please specify country of origin) _____
0 3) Sometimes
4) No
5) Never, and we do not think of it

G9) If your family does socialize with Czechs, do you cooperate/ advise one another/ help one anther out?

1 1) Yes, often
0 2) Yes, quite often
3) Sometimes
4) No
5) Never, and we do not think of it

G10) If your family does socialize with other immigrants, do you cooperate/ advise one another/ help one anther out?

1 1) Yes, often
0 2) Yes, quite often
3) Sometimes
4) No
5) Never, and we do not think of it

G11) Does your family (or some members) actively participate in a organisation/ association/ interest group, or the like?

1) Yes (please specify) _____
2) No

G12) In which organisations/ hobby groups/ sport clubs, etc. are you actively involved?

_____

_____

H) IDENTITY

H1) Although you live in the Czech Republic, some people may perceive you as a foreigner. How do you feel about your identity?

_____

_____

H2) Do you sometimes feel that you belong nowhere (that you are neither Czech nor a member of your parents' country of origin)?

0 1) Yes, often
2) Yes, quite often
3) Sometimes
1 4) Rarely
5) Never

H3) Please give an example of a time (situation) when you felt you did not belong anywhere:

_____

_____

H4) How strongly do you feel Czech?

1 1) Very
2) Quite
0 3) Somewhat
4) Not very
5) Not at all

H5) How strongly do you feel a member of your parents' country of origin?

1 1) Very
2) Quite
0 3) Somewhat
4) Not very
5) Not at all

H6) Who would you support in a sports match between the Czech Republic and your mother's country of origin?

1 1) I would certainly support my mother's country of origin
2) I would probably support my mother's country of origin
0 3) I would support my mother's country of origin one time and the Czech Republic the next
4) I would probably support the Czech Republic
5) I would certainly support the Czech Republic

I) LIFESTYLE

I1) What do you usually do on Saturday afternoons and evenings?

_____

_____

I2) On average, how much television do you watch...

1) On a week day (number of minutes)? _____
2) At weekends (number of minutes)? _____

I3) Do you watch television in the language of your mother's country of origin?

1 1) Yes, almost always
2) Yes, quite often
0 3) Sometimes
4) No
5) No, I do not have the possibility to do so at home

I4) What are your three most favourite meals?

1) _____

2) _____

3) _____

J) DISCRIMINATION

J1) Do you feel any hostility/ animosity from Czechs towards members of your ethnic/ immigrant group?

1) No, not at all
2) Not really
3) Somewhat
1 4) Yes, to a degree
5) Yes, very much

2) Have you ever felt personally humiliated, unjustly treated, or discriminated against because perceived as a "foreigner"?

0 1) No, not at all
2) Not really
3) Somewhat
1 4) Yes, to a degree
5) Yes, very much

J3) If yes: when, where, and by whom did you feel discriminated against?

_____

_____

_____

K) FEELINGS

K1) Do you agree with the following statement: "I do not have much to be proud of"?:

0 1) Yes, I agree completely
2) Yes, I agree
3) I agree somewhat
4) No, I disagree
1 5) No, I disagree completely

K2) Have you ever had strong feelings of anxiety and/or depression?

1 1) No, never
2) Rarely (less than once a week)
0 3) Sometimes (once or twice a week)
4) Often (three or four days a week)
5) Almost always (five or six days a week)

L) SOCIAL STATUS AND ADAPTATION

L1) How would you describe your family compared to an average Czech family?

1 1) Very rich
2) Rich
0 3) Neither rich nor poor
4) Poor
5) Very poor

L2) Since you immigrated to the Czech Republic, how has your family's living standard changed?

1 1) It has improved significantly
2) It has improved
0 3) It has not changed
4) It has deteriorated
5) It has deteriorated significantly

L3) Are you generally satisfied with your involvement in Czech society?

1 1) Yes, I am very satisfied
2) Yes, I am satisfied
0 3) Not unsatisfied
4) No, I am unsatisfied
5) No, I am very unsatisfied

L4) Are you generally satisfied with your life?

1 1) Yes, I am very satisfied
2) Yes, I am satisfied
0 3) Not unsatisfied
4) No, I am unsatisfied
5) No, I am very unsatisfied

M) RELIGION

M1) What is your religion?

0 1) I am Roman Catholic
2) I am Protestant
3) I am Orthodox
4) I am Muslim
5) I am (please specify) _____
1 6) I am atheist (non-believer)

M2) How often do you attend a church/ masjid (mosque)/ synagogue, etc.?

1 1) Regularly
0 2) Sometimes
3) Never

N) FUTURE

N1) Do you intend to study at university and to finish such studies?

1 1) Certainly
0 2) Probably
3) I do not know yet
4) Probably not
5) Certainly not

N2) What would you like to be doing when you are 30 years old?

_____

_____

N3) Do you think you will fulfil that desire?

1) Yes
2) No

N4) If not, why?

_____

_____

N5) Where would you like to be living when your are 30 years old?

1) Where I am now
2) Somewhere else in the Czech Republic
3) Somewhere in Europe, outside the Czech Republic (please specify) _____
4) Somewhere else in the world (please specify) _____
5) I do not know

O) CONCLUSION

O1) What should be done to improve the lives of foreigners (including their children) in the Czech Republic?

_____

_____

O2) Please tell us a joke:

_____

_____

O3) Please share with us a funny story from your life in the Czech Republic:

_____

_____

O4) Please share with us a sad story from your life in the Czech Republic:

_____

_____

O5) We are at the very end of the survey. Did we omit something important concerning the whole issue? Would you like add to anything?

_____

_____

_____

_____

IOM International Organization for Migration
OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations
OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones



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European Commission Project:

"Dimensions of Integration: Migrant Youth in Central European Countries"

Country Report on Germany

By

Richard Wolf and Mihaela Tudose

INDEX

PREFACE

The objective of this study is to research the current status of migrant youth integration in Germany: in other words, to assess the socio-economic position of young people with a migration background in German society compared to native German reference groups of the same age. In addition, factors and indicators of successful integration were sought and identified.

Given the extreme breadth of the field and the amount of studies that have been dedicated to it, it has been a challenge to get a full picture of the overall processes concerning the integration of migrant youth in Germany. Since migrant youth in Germany are a comparatively well-studied group, this report has chosen to focus particularly on the second-generation – the children of former "guest workers" – and on ethnic German youth. Even despite this focus, it was not possible to survey all the relevant literature; the data provided by the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), in particular, was used to shed more light on the degree of integration in different areas, above all for the descriptive passages.

The first section of the report begins with a short overview of the history of immigration to Germany and concludes with a general description of integration theory; also included in the first section is a focus on the demographics of migration and on the identification of research groups of specific relevance for this report. The second section deals with integration policies in Germany and is divided in two parts: general integration policies and special integration policies (targeted at certain migrant groups, e.g. youth). An analysis of relevant literature and a descriptive analysis of the SOEP data form part of section three, where indicators and factors of integration are also identified – mainly by concentrating on structural integration (school attendance, labour market participation). The fourth section gives a short overview of the kind of cultural developments that have arisen from the presence of migrant youth in Germany and of the effects they have had on the host society. Finally, the fifth section outlines some general recommendations for further research and statistical elaboration, as well as some specific recommendations for promoting of the structural integration of migrant youth.

The authors are especially grateful for the written input of Prof. Dr. Friedrich Heckmann, Edda Currle, Stefan Rühl, Veronika Vitt, and Gisela Will.

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW

1.1. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION TO GERMANY AND INTEGRATION THEORY

Germany has experienced large scale immigration since the end of World War II. German refugees, foreign workers and their families, asylum seekers and foreign refugees, EU migrants and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are among the largest groups. Immigration raises the question of integration and of how a given society relates to "newcomers" in the spheres of economic, political, social, and cultural life. This chapter is about the political and societal responses to the "question of integration" in Germany. Since political perceptions and attitudes towards "returning" ethnic Germans are quite different from those relating to foreign migrants, it is necessary to discern between political responses towards ethnic Germans (*Spätaussiedler*) and foreign migrants.

We shall first give a brief overview of the forms and quantitative proportions of immigration to Germany since the end of World War II. As to integration, we assume that its political determinants in the receiving society are largely influenced by the societal "definition of the immigration situation", i.e. an understanding by major political and societal actors of the "nature" of the ongoing migration processes. Thus, a section on the demographics of migration will be followed by a discussion of the political and societal definition of the immigration situation in a historical perspective.

Furthermore, we assume that responses to immigration are determined by a country's general principles of social order and by its sense of nationhood, so that the ways in which a country generally and "normally" tries to secure cohesion, untangle conflicts, and solve social and economic problems will also be used for integrating migrants. By "sense of nationhood" we refer to constitutive principles of a concept of nation, especially criteria of membership and inclusion. These are of major relevance for policies of citizenship in relation to immigrants; not only do these policies represent a main aspect of structural integration policies, they have also undergone major changes in Germany between 1999-2004. Germany has been continuously classified as an archetypical ethnic nation state, which is why current changes towards a more republican and universalistic model of nation deserve particular attention.

General integration policies and welfare state measures in Germany usually include immigrants. The relevance of general integration policies for the specific integration of immigrants will be discussed in Section 3. Concurrently, special measures and institutions that have been devised purposefully for immigrants also exist. We shall call these "special integration policies" .

Integration policies (general and specific), citizenship rules, and other elements of a national mode of integration set conditions for the integration of immigrants. But integration cannot be forced upon people in modern societies, it is a result of individual choices, often with motives that do not appear related to integration at all. Integration "can occur as the often unintended, cumulative by-product of choices made by individuals to improve their social situation" (Alba, 1999). If integration is - in this sense - a kind of market process, it is also a political process that sets conditions and gives incentives for individual choices and decisions: these conditions and incentives are what integration policies are formulated on.

We are working with a concept of integration that leans partly on ideas of "assimilation" as formulated by Gordon (1964) and Esser (2000) and on a general and formal understanding of integration. For pragmatic reasons, we do not use the term "assimilation" because it almost immediately evokes emotional reactions and connotations of cultural suppression in many audiences.

Integration as a general and formal concept may be defined as a process that aims at a) forming a new structure out of single elements, or b) "improving" relations within a structure, and c) adding single elements or partial structures to an existing structure and joining these to an interconnected "whole". Integration refers both to the process of connecting the elements as well as to the resulting degree of interconnectedness within the "whole". In the context of immigration, integration refers to the inclusion of new populations into existing social structures and to the quality and ways through which these new populations are connected to the existing system of socio-economic, legal, and cultural relations.

The kind of connectedness that results from binding new populations to existing structures involves the process of acquiring membership status in the core institutions of the receiving society (its economic and labour market, its education and qualification system, its housing market, its political community) and the learning and socialization necessary for participating in the new society. Thus, integration means the acquisition of rights and access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendants: .

Rights can be used and positions and statuses can be taken up only if immigrants actively participate in certain learning and socializing processes. In relation to these preconditions of participation, integration refers to processes of individual cognitive, cultural, behavioural, and attitudinal change: . Acculturation primarily concerns immigrants and their descendants, but it is an interactive, mutual process that changes the receiving society as well.

The membership of immigrants in the private sphere of a new society is reflected in their personal relations and group membership (social intercourse, friendships, marriages, participation in voluntary associations): .

The degree to which immigrants feel like they are members in a new society is manifested in feelings of belonging and identification, particularly in the form of ethnic and/ or national identification: .

Thus, integration means an acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a change in individual characteristics, a building of social relations, and a formation of feelings of belonging and identification by immigrants towards the receiving society. It is a process that depends on a number of conditions relative to a host society's so-called "openness" to a new group of people. A "successful" or progressing integration process might also be characterized by increasing similarity in living conditions and ethnic-cultural orientations between immigrants and natives, and by a decrease in ethnic stratification. Before we start our analysis of migrant youth integration in Germany, we shall give an overview of the demographics of migration into Germany since World War II.

1.2. DEMOGRAPHICS OF MIGRATION

Large scale migration movements have occurred in Germany since the end of World War II. Between 1945 and the early 1950s, about 12 million German refugees and expellees arrived in the four allied occupied zones from former German territories or from German ethnic minority settlements in south-eastern and eastern Europe, and from the Soviet Union. Moreover, prior to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, 3.8 million people migrated from East to West Germany. Figure 1 shows the number of people who migrated to Germany between 1990 and 2003, as well as the number of people who re-emigrated or left the country.

Figure 1: Immigration - Emigration, Germany, 1990-2003



Source: efms, 2004.

Immigration has always been accompanied by simultaneous processes of return migration or emigration. A huge "coming and going" occurred: over the last 35 years, about 33 million cases of immigration to Germany and about 23 million cases of emigration have been recorded, leading to a net gain of about 9.7 million between 1959 and 2002 (Federal Statistics, 2004). With the exception of some short periods, Germany has always experienced a net gain of migrants. Because fertility levels have been below reproduction level since the mid-1960s, population increase since then has been totally due to immigration. It should be noted that integration is an issue of major significance with regards to migrants with the possibility of staying and living in Germany, much less so for most asylum seekers and present day temporary labour migrants (seasonal workers or contract workers, for example).

Whereas migration in the late 1940s and early 1950s was closely related to the Second World War and its consequences, migration in the late 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s was largely the result of labour market processes. The combination of high economic growth with internal labour shortages led to a continuous and increasing recruitment of foreign workers, until 1973. Due to rising unemployment rates at the beginning of the 1970s, in 1973 the general recruitment of foreign guest workers came to an end. After 1973, family reunion processes occurred on a large scale and have, since then, become another major source of immigration to Germany. Ethnic Germans from south-eastern and eastern Europe (*Spätaussiedler*) are also a group whose migration intensified in the 1990s, during which time more than 2 million people arrived in Germany following the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Since the 1950s, about 4 million *Aussiedler* and *Spätaussiedler* have arrived, very few of whom have ever returned to eastern Europe.

Asylum seekers and refugees make up two other large groups of migrants: about 1.8 million people asked for asylum in Germany in the 1990s, while the total number of asylum seekers between 1959-2000 is of 3.02 million asylum (ibidem). War refugees, so-called contingent refugees, and Jewish people from former Soviet territories form additional groups of migrants. Figure 2 shows the different forms of migration to Germany at the beginning of the new millennium. The size of the symbols roughly represents the size of these groups.

Figure 2: Forms of Migration to Germany



This illustration only gives a rough approximation of the scale of the various migration types. For more details please cf. the following paragraphs and tables.

Source: efms, 2004.

Ethnic Germans, family members, temporary labour migrants, asylum seekers, and EU migrants are the main groups of people that have come to Germany in recent years.

The size of the "integration problem" can be roughly estimated from the present size of the foreign population in Germany (Table 1). The figures are imprecise and overestimate present integration needs in that they do not directly indicate the kind

and degree of integration already achieved: there are foreigners who have integrated very well, and foreigners who have not. On the other hand, the figures also underestimate integration needs because they do not record the immigrant ethnic German population, whose integration requires similar efforts as that of other immigrant groups.

Table 1: Foreign Population in Germany (1997-2002)

Year	Total Population	Foreign Population	Foreign Population (%)	Change in Foreign Population (%)
1997	82,057,400	7,365,833	9.0	-
1998	82,037,000	7,319,593	8.9	-0.6
1999	82,163,500	7,343,591	8.9	+0.3
2000	82,259,500	7,296,817	8.9	-0.6
2001	82,440,400	7,318,628	8.9	+0.3
2002	82,536,700	7,335,592	8.9	+0.2

Source: 2004 Migration Report of the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration: 146.

The numbers of the stock of immigrants, as presented in Table 1, show that the total number of foreigners living in Germany has changed only slightly since the mid 1990s. The share of foreigners compared to the total population was recorded at a constant of 8.9% in the time period presented above. In absolute numbers, that amounts to approximately 7.3 million foreigners.

1.2.1. Research groups of interest in the Present Study

Due to their group size and statistical relevance, two migrant groups have been selected for in-depth analysis: second-generation labour migrants whose parents immigrated to Germany from recruiting countries in the late 1950s and 1960s, and young ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, most of whom came to Germany in the 1990s.

The Second Generation The term "second generation" refers to young people whose parents immigrated to Germany before they were born or were of school age. Second generation migrants in Germany might hold either a foreign or German citizenship. Special emphasis is hereby put on the second generation migrants of the two largest groups: those of either Yugoslav or Turkish background.

Table 2: Share of Foreign Nationals Born in Germany, 31 December 2000

	Total Population		0-18 Years		0-35 Years	
Country of Nationality	**Number (in 1,000s)**	**Of Whom Born in Germany (%)**	**Number (in 1,000s)**	**Of Whom Born in Germany (%)**	**Number (in 1,000s)**	**Of Whom Born in Germany (%)**
Turkey	1,998.5	37.4	616.7	86.8	1,322.5	56.4
Yugoslavia*	1,106.2	19.4	253.0	55.3	617.7	34.5
Italy	619.1	28.2	116.1	81.1	314.3	52.7
Greece	365.4	26.6	61.9	75.6	184.6	51.2
Portugal	133.7	18.9	22.2	67.9	71.9	35.0
Spain	129.5	24.2	11.4	84.7	55.6	51.6
All Foreigners	7,296.8	22.1	1,542.4	68.5	4,125.7	37.4

Source: Federal Statistical Office (on request); own calculations.
*Includes Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia.

Since neither second or third generation migrants are a category in official statistics in Germany, only a rough estimate of their number is possible. A first indicator is the share of foreign nationals born in Germany in relation to all residents of a particular nationality, as most second generation migrants still hold their parents' citizenship.

Almost a quarter of all foreign nationals living in Germany at the end of 2000 were born in the country and therefore belong to the second or third generation. This is true for more than two thirds of persons under the age of 18 and for over one third of persons between 18 and 35 years of age. The largest percentage of second and third generation migrants (86.8%) can be found among Turkish nationals under 18. By the end of 2002, 7.34 million foreigners lived in Germany, 1.91 million (26.1%) of whom held Turkish nationality (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003). Consequently, Turks represent – and have represented, since the early 1970s – the largest group of foreigners.

These figures only indicate the minimum number of second and third generation migrants in Germany. Naturalized persons and those who were not born in Germany but immigrated before school entry age are not included in the figures. There is quite a lot of statistical material and literature on young foreigners, and there is intense discussion about – for example – their educational failures and achievements, but all this is often mentioned without taking into consideration the generational status of people being examined and the increasing number of naturalizations, especially in the second generation.

Ethnic German Immigrants (*Aussiedler*) According to §4 Par.3 BVFG (Federal Law on Displaced Persons), *Aussiedler* are legally considered as Germans according to Art.116 of the Basic Law. Legally speaking, they must either be German

nationals or of German descent and to be living in one of the areas recognised in the BFVG as German settlement areas. According to the 1993 Law on Resolving the Long-term Effects of World War II (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz), most *Aussiedler* are former residents of territories that fell within the borders of the former Soviet Union. In 1993 and, later, in 1998, a quota was imposed on migration inflows of *Aussiedler* (following an amendment to the BFVG and a federal law on debt reduction that came into force on 22 December 1999). Since then, the Federal Administrative Office (Bundesverwaltungsamt) responsible for the admission of *Aussiedler* is no longer entitled to issue more entry permits than were granted in 1998 (i.e. a total of 103,080 persons including applicants and family members).

Table 3: Immigration of *Spätaussiedler* by Country of Origin: 1990-2002

	Poland	Former USSR	Former Yugosl.[1]	Romania	Former CSSR[2]	Other[3]	Hungary	Total
1990	133,872	147,950	961	111,150	1,708	96	1,336	397,073
1991[4]	40,129	147,320	450	32,178	927	39	952	221,995
1992	17,742	195,576	199	16,146	460	88	254	230,565
1993	5,431	207,347	120	5,811	134	8	37	218,888
1994	2,440	213,214	182	6,615	97	3	40	222,591
1995	1,677	209,409	178	6,519	62	10	43	217,898
1996	1,175	172,181	77	4,284	14	6	14	177,751
1997	687	131,895	34	1,777	8	0	18	134,419
1998	488	101,550	14	1,005	16	3	4	103,080
1999	428	103,599	19	855	11	0	4	104,916
2000	484	94,558	0	547	18	6	2	95,615
2001	623	97,434	17	380	22	6	2	98,484
2002	553	90,587	4	256	13	0	3	91,416

Source: Federal Administrative Office (Bundesverwaltungsamt), Federal Ministry of the Interior

[1] Includes Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.

[2] Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic, now divided into Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

[3] "Other countries" plus inflows to Germany via a third country.

[4] Figures after 1 January 1991 are for East and West Germany together

Due to the rising number of inter-ethnic marriages in the countries of origin, the ratio between *Aussiedler* and their accompanying family members has reversed: from slightly more than 77% in 1993, they dropped to about 22% in 2001. Consequently, the great majority of immigrants today accompany non-German family members. On arrival in Germany, they too are entitled to receive German citizenship[1] and have the same legal entitlements as *Aussiedler*. In 2002, approximately 91,400 persons entered Germany as *Aussiedler* (see Table 3). Since 1950, respective inflows of Aussiedler and accompanying family members have amounted to more than 4.2 million persons.

1.3 POLITICAL AND SOCIETAL DEFINITION OF THE IMMIGRATION SITUATION

Definitions of the situation are central to how individuals and groups act. They are far from being "given" or static. With regards to general, collective definitions, different social camps often compete and struggle for the power to define situations and thus influence social and societal action. Migration is a good example of this. For a long time, there has been a struggle in Germany about the "nature" of the migration processes. " (Germany is not an immigration country) is one slogan that has been used to define the long-standing German situation, but another camp has said exactly the opposite: "" (Germany is an immigration country). Different definitions of the situation have a determining influence on the kinds and quality of integration policies: if, for example, political actors do not believe that there actually is immigration taking place, they will not - like "classical" immigration countries - create institutions and make laws to receive people from abroad as future citizens.

When the active recruitment of foreign workers began in 1955 (increasing rapidly after 1961), no group involved in the process perceived or defined the situation as other than temporary: not the employers, the trade unions, the state that was sending and receiving workers, not even the "guest workers" themselves. Everyone believed in the temporary nature of the employment and in a kind of "rotation system" whereby new workers would substitute those who returned home. What was later called the "myth of return" was not totally a myth.

The "rotation system" functioned only in part for two reasons. Firstly, employers wanted to keep workers who had been trained and socialised. They did not want to continuously have to organise mechanisms to train and socialize newcomers into the company, or put efforts into the general acculturation of newly arrived foreign workers. Secondly, the workers began

[1] On receiving their entry certificate, *Aussiedler* and accompanying family members (spouses and children) are automatically granted German citizenship. This amendment to the Citizenship Law (§7 *StAG*) took effect on 1 August 1999 and exempted this group from regular naturalization procedures.

to develop ties to German society on several levels, so that while they kept thinking they would return to their country of origin, they would repeatedly postpone concrete plans for such a return (Heckmann, 1981).

During the "guest worker" recruitment period, which lasted until 1973, integration into German society was not a factor determining people's perceptions of the situation. Partial accommodation for a temporary stay was all that was needed. The end of worker recruitment in 1973 was intended to lead to a decrease of the foreign population, but, to the surprise of politicians and the public the opposite happened: the foreign population increased due to family reunification trends. By the 1970s, temporary migration began to develop into a settlement phenomenon (Ibidem), at the same time that similar processes were taking place in other European countries (Schnapper, 1992: 127-134). A new definition of the situation was needed. In view of a shrinking labour demand and faced with a largely unwanted immigration flow of family members, the following formula appeared: "" (Germany is not an immigration country). It became, paradoxically, the official governmental definition of the immigration situation. Basically, it meant that the Federal Republic continued to regard the presence of foreign migrants as temporary and the recruitment of workers from abroad as an exception and as something of the past that should not happen again. This formula has been - with somewhat shifting meanings - the official governmental guideline on migration policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

If this denial of an immigration situation was one reaction to the new situation in the mid 1970s, another response was the beginning of a discourse on integration and of concrete policies to address the phenomenon, for there was also the realisation that denial could not result in the total lack of an integration policy. One of the most important steps was the inclusion of migrants into the welfare state system. Churches, welfare organisations, as well as trade unions began to turn their attention to the living conditions and socio-economic opportunities of "foreigners". The state responded to this development with the institutionalisation of a "Commissioner for Foreigners" in 1978. The foundation of this office confirmed integration as a matter in need of attention and definition (Mahnig, 1998: 53) – a welfare state and a democracy that respected human rights could not ignore the needs of an increasingly large portion of its population.

Recognising the need for integration while also sticking to the idea that Germany was not really an immigration country resulted in an ambiguous definition of the situation: "Germany is not an immigration country" embodied contemporary doubts about the legitimacy of foreigners' presence and an attitude of non-acceptance. To complicate matters further, integration policies (particularly those that promoted the inclusion of immigrants into the general welfare institutions), reinforced ties between foreigners and the host country. The paradoxical nature of German policies towards its foreign population throughout the 1980s and 1990s found expression in official guidelines published by the federal government in "" (Integration, controlled access, support for voluntary return) (see for example Bundesministerium des Innern, 1997: 5).

The year 2000 saw another major change in the societal definition of the immigration situation. While in 1999 the new coalition government – composed by the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and the Green Party – had given up the old formula "Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland", the conservative opposition – CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and CSU (Christian Socialist Union) – undertook a major revision of their position. The CSU, for instance, changed its position from being the most ardent opponent and critic of immigration to adopting a new formula ("Germany is not a classical immigration country") according to which Germany was a country that needed "Zuwanderung" (migration inflows) for demographic and labour market reasons. This clearly opened the doors for a new societal definition of the immigration situation so that, while the view that immigration was a burden had dominated the debate until 2000, over time the tone changed and (qualified) immigrants were increasingly seen as a resource.

This change was due to two interconnected developments. Firstly, there was an improvement in the labour market: the level of unemployment decreased but labour shortages in some areas, particularly in the IT sector, started to become more pronounced. It was Chancellor Schröder who suggested a so-called "Green Card" for recruiting IT specialists from abroad in his opening speech at the Cebit computer fair in Hannover in March 2000. The suggestion received strong support from business leaders and the media, and contributed to changing the "climate" of the immigration discourse. Secondly, two demographic studies were published, and both received high-level attention from the media: the United Nations' report on "Replacement Migration: a Solution to Declining and Aging Populations?"; the other contained the long-term population projections issued by the German Federal Office of Statistics. Both studies forecast a dramatic aging and shrinking of the native population over the upcoming 30-50 years, and stirred a broad-ranging and on-going debate on the possibilities of "replacement migration". Both studies regarded immigration as one strategy (among many) for coping with the social and economic consequences of current demographic trends.

1.4 THE NEW IMMIGRATION ACT

During 2000 and 2001, considerable efforts were once again made to reform asylum and migration policies. Important organisations (political parties, charitable organizations, churches, etc) made suggestions, ranging from recommendations to very comprehensive concepts, on how to reform immigration polices. Basically, however, the suggestions were influenced by one of two propositions. The first was that, due to the globalization of the economy, Germany needed to secure

its productivity, innovation capabilities, and skilled labour. The second was that Germany was going to have to confront a significant demographic aging process and a decrease of its population.

The Independent Commission "Immigration" that was set up by the Federal Government and chaired by former president of the federal parliament Rita Süssmuth (CDU), presented a concept for immigration and integration on 4 July 2001. This concept was agreed upon by all important social groups in Germany and parts of it were used by the federal government as a basis for drafting a new immigration law. But before the Federal Government could introduce this draft to parliament, general consent was jeopardized again. The government and the opposition disagreed on the strategies that should be applied ahead of the impending national and state-level elections. And while federal ministers finally agreed on the draft for an immigration act on 7 November 2001, this draft was rejected by the CDU and CSU parties. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, work on the new immigration act was interrupted by consultations on so-called "legislative security measures". In early 2002, the anti-terrorist laws came into force and work on the immigration act continued.

In the meantime, the various parties had still not come to an agreement on the contents of the new immigration act, which meant that the act was only passed by the federal parliament thanks to favourable votes by the government coalition. Three weeks later, the law was also approved by the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament), but under very controversial circumstances due to disagreements between the Bundesrat and the coalition parties of the federal state of Brandenburg (represented by Prime Minister Manfred Stolpe, SPD, and Interior Minister Jörg Schönbohm, CDU); the two groups voted differently, thus blocking the measure. Bundesrat President Klaus Wowereit (SPD) asked the parties to re-state their vote and took the "yes" voiced by Prime Minister Stolpe to mean that he approved the law on behalf of his federal state[2] – the immigration act was finally passed by the Bundesrat. However, those federal states that were governed by CDU and CSU representatives announced the submission of legal proceedings with the federal constitutional court to challenge the decision; on 18 December 2002, the federal constitutional court agreed with this view and declared the law void for contravening Article 78 of the Basic Law.

In 2003, the government restarted the legislative process and again introduced the immigration act to the federal parliament and the Bundesrat. After it was rejected again by the Bundesrat in June 2003, the federal government established a parliamentary mediation committee. In eleven rounds of consultations, the mediation committee dealt with the topics of family reunion, labour immigration, and gender-specific persecution. After almost one year of consultations, government and coalition representatives finally agreed upon a legal text in June 2004. The new Immigration Act was passed by the federal parliament on 1 July and by the Bundesrat on July 9. This marked the first time an immigration act was passed since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. The first part of the Act came into force on 1 September 2004.

The new Act contains certain novelties. The Act now provides for only two residence titles: the limited residence permit and the unlimited settlement permit. Highly-qualified persons can be granted permanent residence and even nationals of states acceding to the European Union are permitted access to the labour market for qualified employment. The previous dual procedure (for residency and work permits) has been simplified so that the foreigners' office can issue work permits and residence permit in one go. Furthermore, as of 2005, new immigrants and resident migrants with insufficient command of the German language are obliged to attend integration courses consisting of two modules: a German language course and a civic education course. If new immigrants fail to attend the courses, the new Immigration Act imposes sanctions on residency rights. Foreigners already living in Germany are also obliged to attend the courses, although, in reality, these cannot always be provided. Non-compliance with the obligation to attend integration courses is to be punished with a reduction in social benefits for the duration of a person's non-attendance. It should be noted that the cost of integration courses, estimated at about 260 million euro each year, is borne by the federal government.

1.5. THE NEW CITIZENSHIP BILL

In May 1999, a new citizenship law was passed by the . The fact that the law became effective on 1 January 2000, on the cusp of the new millennium, underlines the almost revolutionary character of the law, which introduced the principle of "ius soli" or "law of the land". This principle is based on an idea of belonging that is tied to birth on German soil (as opposed to a concept based on lineage, embodied in the principle of "ius sanguinis"); it eases naturalization and, to some degree, tolerates double citizenship. Thus, the fact of living in the same society and on the same territory, and not just descent, are recognized as criteria for inclusion.

The new Citizenship Bill has been extremely controversial. A first version of the law foresaw a broad acceptance of double citizenship, against which the conservative opposition launched a successful public campaign which gathered millions of

[2] In the German legislative proceedings important laws have to be voted on by both parliamentary chambers (*Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*). The Bundestag (federal parliament) is the first and most important chamber and consists of the politicians elected in the national elections. The *Bundesrat* consists of representatives of the governments and parliaments of the federal states. Only if the law is voted for by a majority of both chambers it comes into force, after being signed by the federal president.

signatures. The campaign succeeded because it mobilised people on the basis of prejudice, but also because of a feeling among Germans that foreigners would be unduly privileged. The campaign led to the restriction of double citizenship: persons entitled to German citizenship through "ius soli" provisions in addition to another citizenship by descent must opt for one or the other sometime between the ages of 18 and 23. The big controversy over double citizenship actually left the truly radical part of the law, namely the introduction of "ius soli," almost unnoticed. Interestingly enough, what the conservative opposition was suggesting as an alternative to "ius soli" was not so different from this territorial principle anyway. Their concept was called “Einbürgerungszusicherung” and it aimed to give newly born children of foreigners a paper guaranteeing them citizenship at the age of 18 and giving them the unconditional right to live in the country until then. The non-ethnic and republican content of the new law also lies in defining citizenship as one's adherence to the constitutional order. Naturalized persons have to sign a declaration that they do, in fact, choose to abide by that order.

Finally, whereas the ethnic nation concept tends to see ethnic-national belonging as a kind of primordial tie, the new law explicitly understands its regulations as an instrument for the integration of immigrants. The old view, still propagated by the CDU/CSU opposition, views naturalization as the concluding act of a successful process of integration. By the end of the 20th century, both the definition of the immigration situation and the traditional concept of nation had changed. Implied in this development is the creation of new possibilities for immigrants' inclusion in society and the nation.

2. THE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. GENERATIONAL INTEGRATION POLICIES AND THE INCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS

General integration policies are those policies that the modern welfare state "normally" applies in order to favour the integration of both Germans and immigrants alike. Clearly the single most important aspect of integration policies towards migrants is the inclusion of immigrants in these general integration policies. We shall first discuss aspects of structural integration (labour market, education, vocational training); then, we will proceed to cultural integration; finally, we will deal briefly with social and identificational integration. As mentioned earlier, structural policies are understood as measures aimed at easing access into society's core institutions.

2.1.1. Structural Integration Policies The first treaty for the recruitment of Italian guest workers was signed in 1955. It implied a major decision and the relevance of it for the inclusion of migrants cannot be overestimated: in a corporatist agreement, the Federal Labour Office, employers, and trade unions decided to recruit workers and employ them under the same conditions – in terms of wages, health insurance, unemployment and pension benefits – as German workers. Wage dumping or the dumping of social security standards was to be avoided by including the foreign workers in the welfare system (Heckmann, 1988). Additional and similar recruitment treaties were signed with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.

Thus, from the very beginning, the labour market has been the prime area of integration. Today there are practically no legal barriers to the labour market for foreigners who live in Germany legally. Exceptions to this general rule apply to asylum seekers and to the spouses of non-EU foreigners who come to Germany under family reunion regulations. Asylum seekers were, until recently, allowed to work only after their status had been recognized and after they had received asylum. A new regulation, dated 1 January 2001, however, allows asylum seekers to start working after their case has lasted one year. The husbands and wives of foreigners who have come to Germany to be with their spouses also get access to the labour market, but after three years. Another employment restriction is that foreigners normally cannot hold civil servant positions (''). With "ius soli" and the easing in naturalisation conditions, this restriction will gradually lose some of its impact.

Despite a labour market that is generally open to foreign residents, the unemployment rate of foreigners is around 20%, about twice as high as that of Germans. Hence, foreigners are seen as one of the labour market's "problem groups". As a response to this problem, Germany has instituted extensive vocational training and retraining programmes under the Labour Qualification Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz), in addition to other special programmes. In recent years, for example, the federal government JUMP programme, which received 1 billion euro in funding in 2000, was designed for young people under 25. All these programmes of vocational training and retraining are open to people on the basis of criteria that do not include citizenship.

Interestingly, while "guest workers" came to Germany to find employment, their visa documents explicitly stated that self-employment was not permitted. Gradually, however, legal barriers to self-employment for foreigners - including non-EU citizens - have been removed. While there were very few self-employed people in the first 20 years of migration to Germany, the last 20 years have seen a dramatic change. Today, the rate of self-employment among economically active migrants is fast approaching that of the German population (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe Ausländerintegration, 1999: 155).

The Education System The federal states are the main actors in educational policy, although co-ordination efforts on a national level are regularly undertaken by the Kultursministerkonferenz. In 1964, this Conference of the Ministers of

Education took basic decisions for the educational policy affecting migrant children. One major decision was that the children of "guest workers" should be obliged to attend school. No such obligation exists, however, for pre-school attendance (be they children of German or of foreign citizens), despite the fact that several studies have shown the positive effect that pre-school or kindergarten attendance has on immigrant children's school performance (Esser, 1990). Nonetheless, state policy at all levels of government has been to increase the number of kindergarten facilities; at the moment, almost every child aged 4-6 is able find a place in a kindergarten in Germany.

The 1964 decisions were taken in the belief that guest workers' children should be integrated into the regular school system and that, if necessary, preparatory and parallel German language training should be provided for them in addition to voluntary tuition in special courses in their mother languages after regular classes. The rationale guiding these decisions was based on the desire to avoid social problems with a population that would temporarily live in Germany. Exceptions to this system are the so-called national or bilingual classes in Bavaria and the rather large system of private Greek schools in several German cities.

In the past, Germany did not understand itself to be an immigration society and thus gave schools the explicit job of integrating ("assimilating") the children of immigrants, with the intention of avoiding social problems. As a result of the "unofficial curriculum" of the schools always has been and continues to be focused on acculturation and integration.

Occupational and Vocational Training There are two major qualification systems in Germany: the college-university system of higher education and the vocational training system. Both systems are open to non-German citizens. Increasingly, the children of migrants have been moving into the higher system of education, but their proportion is still far below that of German children of the same age. The large majority of first generation migrants come from working class backgrounds and are employed in jobs that demand few or only basic qualifications, which is why it is realistic to assume that only a minority of their children will move directly into higher education. And since the labour markets of the future will have fewer and fewer positions for unqualified people, it is essential that the large majority of these children get access to the vocational training system.

The German vocational training system has a special feature called the "dual system". This means that the training consists of apprenticeship and, parallel to that, academic preparation in special schools. Beside the dual system, there is also a system of vocational schools without apprenticeships. In comparing the integration policies of several European countries in 1990, Entzinger noticed that in Germany "special efforts have been made to attract more second generation youth to apprenticeships" (Entzinger in Faist, 1993). Efforts to increase the number of apprenticeships were and are largely made through corporatist arrangements. "Since the early 1970s, state representatives, unions, and employers have cooperated to regulate issues such as the number of apprenticeship occupations, pay rates, and revisions of curricula ... The strength of the corporate arrangements is that it has coped rather successfully with the under supply of training slots in the dual system from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s" (Faist, 1993: 317).

Currently, it is difficult for young people to find apprenticeships, since most employers not only want a school diploma but also decent grades. And because of the disadvantaged position that immigrant children continue to face in the educational system, there are substantially fewer migrant children in apprenticeship positions compared to Germans. Notwithstanding students in higher education, for example, studies have shown that while 65% of Germans aged 18-20 follow some kind of apprenticeship program, the percentage for non-Germans of the same age group is of only 33% (Jeschek, 1998: 4). While 33% may indeed seem rather low, the percentage has, in fact, grown steadily over time. Statistically speaking, differentiating between Germans and non-Germans means to put youth who were born and socialized in Germany into the same category as those who came to Germany at a later stage in their lives due to family reunion, family asylum, or temporary protection status. The European Forum for Migration Studies' own research in the framework of the EFFNATIS (Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies towards Second Generation Migrant Youth) project has shown that generational status makes a big difference and that comparing immigrant children with other immigrant children improves the picture. In addition, the number of migrant youth in full-time vocational schools without apprenticeship has also increased continuously over the past 30 years.

What are the others, who are not in the "regular system", doing? Are they working in jobs that demand no professional training or are they unemployed? In fact, most of them are neither working nor registered as unemployed, but are participating in publicly-financed training courses. These courses have been designed especially for those without an apprenticeship or without a place in the vocational training system. The competition for apprenticeships - at least attractive apprenticeships - is quite tough, since demand for these positions far outweighs supply. Although the system of preparatory or substitutive measures in vocational training has not been expressly designed for migrant children, it is open to them as German residents and is of particular importance for their integration.

One type of measure, which has been implemented within the vocational school system, is also used to train people in the dual (vocational/ professional) system. There are two basic courses, each lasting 12 months: the "Berufsvorbereitungsjahr", or pre-apprenticeship programme, which is designed to improve basic general skills; and the "Berufsgrundbildungsjahr", or

basic vocational training, which is more specific in terms of vocational training and counts as one year of apprenticeship within the scheme of a longer-term apprenticeship position. Another type of measure (Ausbildungsvorbereitende Maßnahmen) consists of courses of 2-11 months that prepare people for vocational training: they include motivation courses, courses for learning basic skills (including linguistic skills), courses for disabled people, and support for employers who train employees. In the future, it is expected that vocational training and other support measures for apprentices will be provided by publicly-financed firms to help young trainees pass exams; among them, there will, of course, be many immigrant youth. Training programmes that are specifically designed for immigrants will be described in the next section on special integration policies.

Welfare State Policies and the Inclusion of Immigrants From the very beginning of their recruitment, foreign workers and their families have been integrated into the welfare state's social security system with the same rights as natives: they have had access to pension funds, health insurance, unemployment and accident insurance, and, recently, insurance for intensive care (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1998: 64). Immigrants are entitled to tax reductions for children and receive benefits for each child. Depending on the parents' income, citizens and non-citizens alike are entitled to student loans and financial support for other forms of education and occupational training. Most foreigners are also entitled to welfare benefits in case of poverty. As a matter of fact, while 30 out of 1000 Germans receive such benefits, 90 out of 1,000 foreigners do (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe, 1999: 214).

2.1.2 Cultural Integration Policies

The cultural dimension of integration is a process that encompasses the learning of cognitive abilities and knowledge of a society's culture. Language is of major importance here. Cultural integration also includes the internalization of values, norms, attitudes, and the formation of belief systems. Since children of immigrants are usually incorporated into the general school system in Germany, they are subject to the socialising and acculturation effects of the general school system. The decision to expose immigrant children to the same influences that Germans are was a conscious one, right from the very beginning. In that sense, there has always been a policy of acculturation in schools that did not affect the first generation of migrants, who did not, in general, participate in the major socialising institutions of society. Most of their (partial) acculturation occurred at the workplace.

Policies affecting religion also play a role in the cultural and "ideological reproduction" of society, despite Germany's self-definition as a secular state. The role played by Christian churches and Jewish institutions is defined in the law and through tradition, and it includes a certain influence in the educational system: for example, through the institutionalisation of religious instruction in the school curriculum. No such role has been granted, as yet, to Islam, the most prominent religion among immigrants.

Traditionally, the integration of a certain religion in German culture occurs through the establishment of a treaty between a religion's representative body and the state. The problem with the institutional integration Islam is that there is no body capable of legitimately acting as a negotiating party with the state. Currently, there are 2,200 Islamic mosque organisations in Germany and at least 13 federations, several of which claim to represent the interests of all Muslims (Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 1999: 119). Nonetheless, a process that could result in the institutionalisation of Islam in accordance with traditional patterns is underway. As early as 1985, the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia introduced the teaching of Islam by Islamic teachers under the supervision of the state government. The federal state of Hessen is proceeding in a similar direction. Recently, a high court in Berlin ruled that Islam should be treated in the same way that Christian churches and Jewish institutions are treated, and has allowed an Islamic federation to start organising the teaching of religion in Berlin's public schools. In sum, however, the relationship between the German State and Islam's representatives is still being clarified.

2.1.3. Social Integration Policies

While it is certainly true that a modern, democratic nation state does not determine the structure of private relations in a free society, certain basic political decisions and state structures do have an influence on private relations. The influence is weakest among the first generation of migrants, the vast majority of whom maintain private social relations within the ethnic group. As for the children of immigrants, the most important influence determining social integration is exerted through schools and occupational training institutions, for these represent major opportunities for immigrant and German children to establish social relations and friendships. The influence of these institutions is all the stronger during the first five years of schooling, since parents are obliged by law to send their children to elementary schools in the area where they reside; people have to use tricks to evade this rule.

Unfortunately, the integrating effect of the territorial principle that governs where children are sent to school might be counteracted by ethnic housing segregation practices. Despite prominent examples that show the contrary (like Kreuzberg in Berlin or Wilhelmsburg in Hamburg), urban policies that aim at avoiding large ethnic concentrations and "ghettoes" have proven successful: municipalities are, in fact, obliged by law and government orders to avoid concentrating migrants in public housing (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe, 1999: 211-212). As a result of such regulations, ethnic housing segregation seems to be rather low in Germany, especially when compared to other countries.

While it is true that the general mode of integration in a society includes both state and private actors, the area of social integration is a field where private actors play the major role. With regards to immigrants' membership in clubs and associations, a complex picture emerges. On the one hand, such clubs play a very central role in ethnic communities and are an expression of each group's cultural and social "autonomy". On the other hand, opening immigrant access to similar associations in the receiving society and increasing immigrants' perception of these as opportunities for common interaction may contribute to reducing social distance between groups (especially between immigrants and non-immigrants).

Sports clubs are by far the most important category of private organizations for integration purposes in German society. The Deutsche Sportbund (Federation of German Sports Organisations), which has more that 20 million members, decided (as early as 1981) to recommend its members to lobby for the membership of "foreigners" in "regular" sports clubs and not to favour the organization of sporting activities on the basis of ethnic affiliation (Bammel and Becker, 1985). This does not mean, however, that ethnic sports clubs are not accepted in the Deutsche Sportbund. Integration through sports clubs, and in particularly soccer clubs, has become a most important field of establishing social relations between the children of international migrants and German children, as well as between their respective parents.

2.1.4. Identificative Integration Policies

Identificative integration policies as part of the general mode of nation state integration include a variety of practices to foster subjective feelings of belonging to the nation and nation state. Political socialization, the teaching of history, the celebration of certain historical events, the internalization of symbols, and the development of particular emotions can be examples of general ways to promote identificative integration among the population. A head of state's role in modern nations is also quite central for identification processes.

In Germany, there has been a tendency to define national belonging through common ethnicity. This, of course, excludes foreign migrants, who have regarded the official denial of the de facto immigration situation in Germany as part of a continuous refusal to grant legitimacy to the "presence of foreigners" in the country. This has not invited feelings of identification. Unsurprisingly, surveys show very low degrees of identification with Germany among migrants (Schmidt and Weick, 1998: 4). Münz et al. report that only 11% of all migrants on the Socio-Economic Panel identified themselves as Germans (Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, 1997: 101). What was lacking, until recently, was a model of national belonging, a model of becoming and being German based on permanently living and working in the country that included migrants as well. The general mode of identificative nation state integration has not included foreign migrants but only the large group of migrants defined as "ethnic Germans" (*Spätaussiedler*).

On the whole identificative integration policies have not been wholly consistent. The approach described above is that of the Federal Government until 1998. And while other entities, including some federal states, municipalities, welfare organizations, churches, and NGOs, have also been active in leading campaigns supportive of increased naturalization rates, the Federal Government and the retain the most authority and influence in this area. Even during the 1994-1998 a majority of its members were in favour of changing naturalization rules, "coalition arithmetics" obstructed this majority. The new Citizenship Law of 1999 described in Section 1.5 has not only brought about substantial legal changes, it also aims to invite a greater degree of identification with a German nation that no longer perceives itself solely as an ethnic nation and is redefining itself according to more universal parameters. The Federal Government's current campaign to back the new citizenship law (*http://www.einbuergerung.de*) demonstrates this: a "foreign looking" couple, for example, is shown on a poster with the text "typical German"; another poster depicts a young boy of Turkish origin who is saying "" ("I am a Berliner").

2.2. SPECIAL INTEGRATION POLICIES

Special integration policies refer to measures and institutions that are explicitly and directly designed for immigrants and their children. Special integration policies imply the creation of new institutions or the differentiation and/or expansion of existing institutions. Some of the special measures and institutions can be clearly related to one of our central dimensions of integration, while others relate to several dimensions. The institution of a "Commissioner for Foreigners" (Ausländerbeauftragte/r) is an example of the latter kind, for it exists on the federal, state, and municipal levels. These "Commissioners for Foreigners" recently changed their names to "Commissioners for Integration"

(Integrationsbeauftragte). Commissioners can be addressed by individuals and groups for information and support, but they can also act on their own accord and take initiatives for the improvement of immigrants' opportunities. Moreover, commissioners collect data relative to immigration and integration, and inform politicians and the general public. The post of Federal Commissioner for Foreigners/Integration has always required particularly active incumbents in this respect. Starting with the first Federal Commissioner, Heinz Kühn, in 1978 and his courageous analysis "Germany has become an immigration country", the commissioners have also played a significant role in political discourse and in defining the immigration situation.

Foreigners' Commissions (Ausländerbeiräte), on the other hand, are elected bodies that work as a kind of substitute for the lack of political participation of non-citizen residents. In some federal states, members of these commissions have been appointed, but the large majority is elected - usually with a low voter turnout - in cities. They were devised to represent migrants' interests and to advise the mayor, the city counsellors, and the municipal administration on matters relating to immigration and integration.

Another special mechanism that cannot be related to only one dimension of integration but to several is the counselling for migrants by social workers (Ausländersozialberatung), with whom migrants may bring forth problems they are experiencing. Different welfare organisations are responsible for different nationalities and social workers usually either have the same nationality/ ethnic background as their clients or speak their language, at least. Continuing the tradition of foreigners' spiritual welfare work by the churches and refugee organizations, charitable organizations (especially Caritas, Diakonisches Werk, and Arbeiterwohlfahrt) were the first to offer a wide range of counselling services at the time of labour recruitment, mostly working with volunteers. Since 1970, the Federal Government and the federal states have continued to finance approximately 600 counselling offices with about 900 social workers (Bundesministerium des Innern 1998, 45). A new policy, however, aims at pushing for the increased integration of migrants into the general system of social work and counselling (Beauftragte 2000, 6). Gradually, the classical form of social counselling has become only one part of an extensive network of immigrant social work.

In the following sections we shall discuss special measures in the areas of structural, cultural, and social integration. Specific identificative policies will not be dealt with because so little has been done in this respect. One measure worth mentioning, however, is the campaign for the new citizenship law led by the Federal Government. It is not only aimed at the ethnic German population but could also be regarded as an invitation for greater identification among immigrants. The ceremonies that are carried out for new citizens on the occasion of their naturalisation in some cities could also be interpreted in this light (Berlin, Frankfurt, Bamberg).

2.2.1. Structural Integration: Special Measures

According to the German Constitution, the responsibility for the system of education in Germany lies with the individual federal states (federalist state structure). For that reason, there are no national, standardized legal regulations regarding the school attendance of migrants. A first comprehensive survey of the legal, organisational, and curricular regulation of school attendance by children with immigration backgrounds was carried out in 2001 and its results were published in "School Education for Children of Minorities in Germany 1989-1999" (Gogolin, Neumann, Reuter, 2001). The survey also deals with the particularities of the individual federal states, revealing that in all federal states supportive measures are offered for children and young people with immigration backgrounds. These measures vary greatly, however, with respect to their legal basis, target group, and organisational implementation[3]. The different strategies have been discussed in many federal states all the more since the results of the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) Study came out. Different types of measures for migrant children exist and are offered in almost all the federal states, with varying degrees of emphasis.

The pedagogical principle of "intercultural education" is another measure directed at promoting intercultural cohabitation in schools; in at least some federal states, this principle is currently receiving more attention, perhaps because it does not only target migrants but also German children.While special support classes[4] are generally found at the outset of primary education for beginners, they are also found in primary schools and secondary modern schools for so-called "newcomers

[3] As an example, mention could be made of a measure which is only offered in Bavaria for migrant children: the bilingual classes. In these classes, children are grouped together by mother tongue, which usually corresponds to the same nationality -- this is why the bilingual classes are sometimes referred to as "national classes". Teaching is carried out in the pupils' mother tongue and in German, but the proportion of German increases in the higher classes. Although transfer into regular classes is possible and (at least officially) desired, the pupils can actually continue attending these classes until the 9th year. In the early 1980's, approximately 40% of all migrant pupils in Bavaria attended such classes. Currently, there are only 188 bilingual classes (formerly 1,400), which are mainly attended by Turkish children. However, there are still 28 Greek, 16 Italian, 3 Croatian and 2 Serbo-Croatian classes (as of the 1996/97 academic year; cf. Neumann, 2001: 34). The reduction in the number of these classes is at least in part due to widespread criticism which accuses this class form of encouraging segregation. A complete abolition of these classes is not under discussion at the present, however. A similar segregation effect is seen in national schools that were established primarily for Greek pupils due to cooperation between Greek migrant organisations and the Greek government.

[4] The terminology used for this educational measure differs in the various federal states. For example, some states refer to preparatory classes or courses or transitional classes.

entering education at a later stage" (*Seiteneinsteiger*). In these classes, children and young people who have not yet reached an appropriate level due, for example, to their poor German skills, are prepared for transition to the regular classes. In these classes, they mainly learn German but also receive assistance with other subjects. After a year in these special classes, the students should be able to join regular classes, but the period of attendance may be reduced or, in exceptional cases, extended for a period of two years maximum. This model, which attempts to foster a form of teaching that is as integrated as possible with German and migrant pupils in regular classes, currently dominates - with minor differences - in all federal states.

If the formation of a special support class is not possible due to a low number of participants[5], then special instruction (support course, intensive course, etc.) is offered as an accompanying instrument. As with special support classes, learning German and receiving some instruction in other subjects, such as mathematics, is the main purpose of the teaching. Special instruction is conceived as a temporary measure to facilitate integration into the regular classes and to reach the level of the desired class. In order to establish such a measure, there must be a minimum number of pupils for each class. In primary and secondary modern schools in Baden-Württemberg, for example, at least four migrant pupils must have difficulties with German as the teaching medium or demonstrate poor knowledge in other subjects in order for special courses to be offered (cf. Schroeder, 2001: 14).

Measures for the Integration of Immigrants in Schools As already mentioned, there are regulations in all federal states for the provision of certain supportive measures intended for pupils of non-German origin. It is true that these measures are carried out with the intention of facilitating the integration of immigrant children and youth into the German education system, but they are rarely considered sufficient to achieve these objectives.

It is therefore not surprising that there are a number of additional measures within schools intended to assist immigrants on a daily basis. These initiatives are sometimes proposed by committed teachers, social workers, but also by the pupils' parents. One example of an initiative that has, for some time now, provided considerable support to non-German children is the Network of Regional Offices for Foreigners' Affairs (Netzwerk von Regionalen Arbeitsstellen für Ausländerfragen – RAA). Twenty-nine such offices have been established in West Germany and 17 facilities have been founded in the new federal states. These Regional Offices and other associated projects also cooperate on a federal level. Whereas organisations in West Germany mainly focus on fostering the integration of immigrant children and youth, the main emphasis in East Germany is on combating xenophobia and on measures for Intercultural Education (further tasks of the RAA are described at *http://www.raa.de*).

In addition to these larger networks, there are also a number of smaller initiatives that have managed to establish cooperations on the regional and municipal level. One project for the promotion of the integration of ethnic German youths (*Aussiedlerjugendliche*) was developed by the Parents' Initiative for Aussiedler (Aussiedler-Elterninitiative) and called "New People of Marzahn" ("Neue Marzahner"). The project was implemented at the Thuringia secondary school in Berlin-Marzahn and is financed by the federal schools inspector of Berlin. Its objective was to improve integration opportunities for young ethnic Germans in school as well as to provide them with assistance to transit into a vocational career. In addition, it aims to improve communication between locals and immigrants. These objectives are to be achieved through several measures: social training for youths, leisure time programs, assistance and support in cases of learning difficulties, accompaniment and assistance in the search of apprenticeships, and provision of an information course for parents called "Our School". Project activities are supported by a close network of youth and school social workers as well as by the Berlin-Nord Rotary Club and the Berlin-Gendarmenmarkt, as well as by the Foundation of Berlin Citizens (Bürgerstiftung Berlin). As a result of these efforts, the percentage of Russian-German pupils who graduated from secondary school was increased to 40% at the Thuringia secondary school, while in the rest of Berlin it is 4% (cf. Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2002: 15).

Measures for the Vocational Training of Immigrants There are a number of programmes that encourage disadvantaged youth to start vocational training courses, assist them in the search for apprenticeships, and support them during the vocational training. One of the difficulties with measures explicitly aimed at immigrant youths is that special needs (e.g. language deficits) cannot be addressed sufficiently well because the problems are very complex. For that reason, a number of measures are also directly addressed at youths of non-German origin. An example is the programme called "Promoting competences - Vocational qualification for target groups with special needs" (Kompetenzen fördern - Berufliche Qualifizierung für Zielgruppen mit besonderem Förderbedarf) that was developed by the Alliance for Labour, Qualification and Competitiveness (Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit) and is implemented by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. This programme includes four innovative areas, the fourth of which deals with the improvement of vocational qualification opportunities for migrants and, in particular, tries to increase the number of migrants participating in vocational qualification courses. The term "migrant" was deliberately used when formulating the fourth innovation area in order to include ethnic Germans as well as naturalised youths with migration background.

In particular, the programme aims at promoting networks, given that "experience shows that a fundamental improvement regarding the qualification situation of migrants can only be achieved if forces are joined locally" [own translation]

[5] As a general rule, special classes are created when an average of 10 children cannot immediately be integrated into regular classes.

(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2001c: 16). Modelled on the "Counselling Centres for the Qualification of Foreign Trainees" (Beratungsstellen zur Qualifizierung ausländischer Nachwuchskräfte, BQN)) that were successfully implemented in a pilot project, co-operation networks will be established nationwide with the objective of increasing the number of migrants in vocational qualification courses. The task of the counselling centres is not only to provide advice to migrant youths, but to also "function as central focal points and initiative centres on the regional/ local level for everything that might contribute to improving the qualification situation of migrants" [own translation] (Ibidem: 17). All relevant key organisations active in vocational training and migration work are expected to be included in the programme: vocational schools, administration and job centres, companies, educational institutions, migrant organisations, as well as migrant social workers. The activities of the local networks are to be supported and coordinated at the federal level, which is why an "Initiative Office for the Vocational Qualification of Migrants" (Initiativstelle Berufliche Qualifizierung von Migrantinnen und Migranten) was established at the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB).

Aside from measures that are explicitly aimed at youths, there are a number of measures in vocational training that aim to increase the number of companies run by migrants that offer apprenticeships, and these should also be mentioned here. One example is the project "Migrants Create Additional apprenticeships (Migranten schaffen zusätzliche Lehrstellen), which is funded by the Turkish Community in Schleswig-Holstein e.V. in Kiel.

2.2.2. Cultural Integration

Cultural integration has a cognitive side, but also includes the internalisation of values, norms, attitudes, and the formation of belief systems. In order to understand cultural integration as a mutual and interactive process, however, and not as a one-sided assimilation process, cultural integration policies have to give immigrants' cultures a place in the receiving country.

As more and more "guest workers" and their families settled in Germany during the 1970s, the Federal Government made a coordinated effort to systematically support language training for migrants by helping to found the "" in 1974 (since 2000 "Sprachverband Deutsch e.V."). This is a federation of about 500 institutes offering German language courses that have coordinated their programmes, their teaching methods, and certificates (Beauftragte, 1997: 45). Between 1975 and 1998, more than 1.32 million people took part in these courses and 484 million DM were provided by the Federal Government as financial support. Cultural integration measures geared toward meeting the cultural needs of immigrants are called "mother-tongue instruction". These courses are offered to immigrant children on a voluntary basis in afternoon classes. They are mostly financed by the federal states and have been organised in cooperation with the respective national consulates. It has been estimated that about one third of all migrant children take part in these classes (Kupfer-Schreiner, 1996).

Since the end of the 1990s, a new system for giving migrants language tutoring has been discussed among experts: the so-called Inclusive Language Concept (Gesamtsprachenkonzept). While the kind of language tuition imparted used to be determined by the legal status of the immigrant, it is expected that the individual's needs for learning German will become the decisive criteria. For that purpose, the three sources of federal funding (SGB III-courses by the Federal Labour Office, guarantee fund courses by the BMFSF, courses by the Federation of Institutes offering German language courses by the former BMA) are expected to be included in coordinated integration courses. It was decided at the federal level to start a period, in 2002, when the inclusive language concept would be tested in selected regions. The Federal Government also financed numerous model projects. The testing period served as a preparation for the implementation of the inclusive language concept by the time the Immigration Act came into force, in its previous form, on 1 January 2003.

Additional instruction in migrants' mother tongue is mainly offered in the western federal states, primarily for children from former "guest worker" recruitment countries. Exceptionally, Hamburg is currently the only federal state in Germany offering Romani as a school subject in seven schools (Open Society Institute, 2002: 146). In the eastern federal states, courses are occasionally offered in other languages, too (cf. Reuter, 2001: 114). Teaching in the mother tongue is primarily carried out by foreign teachers employed by the federal state in question. In other federal states, by contrast, teaching is offered by the consulates, albeit always within school buildings. While the initial aim of such teaching was to facilitate children's return to their home country, its socialisation function was later accepted. It is now generally assumed that promoting the mother tongue does not hinder the learning of German, but rather increases linguistic competence in general (cf. Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, 2001).

Public radio and television broadcast companies have offered special radio and television programmes since 1964, mostly in Italian, Greek, Spanish, Turkish, Croatian, and Serbo-Croatian. With the spread of cable and satellite television, these programmes are having an increasingly difficult time reaching their prospective audiences (Beauftragte, 1997: 80-81).

If cultural integration is considered a two-way process, then there must also be policies directed towards the native population. It is impossible to describe the many cultural activities that are related to migration and the culture of the different immigrant groups. We can only mention here the public media of radio and television that inform about or broadcast products of the culture of immigrant groups, immigrant cultures in school curricula, and the many "multicultural programmes of cities" that are not only produced for the migrant population but for a general public.

2.2.3. Social Integration

Special policies of social integration refer to measures of the state and of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) related to the development of "positive" personal social relations between the native population and immigrants (often called "intercultural relations") and to the increase of migrant membership in private associations. The reduction of prejudice and discrimination is part of this work. Churches and trade unions have made many efforts in this sense: in 1997, the Catholic and Protestant churches published a common memorandum on migration and integration that aims, among other things, to improve the level of migrants' social integration (Kirchenamt, 1997). For their part, the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB) and most independent unions also have offices and employ special staff to deal with the issue of migrants' integration. Many NGOs have been founded to carry out activities focused on social integration, and youth organisations receive support from the state if they try to integrate migrant youth organisations into their federation (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe, 1999: 182). Many organisations, including the Ministry of the Interior have led campaigns against xenophobia, ethnic prejudice, and racism. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the police and the judiciary have strongly intensified their efforts against right-wing extremism and racist crimes (Ibidem: 228).

Intercultural education was initially introduced within the framework of a "foreigners pedagogics (Ausländerpädagogik)", as a first, systematic approach to the consequences of migration for schooling. Whereas intercultural education used to be restricted to classes with a high percentage of migrant children, today it is increasingly seen as a cross-section duty of schools that is relevant to all subjects and all children (cf. Reuter, 2001: 118). However, since the teaching of intercultural education could take a wide variety of different forms in various curricula, the contents of the course continue to be largely up to the individual teacher. In this context, demands are repeatedly made to include intercultural education in teacher training (cf. Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2002). School textbooks that deal with various foreign cultures in different ways should also be integrated in general teaching practice, in accordance with the principles of intercultural education. Even though some progress has been made in this field since the 1970s, some textbooks (even, occasionally, their new editions) face repeated criticism for their alleged support of prejudices against certain ethnic groups (cf. Höpken, 1993; for example, or Poenicke, 2001).

Pre-school initiatives that also include children's parents have also proven to be effective. The best known initiative in this area is surely the HIPPY Programme (Home Instruction Program for Preschool Youngsters). HIPPY is an international approach that is now offered in many German cities (e.g. Berlin, Bremen, Munich, Nuremberg), mostly by charitable organisations. The programme comprises home assistance for non-German pre-school children aged 4-6 and their mothers. The mothers are encouraged to learn German at home with their children, firstly, in order to prepare them better for school and, secondly, in order to improve their own language skills. Experience has taught that it is often difficult to reach migrant women through measures that take place outside the home. For that reason, HIPPY counts on volunteer women (most of whom also have a migrant background and knowledge of an appropriate language) who are trained and supported by qualified experts of the funding organisation. The volunteer visits a mother participating in the program once a week. She brings teaching material for the following week and explains it. The mothers instruct their children about 15 minutes per day with the material provided by HIPPY. HIPPY is carried out in coherent learning units and consecutive learning steps that correspond with the development of the child and promote it in a lasting way. During the weekly meetings with the volunteer or in regular meetings with other mothers participating in the program, experiences can be exchanged and problems can be discussed. Consequently HIPPY, ideally, does not only improve the mothers' and children's language skills, but also promotes (additional) social contacts for the mothers. The long-term objective of the program is to improve the opportunities of a successful integration in school, vocational training, and in social relationships.

In 2001, the Intercultural Council (Interkultureller Rat) in Germany developed the idea to form Abrahamic Teams with Jewish, Christian and Muslim representatives who visit schools and public events. For this purpose, the Intercultural Council cooperates with administrative bodies, migrant and human rights organisations and other societal groups, and promotes dialogue among various groups. By the end of 2002, more than 50 Jewish, Christian, and Muslim persons volunteered to participate in such events. The european forum for migration studies (efms) carried out an evaluation of 5 to 7 events by the Abrahamic Teams. The emphasis of the evaluation was on the outcome as well as on the long-lasting effects with regard to the gradual reduction of anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic prejudices (*http://www.interkultureller-rat.de*)

New Policies for the Promotion of Equity Policies that promote social equity – like equal opportunities, affirmative action, or anti-discrimination measures – seem to be gaining weight in European discourse on special integration policies. Anti-discrimination measures, for instance, are foreseen by § 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty as a model for future policies. In Germany, there is a tradition of promoting policies in favour of equity of opportunity, particularly in relation to educational opportunities for working class children. This tradition has, however, only partially been expanded to children of international migrants. A lively political discourse on anti-discrimination laws is currently taking place in Germany. In 2000, two anti-discrimination directives were passed by the European Council which have to be translated into German law due to the supremacy of EU regulations over national ones. Yet, one effective measure against discrimination in car insurance was taken: an extra charge for foreigners - who have indeed a higher accident rate - was forbidden by law

(Beauftragte, 1997: 108). Affirmative action policies have been practised on the basis of gender within the SPD and the Green Party, but affirmative action policies have not as yet been introduced into the discussion of equal opportunities for migrants.

3. FACTORS AND INDICATORS OF RELEVANCE TO INTEGRATION LEVELS

In the following section, factors and indicators of relevance to the level of integration of young migrants will be identified. This will be done by focusing mainly on structural integration and on the results of quantitative, empirical studies. The results of the EFFNATIS field study[6] and a descriptive analysis of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1991, 1997, and 2002 will be used to assess the level of integration. In addition, relevant factors and indicators highlighted in the findings of other studies that have taken a deeper and empirically different look at the integration of migrant youth will be discussed. Before examining the four dimensions of integration, however, this section will begin with some comments on methodology.

3.1 EXISTING DATA AND ITS QUALITY

Existing data on the specific situation of children and youth with a migration background who are in the German education system is drawn from official education statistics (collected by the Federal Office for Statistics – Statistisches Bundesamt – and by the respective statistical offices at the federal state level – Statistische Landesämter) and from the results of various empirical studies on different sub-topics connected to education. While these empirical studies supplement the analyses of the official statistics, they also go one step further in that they attempt to identify those factors that are especially important in explaining structural integration processes among migrants. Aside from analysing the situation of migrants in the education system, empirical findings provide in-depth insights into the integration process and status of individual migrant groups.

Data and sources relevant to research on the integration of migrant youth are:
- Official statistics (e.g. Micro Censuses, school statistics, statistics on vocational training and higher education);
- Regular representative surveys (e.g. by the SOEP or the German General Social Survey *Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften* – ALLBUS);
- Representative surveys (e.g. PISA, IGLU);
- One-off surveys (on a regional or local level).

Institutions, households, and individual persons are the subjects of interviews. For the collection of data on the structural integration of children and youth with migration background, there needs to be an analysis of "structural data" as well as of "result data". While structural data allows for a description of educational offers, their objectives and target groups, and for getting an overall impression of the education situation of German and non-German children and youth within a certain period of time, result data refers to the short-, medium-, or long-term impacts and achievements of foreign children's presence in the education system, and also registers the outcome of these impacts.

Usually, official statistics are used for systematic reporting on migrants' integration processes. Statistics relative to schools, universities, and vocational training institutions, in particular, are highly differentiated and specific. The existence of a wide range of official statistics with aggregated (non-individual) structural data can be explained by the fact that, in Germany, the federal states are responsible for the education system. Apart from complete statistical surveys (*Vollerhebung*) (e.g. school statistics) representative studies with complex sampling methods (e.g. Micro Census) are worthy of mention. While complete statistical surveys concentrate on the registration of objective structural data (e.g. number of pupils), representative studies collect additional background information on individual persons.

The strong point of official statistics is the registration of basic information which can be collected in clear, comparable categories. Apart from the Micro Census, official statistics only allow for in-depth analyses on individuals on specific thematic areas (e.g. the Income and Consumer Survey of the Federal Statistical Office). The Micro Census, on the other hand, is a very important data source for the living situation of German and migrant children, youth and families, for it has the advantage of allowing links and comparisons to be made between different features of selected groups of the population.

Besides official statistics, annual reports by the administration are also useful for getting more information on the situation of migrant youth in the education system. The statistics collected by the Federal Labour Office should be mentioned here, for they include data on the promotion of vocational training – an important supplement to official statistics.

Some exceptions notwithstanding, official statistical data in Germany cannot be used for academic research on individual persons due to data protection regulations; consequently, representative longitudinal studies have become an indispensable

[6] The research project "Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective" was a cooperation project of nine partners from eight European countries: Germany, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain. EFFNATIS started its work in January 1998 and finished it in March 2001. The european forum for migration studies (efms) was one of the project partners (representing Germany) and the coordinator of the project.

source for social scientists over the last 20 years. These empirical instruments have certain advantages: they provide a long-term monitoring of society and allow for thematically differentiated analyses as well as for analyses that focus on alternating details. The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provides a good example of the application of such an approach in research. The SOEP is a representative survey of private households that has been carried out in West Germany since 1984, mostly with the same German and non-German respondents. Every year, more than 20,000 persons are interviewed by the SOEP. Since the survey covers almost all thematic areas of interest to research in integration (among which are education, income, housing, identification), it offers an ideal starting point for in-depth empirical analysis, for example for identifying relevant factors in the participation of children and youth with migration background in the education system.

The descriptive analysis contained in this report on the progress made by selected migrant populations with regards to integration used SOEP data for the years 1991, 1997 and 2002. In order to compare the socio-economic situation of interviewees with or without a migration background, study groups were formed according to generation status, age, and nationality. The SOEP data granted the special possibility of filtering out second generation migrants for a more precise analysis[7]. According to our definition, second generation migrants are the children of immigrants who were either born in Germany or entered the country before the age of attending school in Germany. The EFFNATIS study conducted in 2000 and other current research findings clearly show the necessity in empirical research of conducting group comparisons not only by nationality but also, and especially, by generation. The following chapter presents an overview of relevant data on the educational participation and the educational success of migrant children and youth; the information has been structured according to the different levels of the education system. In the following sections, the results of the SOEP evaluation are shown parallel to the description of selected official statistics and key thematic studies.

3.2. STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION

Structural integration means the acquisition of rights and access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendants. Education in schools, vocational training and employment are key variables in the successful structural integration of migrant youth, which in turn has positive effects on their cultural and social integration. In fact, schools and vocational training institutions provide youth with the cultural capital that will later prove decisive in accessing the labour market. Unfortunately, academic studies and official reports on education and vocational training show that youth and children with a migration background are clearly "lagging behind" their German peers. Without a school-leaving certificate or a completed vocational training course, the labour market remains largely closed to migrant and German youth alike; thus, any kind of upward social mobility – or the opportunity for permanent social integration – will remain restricted during the person's vocational career. Apart from the cultural capital which children acquire by attending school, resources (financial, cultural and social) provided by the family are also important for integration. For that reason, data on education and employment are seen as important indicators for the structural integration of migrants in German society.

3.2.1. The Education System in Germany

According to the German Constitution, the individual federal states are responsible for the education system in Germany (federalist state structure). The central government is solely responsible for vocational training courses that take place outside of the schools, primarily in companies (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt (StBA), 1997: 36). Germany's education system is divided into four levels (elementary, primary, secondary, and tertiary) and its structure can be roughly outlined as follows.[8]

The elementary level comprises institutions - mainly pre schools and kindergartens - for children aged 3-6. Upon reaching the age of 6, children are required to attend the Grundschule[9], a primary school for all children which usually covers grades 1-4 (primary level). Transition from primary to secondary school, which has to be attended until the end of compulsory schooling (usually after nine years of full-time education), is regulated differently in the various federal states. Secondary schooling in Germany is basically divided into three parts: the Hauptschule (secondary modern school), the Realschule (a secondary school leading to intermediate qualifications) and Gymnasium (grammar school) (cf. StBA, 1997: 43).

The Hauptschule usually takes five years. It imparts a general education as the basis for practical vocational training and prepares pupils for attending the Berufsschule (vocational school). The Realschule is a secondary school that lays the

[7] Since the 2002 survey wave, in which a specific question to the members of the household was introduced, it has also been possible to accurately identify naturalised people and to group them as second-generation immigrants.

[8] A schematic presentation of the basic structure of the education system in the Federal Republic of Germany can be found on the homepage of the Conference of the Education Ministers (*Konferenz der Kultusminister*) of the Federal States in Germany (http://www.kmk.org/dossier/aufbau_und_verwaltung.pdf).

[9] Foreign children are also obliged to go to school. However, in seven federal states, the children of asylum seekers are exempt from this rule; in three states the same is true for children of refugees fleeing from (civil) war. Despite these exceptions, it should be noted that all states offer children from these groups the opportunity to attend school (Reuter 2001, p. 112).

ground for vocational training aimed higher skilled jobs compared to the Hauptschule. The Gymnasium usually lasts nine years[10] and is the most demanding form of secondary education, which entitles students to university-level studies. Access to university can also be gained by completing vocational courses at the upper secondary level and/or evening classes at an Abendgymnasium. In some federal states, alongside the so-called "streamed" school system (Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium), there is a regular school called the Gesamtschule (comprehensive school). It imparts the content of years 5-9 or 10 of the "streamed" school system. In addition, there are Sonderschulen (special needs schools); these serve physically/ mentally disadvantaged or socially endangered children who otherwise would either not attend school at all or would not be given the required attention to allow them to succeed. The tertiary level comprises the universities and the Fachhochschulen (a type of higher technical college).

Initial vocational training can take place in Germany via two routes: the dual apprenticeship route, which takes place both "on the job" and in the vocational school "dual system" (comparable to sandwich courses in Britain), and through training in full-time vocational schools (such as the Berufsfachschule, a specialised vocational school). The great majority of young people within the vocational training sector complete their training in the so-called "dual system" (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1997: 37).

Alongside these fundamental structures of the education system, there are numerous other educational measures (for example, the vocational preparatory year) that differ, in part, among the individual federal states. A more comprehensive presentation of the German education system would go beyond the scope of this study.

3.2.2. Attendance at Pre-School Institutions

Attendance at a pre-school institution or a kindergarten promotes the cultural and structural integration of migrant children at an early age. Kindergartens offer the opportunity for children's' linguistic and social integration in a given social environment. The German language is practiced at an early age in the kindergarten, so language deficits can be removed before the child enters school. In addition, kindergartens are important venues for bringing migrant children and their parents in close contact with their German counterparts.

To date, no empirically-secured knowledge (differentiated according to personal characteristics such as nationality, gender and living situation) exists on the number of children enrolled in pre-school facilities. Micro Census data is only useful for calculating the attendance rate of German and non-German children. On the basis of this data, information can be gathered on the share and educational participation of non-German children attending an educational institution, but no insight on nationality-specific differences can be gained. An analysis of the Micro Census data shows that the kindergarten attendance rate for 3-6 year-old migrant children is 42.3%, 5 points lower than the attendance rate for 3-6 year-old children as a whole (47.5%). The percentage of migrant children, however, is much higher in pre-schools (at pre-classes[11] and in kindergartens) than in other kinds of schools. In 2001, 21% of the children in pre-classes and 25% of the children in school kindergartens were foreign. In primary school, the rate is significantly lower, reaching only 12%. The reason for the higher figure at the pre-school level lies, above all, in the fact that enrolment of migrant children is frequently postponed. These delays "are usually justified by deficits in German skills and the cultural unfamiliarity of the parents"(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, 2002: 176).

It should be noted that migrant children who attend kindergarten show much fewer deficits in the German language at the moment of entering primary school compared to migrant children who do not, as seen from the results of the language competence test "Bärenstark" carried out in Berlin (Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Sport, 2002). Empirical studies also confirm the special significance of kindergarten attendance for the further integration of children: the EFFNATIS study showed that as many as 21.3% of Turkish youth who attended kindergarten obtained a higher education degree, while only 8.1% of those who did not go to kindergarten achieved the same academic qualifications (Lederer, 2001: 28). The IGLU Study also confirms that attendance at pre-school institutions has a positive impact on migrant children's academic achievements (Bos et al., 2003).

3.2.3 Data on General Education and Vocational Training Schools

An important indicator for analysing migrants' integration in the German education system is through the level of their participation. This indicator reveals how German and migrant pupils are distributed among various school types: those that provide a general education, vocational schools, and further education institutions. Table 4 provides an overview of changes in the numbers of pupils as a whole and of non-German pupils in particular since the beginning of the 1990s. It shows that the number of non-German pupils increased from the early to mid-1990s, but that, since 1997, the number began decreasing

[10] Very recently this has been reduced to eight years in the federal provinces of Bavaria and Baden Wuertemberg.

[11] Pre-classes are pre-school education institutions attended by children who are not ready for school yet (e.g. due to poor language skills).

again. It also shows that, while the share of non-Germans in all school types remained relatively constant between 1992 and 2002 (8.9%), their numbers at schools providing a general education and at vocational training schools rose from 8.9% to 9.3%. By 2002, 1.16 million non-German pupils were enrolled in general and vocational training schools in Germany.

Table 4: German and non-German Pupils at General Schools and Vocational Training Schools in Germany, 1992-2002

Year	Total Number of Pupils	Non-German Pupils	Share in %	% of Foreign Pupils
1992	11,815,999	1,056,791	8.9	8.0
1993	12,007,538	1,099,012	9.2	8.5
1994	12,218,180	1,122,208	9.2	8.6
1995	12,367,479	1,145,931	9.3	8.8
1996	12,550,343	1,173,832	9.4	8.9
1997	12,696,836	1,178,848	9.3	9.0
1998	12,708,982	1,156,751	9.1	8.9
1999	12,705,250	1,160,452	9.1	8.9
2000	12,642,618	1,155,318	9.1	8.9
2001	12,564,621	1,156,001	9.2	8.9
2002	12,479,946	1,155,709	9.3	8.9

Source: Federal Statistics, 2003.

Attendance at General Schools In the 2002-2003 school year, the total number of pupils at schools providing general education in Germany was about 9.8 million, about 961,000 (9.8%) of whom had a non-German citizenship. In that same year, the share of non-Germans in primary schools totalled 12%. Unlike in primary schools, which all children between first and fourth grade attend, the distribution of migrant children in secondary education is very varied; it is worth noting that migrant children are particularly well represented at Hauptschulen and special needs schools (Sonderschulen), where they form 16% and 18% of the population respectively[12].

Table 5 : Non-German Pupils at General Schools by Type of School, 2001-2003

Type of school	2001				2002				2003			
	German pupils		Non-German pupils		German pupils		Non-German pupils		German pupils		Non-German pupils	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Schools providing general education	8,914,727	100	955,718	100	8,818,896	100	961,381	100	8,764,199	100	962,835	100
Of which												
Primary schools	2,824,314	31.7	387,172	40.5	2,766,480	31.4	377,827	39.3	2,777,462	31.7	369,417	38.4
Hauptschulen	917,019	10.3	196,934	20.6	908,952	10.3	202,471	21.1	889,349	10.1	203,142	21.1
Special needs schools	360,047	4.0	65,436	6.8	361,429	4.1	67,846	7.1	360,662	4.1	68,663	7.1
Realschulen	1,193,388	13.4	84,351	8.8	1,195,586	13.6	87,505	9.1	1,205,599	13.8	91,107	9.5
Gymnasien	2,195,732	24.6	88,594	9.3	2,206,487	25.0	90,237	9.4	2,223,511	25.4	92,752	9.6
Comprehensive schools	480,837	5.4	66,816	7.0	478,909	5.4	68,304	7.1	475,004	5.4	69,924	7.3
Others [1]	943,390	10.6	66,415	6.9	901,053	10.2	67,191	7.0	832,612	9.5	67,830	7.0

Source: Federal Statistics, 2004.

1) Including, for example, school types with several courses of education, orientation classes independent of school type, and evening schools.

2) As a percentage of all migrant pupils.

At Gymnasien, the share of non-German pupils amounted to only 4%. A differentiated analysis according to various types of schools shows that non-German children and youth are overrepresented at Hauptschulen and special needs schools. This could be primarily due to language deficits that make it harder for non-German pupils to keep up with teaching objectives in secondary schools. With regard to trends over the last ten years, it emerges that while the number of non-German pupils has increased by 15%, that of German pupils only increased by 4%. Thus, the share of foreigners increased by 0.8 points to 9.8%. There has been a particularly large increase of non-German pupils attending integrated comprehensive schools and special needs schools (both register an increment of 39%) (Federal Statistics, 2002). The findings also show that the positive trend in young migrants' attendance in higher secondary school that lasted until the 1990s has come to a standstill.

Significant causes for this statistical trend, beside naturalizations (naturalized persons can no longer be identified as migrants in school statistics), could lie in the entrance of refugee children fleeing from civil wars, in particular the war in the former Yugoslavia and *Spätaussiedler* (ethnic German immigrants). These pupils enter the German education system at a later stage and are not as successful as their German peers particularly when it comes to entering Gymnasien (mostly because of their lack of German language skills).

[12] In North-Rhine Westphalia *Aussiedler* and *Spätaussiedler* are recorded in school statistics. Children from *Aussiedler* families are therefore overrepresented in *Hauptschule* (29%) and *Realschule* (19%) and underrepresented at grammar schools (9%).

One study in particular deserves mention in connection to identifying factors relative to the integration of migrant children into the German school system: Ethnic Differences at the Transition from Primary to Secondary Schooling in Germany (Kristen 2000 and 2002). This study looked at six primary schools in Baden-Württemberg to research ethnic differences in the placement of German and migrant children into one of the three secondary school types (Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium) over a period of 16 years (from 1983/1984 to 1999/2000), with some variation between the schools. The study examined choices made at different turning points of pupils' educational career and, in particular, choices concerning attendance at further education institutions of varying difficulty; these turning points are particularly well-suited for research into differences in education (cf. Kristen, 2002: 535). In a school system where enrolment in a particular school type is based on achievement (grades), it would be logical for the number of pupils transitioning to a given school type to reflect the number of pupils achieving certain grades, and that a student's membership in a certain ethnic group would be largely irrelevant. Any differences in choice made by German and non-German pupils that are not based on academic achievement, therefore, warrant further investigation[13].

"The school placement of various ethnic groups is investigated through logistical regression and logistical multi-level models. The central independent working model is the educational achievement of a child, which is operationalised here via the transition into one of the three school types" [own translation] (Kristen, 2002: 539). The ethnic groups examined in the study were: Turks, Italians, former Yugoslavs, and ethnic German migrants. German pupils formed the reference group. Findings showed that, on average, migrant children change from primary school to Hauptschule more frequently than their German peers do, and thus, have correspondingly lower rates of transition to the Realschule and Gymnasien. In addition, there are significant differences between the various ethnic groups: Turkish and Italian children fare the worst, for their rate of transition to the Hauptschule is more than twice that of their fellow German pupils. On the other hand, German children move on to Gymnasien four times more frequently than Turkish or Italian pupils do. Pupils from former Yugoslavia occupy a middle ground (they fare worse than Germans but better than Turkish and Italian pupils), while the children of ethnic German migrants record only slight differences in their rates of transition in comparison to German pupils.

Interestingly, the study concluded that grades achieved in mathematics and German are of central importance for primary school children's transition into one of the three secondary school types; as may be expected, the level of achievement gained in the subject "German" plays a key role. At the same time, differences in grades do not completely explain the differences between ethnic groups. While it is true that ethnic origin plays a decisive role in the case of Turkish and Italian children's choice to enrol in a Hauptschule, the decision of whether to transition to a Realschule or Gymnasium, in contrast, does not seem to be dictated by significant ethnic differences. When ethnic origin does appear to play a role, it is legitimate to question why. "At this point, it seems plausible to suggest discrimination on the part of the school. However, this conclusion is not definitive given that other, so far unexamined differences could also be responsible for the continuing existence of such differences" [own translation] (Kristen, 2002: 549).

Levels of Educational Qualification Differences in German and migrant pupils' school achievements are also apparent in the final levels of academic qualification they obtain. In 2002, 75,300 pupils left schools providing general education. While 19% of migrant pupils left without any formal qualifications, this is true for only 8 % of German pupils; 41% of migrant pupils graduated with a Hauptschule certificate, 29% passed the mittlere Reife (comparable to the UK's General Certificate of Secondary Education), and 11% obtained the right to continue studying or to go to a Fachhochschule (that is, passed the equivalent of the UK's A-levels – Abitur). In that same year, by comparison, 24% of Germans who finished school graduated with a Hauptschule certificate, 41% with a Realschule certificate, and 26% obtained the right to continue studying or to go to a Fachhochschule (Federal Statistics, 2002). Figures for 2002 show that, on average, migrant pupils finish school with significantly lower qualifications than German pupils[14]. Adding the sex dimension shows that, on average, more non-German girls attend secondary schools than non-German boys.

The main results of the EFFNATIS study on the field of education will be presented briefly[15]. A further look at the degree of qualifications attained by autochthonous Germans and the parents of the second migrant generation shows that there is a great difference between the two groups. On the one hand, more than 70% of the Turks and more than half of respondents from former Yugoslavia have either no school-leaving qualification or, at best, one from a secondary modern school (Hauptschule); not surprisingly, they are severely underrepresented among respondents with higher forms of qualifications. On the other hand, Yugoslav children[16] have almost drawn level with the Germans in the intermediate qualifications.

[13] According to Gomolla/ Radtke 2002, forms of institutional discrimination play a role here.

[14] One should note here, however, that among the German pupils there might also be children and youth with a migration background who have integration problems and poor German language skills. These could include naturalized pupils and *Spätaussiedler* who do not show up in the official statistics.

[15] In the framework of this study, 287 Turkish and 283 Yugoslavian 'Children of International Migrants' (CIM) were interviewed, that is, children born to Turkish parents or parents from the former Yugoslavia who came to Germany before the age of 6 and who were aged 16-25 at the time of the interviews; 13.6% of them had German citizenship. As a comparative group, 215 autochthonous young Germans were also interviewed. The interviews took place in Nuremberg in 1999 and an evaluation of the micro-census was undertaken as well.

[16] In the following instance, the term "CIMs" will be used when referring to children of international migrants.

A differentiation according to sex reveals that "a slight tendency of better education for Turkish and Yugoslavian female CIMs [Children of International Migrants] in comparison to male CIMs can be identified" (Lederer, 2000: 26). In addition, the EFFNATIS study examined the connection between foreign children's attendance in kindergarten and academic achievement. It became apparent that "CIMs, especially [those] with a Turkish background who attended kindergarten in Germany, are more likely to achieve a higher educational level" (Lederer, 2000: 28).

Comparing achievements between first and second generation migrants (inter-generational mobility) indicates that "one third of each CIM group in Germany can be described as upwardly mobile with reference to their parents; i.e. former Yugoslavian and Turkish CIM slowly 'catch up'" (Lederer, 2000: 32). It should be noted, however, that the starting position of migrant children is significantly different from that of the autochthonous group. This stems from the fact that the great majority (about 75%) of parents of autochthonous children have a higher qualification, whereas this is true for less than one third of Turkish parents and for less than half of Yugoslav parents.

In sum, the EFFNATIS results show that, despite the poorer academic results registered among second-generation migrants compared to autochthonous Germans, there is some progress vis-à-vis the first generation, i.e. the children's parents. This result was further confirmed by the additional evaluation of the micro-census data, which revealed that the second generation, on average, fares better in the German education system than the group of migrants as a whole, and thus takes up an intermediate position between the latter and the group of autochthonous Germans.

Evaluation of the SOEP data for the present study on academic qualifications gives results that are comparable to the official statistics. In order to generate internationally comparable results, the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) scale was used. This scale is a simple subdivision into three levels of qualification: lower level, middle level, and higher level. In order to obtain the most complete picture possible, an additional, fourth category was taken into consideration, which was made up of people who are either still in education or left school without any qualifications (dropouts). These two groups were combined to form the category "inadequately".

Figure 2: Educational Level of Germans and Different Migrant Groups (1997, 2002)



Source: SOEP data 1997 and 2002, own presentation.

In this study, the educational levels of Germans, Turks, Italians Ethnic Germans and the second generation were compares[17]. The analyzed data refers to the 17-65 age group. The graph clearly shows that, for both 1997 and 2000, there are significant differences in the academic qualification levels achieved by Germans and other migrant groups. While about 15% of Germans have achieved only the lowest academic qualification, more than twice as many (40%) second generation migrant children appear in this category. As far as the Turkish and Italian study groups are concerned, a comparison of 1997 and 2002 shows an improvement with regard to the qualification structure. This positive development can largely be explained by the

[17] The second generation migrant group within the SOEP database comprises the children of former guest workers who were born in Germany or entered the school system at first or second grade.

fact that most of the second generation of migrants did not finish their academic career until 2002. When the German study group is compared to the second generation, an alignment with the school education structure of the Germans can be observed despite the relatively large proportion of people with lower level qualifications. One interesting result is the relatively high share of ethnic Germans (35.5%) with a high educational level in the year 2002. This can be explained by the fact that many ethnic Germans finish their educational career in the countries of origin and before their migration to Germany. These positive developments do not appear in all areas of education and training, as demonstrated by the small proportion of young foreigners in vocational training.

According to the Education Report by the Conference of Ministers for Education, in 2001, less than one third of non-Germans aged 18-21 were enrolled in vocational training courses within the dual system, compared to 63% of German youth of the same age group (Table 6).

Table 6: Non-German and German Youth in the Dual Education System (Vocational Training)

Year	Non-German Vocational Trainees		% of Vocational Trainees aged 18-21		
	Absolute	Female Trainees	Non-Germans	Germans	Total
1998	104,250	38.6	31.1	64.7	60.6
1999	100,899	39.7	30.4	64.7	60.7
2000	96,928	41.0	30.0	63.4	59.7
2001	92,300	42.0	29.3	63.0	59.3
2002	85,218	43.5	-	-	-

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Conference of Ministers for Education, Vocational Training Report 2003

One reason for the overall decrease in the number of trainees could be the difficulty in finding an apprenticeship post. This trend is difficult to analyse more specifically because the number of naturalizations, especially among Turks, has increased significantly. In 2002, Italian youth formed the second-largest group after the Turks, with 9,851 trainees. In this respect, the 2003 Education Report by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research points out that "the problem posed non-German youth's lack of vocational training should receive more attention in the years to come" [own translation] (Bildungsbericht, 2003: 172).

An examination of the distribution of migrants (aged 18-21) according to nationality, indicates the existence of large differences between the various groups. Spanish and Croatian youth represented a comparatively larger share (50%) of pupils in vocational training in 2000 compared to young people from Poland, Turkey, Greece, and Portugal. Also, it should be noted that most non-German apprentices are trained in technical jobs (48.2%) while very few are involved in civil service or agriculture (2.5%). The 10 most frequently chosen professions make up 43% of all jobs undertaken by non-German trainees. In 2002, the most popular professions included: hairdresser, shop assistant, dentists' and doctors' assistant.

In 2002, 7.2% of non-Germans attended vocational schools, a slight decrease compared to the previous year (7.4%). Non-German pupils are clearly overrepresented in full-time vocational training schools (vollzeitschulischen Bildungsgängen) that do not lead directly to a specific qualification. Furthermore, 15.5% of non-German pupils were enrolled in the Berufsvorbereitungsjahr (a year-long preparatory course for employment) and in the Berufsgrundbildungsjahr (vocational foundation year), a high figure that, according to the 2003 Education Report, is due to a decrease in apprenticeship posts offered by the market.

3.2.4. Higher Education

Foreigners enrolled in higher education institutions in Germany should be separated into one of two groups: *Bildungsausländer* and *Bildungsinländer*. *Bildungsinländer* are students who have acquired their degree for university entrance in Germany; it is a group that consists mainly of children from migrant families who have completed most of their schooling in Germany. For this reason, *Bildungsinländer* are particularly relevant for the study of integration processes. In contrast to *Bildungsausländer*, most of whom come to Germany only for their studies, it is assumed that *Bildungsinländer* will try to access the German labour market after finishing their university degree. The great majority of *Bildungsinländer* are citizens of former recruitment countries and can therefore be categorized as second, or, sometimes, third generation migrants. This group fairly consistently forms one third of all foreign students and, in the 2002-2003 winter term, formed 3.3% of all students. Although as many as 24.1% of all *Bildungsinländer* come from an EU member state[18], the largest group (28.8%) has Turkish citizenship. Students from other countries of origin total less than 5% from each country; in fact, the results of the 17th Social Survey of the Deutsche Studentenwerk show large differences with regard to the social background and the countries of origin of the *Bildungsinländer* (Schnitzer et al., 2004: 71). A much larger number of *Bildungsinländer*

[18] The data refers to the 2002-2003 winter term, before 10 new member states joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

from recruitment countries belong to the lowest social group than German students (72% compared to 12%). The proportion of female students among *Bildungsinländer* in Germany has increased significantly over the last seven years: from 37.4% in the winter term of 1996-97 to 43.2% in the winter term of 2002-2003.

3.2.5 Results of the IGLU and PISA Studies

The results of the IGLU and PISA studies can be used for a more detailed study of pupils' skills, differentiated according to nationality.

1) The IGLU Study: The target group of the IGLU Study (International Primary School Reading Study), which was carried out in 2001, was 4th-grade pupils. Besides reading comprehension, pupils' skills were tested in mathematics, natural sciences, orthography, and essay writing. The skills researched by the IGLU study were linked to the respondents' family background, sex, and migratory status[19]. Results indicated that when the respondents were differentiated according to their socio-economic background, about 20% of those born abroad had low skilled professions compared to 37% of individuals born in Germany (37%). Furthermore, the study showed that parents' higher social standing correlated with higher levels of education among the children. In other words, children with parents employed in low-prestige jobs have a harder time accessing education (bildungsfern) while also having fewer economic resources at their disposal. The results of all evaluated skills showed that children from families without migration background came off best, on a nationwide average. In families where one or both parents were born abroad, results were significantly poorer in all areas. Findings with regard to differences between migrant girls and boys confirm the well-known stereotypes: girls did better in reading while boys had greater success in mathematics and natural science (see Bos et al, 2003). The results were even more telling when they were compared internationally: after Norway, Germany had the largest discrepancy between the achievements of children from families without migration background and those from families where both parents are migrants. In other comparable European countries, this difference is less pronounced.

2) The PISA Study (Max Planck Institute for Educational Research, 2001 and 2002): In 2000, within the framework of the international PISA study, a representative cross-section of approximately 5,000 15-year-old pupils from a total of 219 schools was selected in Germany with the aim of looking more closely than ever before at migrant youth's participation in education and of comparing it with that of autochthonous Germans. The cross-section included 1,056 children from families with a migration background. In order to avoid the aforementioned weaknesses in official education statistics, the study included questions on the country of origin of parents and of the 15-year-olds, and on the language of communication used within the family. In addition, the interviewees' mother tongue and length of residence were recorded. This was particularly important because it allowed for the identification of Germans with a migration background (naturalized Germans and ethnic German migrants, for example). Almost 22% of the 15-year-olds came from families in which at least one parent was not born in Germany; in slightly more than 15% of the families, both parents had migrated to Germany. Only considering the area of former West Germany, the proportions were even higher: 27% and 19% respectively. Approximately half of all 15-year-olds with one parent born outside of Germany had lived in the country since their birth. More than 70% of these young people had attended educational institutions from kindergarten to the end of compulsory schooling. Significant numbers of "newcomers entering education at a later stage" (*Seiteneinsteiger*) could only be found in families of ethnic German migrants, refugees or asylum seekers, but even in these cases children tended to have enrolled in school at primary-school age.

Despite long periods of residence, migrant families clearly differ in their social structure from German families: almost two-thirds of foreign-born respondents were employed as blue-collar workers and approximately half of them carried out unskilled or semi-skilled jobs (cf. Baumert/Schümer, 2001: 341 ff.). The PISA study revealed a difference in the participation in education between (1) children from families in which both parents were born in Germany, (2) children from families where just one parent was born in Germany and (3) children from families where neither parent was born in Germany. The participation in education of young people from the first two groups differs only slightly from each other at the Hauptschule and Realschule level. Specifically, the study showed that children from families with one Germn-born parent tend to attend a Hauptschule slightly more frequently and are a little less likely to go to a Realschule. In contrast, young people from purely migrant families are greatly over-represented at the Hauptschule and greatly underrepresented at the Gymnasium. In addition, differences in educational opportunities between children from families with and without a migrant background are far less than the disparities between young people from different social strata. That means that, particularly in Germany, the link between achievement and social background is noticeable. A further analysis, however, concluded that neither social status nor cultural distance are primarily responsible for disparities in the participation in education; rather, competence/ lack of competence in the German language has a much greater impact. Linguistic deficits

[19] For the sake of presentation, the results have been grouped into three categories: (1) children with both parents born in Germany (family without a migration background), (2) children with one foreign-born parent and (3) children with two foreign-born parents. The total sample consisted of about 6,000 pupils at 168 schools in Germany.

cumulatively affect content-related subjects with the consequence that people with insufficient reading comprehension skills are hindered in their acquisition of competence in all academic fields (cf. Baumert/Schümer, 2001: 379). "For children from migrant families, linguistic competence is the decisive obstacle in their educational career" (Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, 2001: 37).

In a national amendment to the PISA study, research was also done on the level of competence among 33,809 15-year-olds and 33,766 9th-grade pupils from 1,460 schools. The main declared aim of this PISA-E study was to compare the abilities of pupils in the individual German federal states. It thus became apparent that achievement differentials between children from families with at least one German-born parent and children from purely migrant families varied greatly from federal state to federal state. Bavaria distinguished itself by its "consistently low disparities and by a relatively high level of competence in the migrant group." In the area of reading comprehension, the differences in achievement between young people with and without a migrant background were relatively small in the states of Hessen and Rhineland-Palatinate. In contrast, "a large achievement differential across the board could be found in the state of Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia" (cf. Baumert et al., 2002: 58). Results differentiated by federal state reveal, above all, that migrant children are greatly affected by the general quality of the school system: not only are pro-integration support measures important, but regular measures and educational offers also make a significant contribution to increasing equality of opportunity for migrants and autochthonous Germans.

A detailed analysis of the international PISA study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was published at the beginning of 2003 (see Stanat, 2003), confirming that there is a correlation between the proportion of migrant children in classes and academic achievement, as also stated by Kirsten (2002). The analysis concluded that a migrant share of 20% in a school class causes a sharp decline in "medium performance" but that there is no further decline in the level of performance when this share rises to 40% or more. The Max Planck Institute for Educational Research, which was responsible for carrying out the study in Germany, explained that this occurs because schools only start introducing special measures once a certain "critical threshold" has been crossed: "These findings lead to the conclusion that schools already have difficulties in dealing with heterogeneity, even if the multilingual composition of the school classes is fairly low from a quantitative point of view" [own translation] (Stanat, 2003: 256).

A description and analysis of existing data on migrant children and youth in education clearly indicates that non-German children still have poorer educational opportunities than German children. Although various studies agree that the educational level of second generation migrants has considerably improved compared to that of the first generation, it is still low in comparison to German children. With regard to education, second generation migrants occupy a position between their parents' generation and their German peers. In line with data provided by official education statistics, research studies conclude that Turkish and Italian children, in particular, show the poorest achievements in the German education system.

3.2.6. Position in the Labour Market and Occupational Status

Statements on the position of second generation migrants in the labour market are based on SOEP data (Seifert, 1997 and 2000; Fassmann, Münz and Seifert, 1999; RWI, 2001), micro census data (Granato and Kalter, 2001), and on youth-specific surveys (Haug, 2002). Comparability between these studies is limited due to different definitions of the target group. Most of the authors mentioned a trend towards "assimilation over generations concerning the occupational status" (Kalter and Granato, 2001:23). Regarding the gap that exists in the labour market position between migrant youth and autochthonous Germans, Granato and Kalter (2001) argue that the disadvantages faced by second generation migrants can be explained mainly by differences in educational qualifications. If this aspects is controlled, the effects of nationality in logistic regression models become insignificant (Granato and Kalter, 2001: 517). In contrast to the conclusions reached by Granato and Kalter, a discrimination testing study by Goldberg and Mourinho (2000) "provides clear evidence that the unfavourable labour market position of migrants (…) is, to a considerable extend, attributable to the discrimination they face when they apply for jobs" (Granato and Kalter 2001: 63). (Figure 3)

Evaluation of 2002 data by the SOEP regarding the employment situation of selected groups in the population shows important differences.[20] The 17-65 age group (which in Germany roughly corresponds to the employable population) is shown in the table above according to their employment situation. The German study group has the largest share (61%) of people in full- or part-time employment, while only 45% of Turks are employed (15% less). Ethnic Germans occupy the third position (56%), after the Italians (60%). The Turkish group is also the largest that is "registered as unemployed" and "not employed (inactive)". When the two categories are combined, almost 50% of all the interviewees with Turkish nationality do not participate in working life. This affects Turkish women in particular, the majority of whom are not employed. One of the reasons for a low labour force participation rate is the presence of legal restrictions on non-EU citizens

[20] Since many young people are in training, a precise analysis of the labour market situation on the basis of the SOEP data is not possible. Therefore, this evaluation of the SOEP's material is based on a general comparison of Germans and other selected migrant groups.

Figure 3: Employment of Germans, Ethnic Germans, Italians, and Turks, 2002



Source: SOEP data 1997 and 2002, own presentation.

taking up employment.[21] The following section will give two examples for recent studies on education and job transition of children and youth with migration background.

The study by Diefenbach (2002) on educational participation and job transition among migrant children and youth is based on SOEP data collected between 1984 and 1998. This analysis of the SOEP data more or less confirms the results of the official education statistics. Only the overrepresentation of children with non-German citizenship in special needs schools could not be confirmed by the SOEP data, but there are other results of the study which are worthy of mention. Most often, migrant children attend a Hauptschule after they have completed primary school. Over time, this choice has become increasing unpopular, a finding that matches the continuous increase in migrant children's attendance at Realschule after completing primary school. In contrast to migrant children, many more native German children choose to go to the Gymnasium when moving on to secondary school. SOEP analyses by nationality show that Italians are the migrant group with the largest proportion of children attending Hauptschule after completing primary school and that they also have the lowest share of pupils attending Gymnasium, after Turkish children. Of all migrant groups, Greek children do best, but they continue to perform worse than their German counterparts (see Diefenbach, 2002: 29).

More frequently than native Germans, children from migrant families tend to change from secondary schools to one that offers a higher school-leaving qualification (see Ibid: 31). "This compensation, however, does not occur to such an extent as to push us to talk about an almost equal participation in education between children from migrant families and German children" [own translation] (Ibid: 32). Furthermore, migrant children tend to change from a Hauptschule to a Realschule, whereas German children more frequently change from a Realschule to a Gymnasium. Youths from migrant families reach lower levels of education (such as university studies) than German youths (Ibid: 35). Youths from migrant families leave the education system earlier than German youths, as documented by the higher proportion of migrant workers and unemployed persons compared to German youths aged 18-19. From the age of 24, however, the proportion of employed German youths exceeds the proportion of employed youths with a migration background (Ibid: 19). Youths from migrant families enter the vocational training system slightly earlier than German youths: until the age of 17, the proportion of migrant youths in vocational training is higher than that of German youths; from the age of 18, however, this proportion is reversed (Ibid). Youths with a migration background are apprenticed far less frequently than German youths: "Looking at all age groups, almost three times as many youths from migrant families are employed in unskilled or semi-skilled employment as German youths" [own translation] (Ibid: 36). With regard to the reasons that cause disadvantages for migrant children and youths in the education system – as the descriptive findings show – the study concludes that cultural factors exert a particularly strong influence in choosing to attend of a certain type of secondary school. The child's country of birth does not influence the choice of the educational career. The intention to return to the country of origin, however, does have a statistically significant impact on the probability that a child will attend a Realschule: if the head of the household wants to stay in Germany forever, it becomes more likely that the child will attend a Realschule (Ibid: 58).

The second example is the study on the integration of migrant youth "At home in Germany" by Alois Weidacher (2000). The study is based on a cross-sectional survey, undertaken in 1997, of 2,504 Greek, Italian, and Turkish young adults aged 18-25

[21] Asylum seekers are, for instance, not allowed to work for one year after submission of their application. After that one year period without any legal access to the labour market, their chances to find a job remain slim because of the so called "prior entitlement check" (*Vorrangprüfung*). This means that people who are merely "tolerated" have only limited access to the labour market due to the priority check.

living in West Germany. A reference group of 3,500 young adults of the same age from East and West Germany were also interviewed[22]. The study made use of questionnaires to research the youths' vocational and social situation as well as their political orientation.

Large differences on the subject of education were observed between the interviewed groups, as indicated by the highest educational levels achieved and participation in vocational training programmes. Whereas many German youth in the sample had achieved medium educational levels, i.e. mittlere Reife (General Certificate of Secondary Education) or (Fach)Hochschulreife (A-levels), a large proportion of non-German young people only achieved the Hauptschule school-leaving certificate or no school-leaving qualification at all. All interviewed foreign nationalities displayed one central tendency: women were more frequently still in school or had higher levels of education than men. Across all researched groups, men dropped out of school more frequently without a school-leaving certificate than women.

Due to the relatively high proportion of migrant pupils attending Hauptschule, this group entered the labour market earlier than Germans of the same age. According to the results of the study, about 50% of Turks, 60% of Greeks and Italians were employed, whereas only a quarter of the West Germans and 28% of the East Germans are employed (Weidacher: 52). Women from migrant families had lower employment rates than migrant men, but German women had about the same employment rate as German men. The group with the largest proportion of unemployed persons were the East Germans with 12%, followed by the Turks with 10%, and the Greeks and Italians with less than 6%.

3.3. SOCIAL INTEGRATION

"Social integration" refers to the degree to which immigrants forge social relations through individuals contacts and group memberships (for example, in social interaction, friendships, marriages, and voluntary associations) within their new community. Social integration is a dimension that the American sociologist Milton Gordon dealt with in great detail in the 1960s[23]. According to Gordon, increased "social integration", in other words migrants' increased participation in the social sets, clubs, and institutions of the majority society, also results in an automatic increase in the number of interethnic marriages. In Germany, less research seems to have been carried out on the area of social integration compared to structural integration. While most of the existing studies concentrate primarily on contacts with non-Germans and on interethnic friendships, studies on interethnic marriages are rather rare[24].

3.3.1. Interethnic Contacts and Friendships

Relationships between migrants and members of the host society are used as important indicators of the social integration of migrants. These relationships represent various forms of social networks. In order to assess the characteristics of these networks, the theoretical concept of social capital is considered a suitable approach. Like human capital and economic capital, social capital is seen as a resource that grows through investment – in this case, in social relationships (Coleman, 1991: 392ff)[25].

In the context of the present study, the SOEP data permitted a comparative evaluation of the contact structures between Germans and different migrant groups, including second generation migrants, for the years 1991 and 1997 [26]. The interviewees were asked in the SOEP survey three questions regarding their social contacts to Germans, to which they could answer either "yes" or "no": (1) whether they had contacts to Germans since living in Germany, (2) whether they were visited by any Germans in the last 12 months and (3) whether they visited Germans in the last 12 month. The following bar chart shows clearly, in the form of frequencies, the distribution of (non)-contacts with Germans according to migrant groups. (Figure 4)

The figures show that second generation migrants and ethnic Germans under 30 had the most contact with Germans while Turks and Italians (17-65 age group) had the least. A comparison of the figures for 1991 and 1997 shows a positive trend towards increased contact for both the Turkish and the Italian study groups. Nonetheless, there are clear differences between the various groups, and the Turkish group especially still shows a comparatively high share of persons with no contacts with Germans since living in Germany for the year 1997.

[22] The sample size corresponds to 0.5% of about 500,000 of the 18-25 year olds of these three populations currently living in Germany. It should be noted that since the number of quota criteriawas limited, holders of a school-leaving certificate and unemployed persons are under-represented.

[23] Gordon's integration model concentrates primarily on examining the significance of interethnic marriages for the further integration process of immigrants.

[24] Straßburger, Gabi 1998: Das Heiratsverhalten von Frauen und Männern ausländischer Herkunft. Expertise für die Sachverständigenkommission zur Erstellung des 6. Familienberichts. Osnabrück

[25] In migration and integration research, the concept of social capital is mostly used in addition to other approaches (e.g. economic) to explain migration decisions (Espinosa und Massey 1997; Faist 1997; Haug 2000).

[26] A comparison with the year 2002 could not be given, due to the fact that the questions on social contacts were not part of the 2002 SOEP survey.

Figure 4: Share of Non-Contacts Between Selected Migrant Groups and Germans, 1991 & 1997



Source: SOEP data 1991 and 1997, own presentation.

Concentrating on the migrant youth group that was the focus of this research, it is also worth looking at the above described study by the German Youth Institute (DJI) in the field of social integration. The study analysed those personal and social relationships that are shared by German society; moreover, the authors tried to find out whether and how young adults with a migration background establish social relationships (be they loose or firm) in their interaction with members of the host society. The kind of interaction partners that migrants come into contact with obviously depends on the environment in which they choose to socialize, which can range from leisure time activities to courtship. The extent of interaction is considered in the study as reflective of the degree to which various migrant groups are socially integrated.

The study found that the structure of personal relationships among the three populations of migrant youth under observation (Greeks, Turks, and Italians) differed considerably but that there were some commonalities. Most importantly, it found that the educational level of each group had no particular impact on the degree of contact with Germans but that competence in the German language was a far more decisive factor. In other words, migrant youth with good German language skills (irrespective of nationality) have clearly more contacts with Germans than migrant youth with poor German language skills. As for the differences among the various nationalities, the DJI study concluded that Italians had much more contact with Germans than Greeks or Turks.

One example of a study that employed a differentiated, descriptive research method is the one by Haug (2003). The analysis was based on data provided by the Integration Survey of the Federal Institute for Population Research (BIB) starting in 2000 and by the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). Haug compared the structure of relationships among the 18-23 year olds of German, Italian, and Turkish origin who were interviewed in the Integration Survey. The study showed that, in general, interviewees with Italian background had more contact with Germans than Turkish migrants, and that female migrants had fewer contacts to Germans than young men of their respective ethnic origin. German-Italians from bi-national marriages seemed to be especially well-integrated socially. SOEP analyses of comparable sub-groups identified similar results.

One possible way of explaining these facts could be through the adoption of Esser's theory of interaction (1990), in which it is assumed that different amounts of effort are required to establish relationships with members of one's own ethnic group compared to with members of a different ethnic group. Esser makes use of an empirical study on the status quo of interethnic friendships among Turkish and Yugoslav first and second generation migrants to illustrate the application of his action-theoretical approaches. In the study, respondents were asked about their three best friends. The answers given by both generations were then subsumed into four categories that ranged from "homogeneous ethnically endophile" to "homogeneous ethnically exophile", i.e. from friendships solely within the ethnic group to entirely interethnic friendships. The results of this simple frequency distribution showed a highly "endophile" pattern of relationships among first-generation migrants, Turks as well as Yugoslavs. Among second generation migrants, however, while Turks tended to socialize largely within circles of friends belonging to their own ethnic group, Yugoslavs showed an increased tendency towards interethnic friendships and a decline in inner-ethnic friendships. It can therefore be assumed that second generation Yugoslavs have already proceeded one step further in the process of social integration than the Turks. But how can these differences be explained from an inter-generational perspective?

A person building a friendship with another person is necessarily confronted with a choice whose outcome is determined by a variety of influences. As Esser stated, "this hypothesis results from the assumption that friendships are always of 'interest' but that people always dispose of a limited number of resources for reaching their objective. Which is why only a few very costly relationships can be established, for the resources are too limited." [own translation] (Esser, 1990: 191). The extent to which interethnic friendships are made, however, also depends on the level of effort needed to turn contacts that appear "interesting" in the beginning into long-term relationships through the use of available resources. This effort is reduced by good language skills, the lack of strict rules imposed by an ethnic group's norms and expectations regulating contacts, as well as by the degree openness and sociability of the members of the other group.

3.3.2. Interethnic Marriages

Marriage patterns constitute a special indicator of migrants' level of interaction with the host society[27]. The extent to which members of different ethnic groups mix over time allows for conclusions to be drawn regarding the long-lasting social integration of the various populations. Unfortunately only very little information is available on interethnic marriages in Germany, especially concerning youth with a migration background. Some statistical information on marriages can be obtained from the official statistics. In the year 2000, 18.8% of all marriages consisted of at least one partner with a non-German nationality. Since 1960, this share has grown continuously (4.0%). In 1960 the share of bi-national marriages was 3.7% of all registered marriages. This figure increased to 15.6% in the year 2000 (Federal Statistics, 2003). More detailed information on interethnic marriages can be drawn from surveys carried out in recent years.

The study by the German Youth Institute (DJI) "At home in Germany" is one of few exceptions that also includes some questions on the choice of spouses. Moreover, since the researched group is quite young, the DJI study does not only differentiate spouses according to their nationality, but also includes questions on other forms of cohabitation. For example, the study found that, in general, about 50-75% of unmarried migrant youth would consider marrying a German partner; Turkish youth, however, differed considerably in the answers they gave: Turkish women, in particular, showed very little interest in establishing a relationship with a German.

When it came to questioning the subjects of the study on the issue of marriage, the majority of all nationalities chose their spouse within their own ethnic group, with Turkish youth displaying the greatest degree of support for this option: in 88% of cases, both spouses were Turkish. Apart from providing a descriptive analysis of contacts between Germans and selected nationalities, the DJI study tried to highlight the factors that heavily influenced interviewees' interest (or lack thereof) in marrying a German citizen. The study concluded that the greater the length of time spent by migrants in German socialization structures, the more likely it was that interethnic marriage would be considered. Other important factors leading to increased chances of marrying outside one's ethnic group were: German language proficiency and a higher level of education. In sum, while it is true that Germans and other ethnic groups do come into contact, when they marry they tend to find spouses of the same nationality. This result holds most true among the interviewed Turkish group.

Beside the DJI study, the 2000 "German Shell Study" also included a question on interethnic marriages in its questionnaire[28]. In this case, however, the study was not concerned with the nationality of respondents' spouses but, rather, with a hypothetical question on marriage preferences: "Under which circumstances would you marry somebody with a different nationality from your own?" [own translation]. In stating potential reasons for a mixed marriage, respondents most frequently said "Love and nothing else": 78.7% of Italians, 54.6% of Germans, and 52.9% of Turks gave this answer (:252). All the other reasons or conditions ("The partner must have the same religion", "The partner must convert to my religion", "Parental agreement", "Raising children according to my ideals" etc.) were chosen less frequently. A clear majority of all interviewed youth, independent of their national origin, favoured a marriage based on love.

The 2000 EFFNATIS study on the integration of second generation migrants also comprised several questions dealing social integration. The statements in that field concentrated on attitudes towards family and partnership. The questionnaire used for interviewing partners included statements that respondents were asked to either agree or disagree with and that were intended to find out how young migrants picture their future family and what roles they ascribe to the sexes. (Table 9)

A broad majority of interviewees in both groups (second generation migrants and Germans) expressed "modern" attitudes in answering the first two questions (on role allocation of the sexes and acceptance of divorce). In comparing Turkish and Yugoslav interviewees, however, the former proved to be somewhat more conservative. In the case of the question gauging

[27] In the context of a descriptive evaluation, this paper is unable to reach definitive conclusions about the structure of interethnic marriages among second-generation migrants on the basis of current data from the SOEP. For this reason, results from other relevant surveys have also been shown, including the study conducted by the German Youth Institute and the results of the EFFNATIS project conducted by the efms.

[28] Since 1953, Shell Youth Studies have been published regularly (mostly every three to four years) with the aim of gaining insights about the situation of young people in Germany. In 2000, non-German youth were included in all phases of the study. The sample consisted of 4,546 youth from all over the country aged between 15-24; it was representative with regards to age, sex, employment, federal state, and size of district. It was organised as a quota sample in accordance with official statistics, with an over-coverage of 20%.

Table 9: Attitudes Towards Family and Partnership

The husband's task is to earn money, the wife's task is to look after the home and the family.	2nd-generation migrants	Germans
- I agree/ agree entirely	16.6%	11.2%
- I am unsure	12.0%	8.5%
- I disagree/disagree entirely	71.4%	80.2%
If a person is unhappy in the marriage, he or she should be allowed to get divorced.		
- I agree/agree entirely	83.5%	88.8%
- I am unsure	12.0%	6.2%
- I disagree/disagree entirely	4.5%	5.0%
Do you think it is defensible for a man and a woman to live together without being married?		
- Yes	78.0%	95.3%
- No	22.0%	4.7%

Source: EFFNATIS Survey, 2000.

respondents' acceptance of unmarried cohabitation, a large majority of all youths considered such behaviour defensible, although the difference in the rate of agreement between the groups was clearly greater in this case than in the two preceding questions. This is due to the answers provided by the Turkish sub-group, which answered positively in only 65.5% of cases, while the Yugoslav group answered "yes" to 90.5% of questions, a rate almost equal to that of young Germans.

It should be kept in mind that the sources referred to here on the subject of family and partnership values only concern youths. Within this age category, both Germans and migrants consider living together as partners and having children a firm point of orientation in the future of their private lives; as for their views on the roles of the sexes, no serious differences can be ascertained here either. Apart from getting an idea of what youths think, it is interesting to learn more about parents' preferences and whether they would prefer their children to marry someone of a certain nationality. This question, directed at the parents of migrant youth, was included in the 2002 Representative Study by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs[29]. Yugoslav, Italian, and Greek parents answered in roughly in the same way to the question "Would you agree if your son/ daughter married a German?" Around 80-85% of these respondents declared themselves open to such a possibility. Turkish parents, on the other hand, responded differently: 60.7% said they would agree if their son married a German girl, but they were much more critical of a daughter marrying a German man (only 55.6% would give their consent) (:77).

3.3.3. Participation in Clubs and Organizations

Migrants' degree of participation in organizations, associations, and clubs of the host society is another important measure of social integration. Do migrants become politically involved, are they members of political parties? Do they prefer to be members of groups that are orientated towards their country of origin, such as ethnic sports clubs, or do they participate in organisations orientated towards the host country? Is membership in an ethnic organisation detrimental to integration in other areas of life?

According to the findings of the EFFNATIS survey, the rate of membership in political parties is very low for both Germans and second generation migrants, while that of trade unions is somewhat more significant. Approximately one-third of second generation migrants and about 45% of young Germans are members of other types of organisations, with sports clubs being by far the most important – ethnic sports clubs, cultural associations, local history societies, political organisations do not boast considerable membership rates.

The DJI study found that less than 3.5% of youths targeted by the research were members of German political parties or interest groups. It also found that membership in church and religious groups and associations ranged from 3.5% among East Germans to 9.8% among Italians. Membership in German sports clubs was particularly high, with 20% of young Turks and 28% of Greek and Italian youth declaring such participation; 32% of West Germans claimed to belong to sports clubs. Most migrant youth (45.5%) was not a member of an ethnic or a German organization.

Another difference regarding the participation of migrants can be seen in trade union organizations. Italian and Turkish youth (12% and 13.5% respectively) were significantly more likely to claim membership in trade unions than the East and West German control groups (6.6% and 5.5% respectively). This difference is closely linked to the fact that migrant youth enter employment at an earlier age and that their jobs are in relatively less-skilled professions.

[29] A representative study on the "Situation of Non-German Workers and Their Relatives in the Federal Republic of Germany" included interviews with Turkish, former Yugoslavian, Italian, and Greek workers and their relatives in the old federal states and in what used to be West Berlin: 1,000 people of each nationality were interviewed (respondents were chosen through a mix of random and quota sample methods). All relevant areas of daily life were covered by these interviews, not just those strictly connected to social integration.

Table 10: EFFNATIS Membership in Parties, Trade Unions, Clubs/ Organisations

Are you a member of a political party (a German party and/or a party of your parents' country of origin)?	2nd Generation Migrants	Germans
- Yes	1.4%	4.7%
- No	98.6%	95.3%
Are you a member of a trade union?		
- Yes	12.9%	7.9%
- No	87.1%	92.1%
Are you a member of a club/ organisation (e.g. sports club, cultural association, local history society)?		
- Yes	34.4%	44.9%
- No	65.6%	55.1%
If yes, which?		
- general sports clubs	**67.4%**	**71.2%**
- ethnic sports clubs	4.2%	-
- religious organisations	4.2%	3.3%
- cultural associations/local history societies	8.5%	7.2%
- political organisations	1.3%	2.0%
- martial arts clubs	6.4%	2.6%
- other	8.1%	13.7%

Source: EFFNATIS-Survey, 2000.

The empirical analyses conducted by Diehl and Urbahn (1998) were based on an evaluation of the 13th wave of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) that started in 1996 and that took into consideration a sample of foreigners with a West German sample as a control group. In general, it pointed out that more recent research literature concerning Turkish immigrants' participation in German society tends to concentrate heavily on their membership in Turkish organisations and that there are hardly any extensive studies on this group's participation in German organisations (:21). This applies particularly to participation in social organisations.[30]

With regard to participation in political organisations, it was ascertained that, in general, immigrants are more often involved in political organisations oriented towards their country of origin than they are in host-country political organisations (:33). The SOEP data, however, does not report on immigrants' membership in political parties in a way that is comparable with the EFFNATIS data, it only gives results on political party preferences. With regard to membership in trade unions and professional associations, the data showed that immigrants' participation rates are roughly as high as those of the German control group and that, in the case of some nationalities, it was even higher (on average 21.7% of the interviewees: 41). In contrast, migrants' participation in "civil rights groups" orientated towards the host country, action groups for the employment of foreigners etc., was rather low, though these forms of political participation were predicted to have a greater potential in the second generation (:45f.).

As was true for the establishment of interethnic contacts, good German language skills are closely linked to the degree and frequency of foreigners' membership in German organizations, associations, and clubs. In sum, the non-German population appears to be very well-organised compared with the German group. The study illustrated the link between good German language skills and immigrants' orientation towards German society, including their participation in German organizations.

3.4. CULTURAL AND IDENTIFICATIONAL INTEGRATION

Cultural integration has much to do with a conception of society/ the nation as a cultural community with common values, norms, and preferences; it is also linked to the acquisition of certain competencies that are necessary for individuals' interaction in society. The development of language skills is an example of a necessary competency for cultural integration; other important aspects that correspond to this dimension of integration include media consumption, and moral and religious attitudes. The following chapter presents results that concentrate mainly on a comparison of the descriptive SOEP data and the results of several studies, like the 2000 EFFNATIS survey.

3.4.1. Language Skills and Language Development

In the SOEP survey, Turks, Italians, and second-generation migrants were asked to indicate their oral and written skills on a five-point scale; the results of this self-assessment are shown in Table 11. Over 90% of second-generation migrants stated that they had good or very good spoken German skills (1997) and over 80% of them believed they had good or very good writing abilities.

[30] Even less information is available on the participation of immigrants in German leisure organisations than on their involvement in other forms of participation named here (Diehl and Urbahn. 1998: 51)

Table 11: German Language Proficiency of Turks, Italians and the 2nd Generation[31]

	Turks		Italians		2nd Generation	
	1991	1997	1991	1997	1991	1997
			Oral German Skills			
Very Good	18.3	17.4	24.2	27.0	-	64.7
Good	28.8	34.7	32.1	32.3	-	29.4
Fair	27.9	28.1	24.6	28.2	-	5.9
Poor	18.3	17.0	18.1	11.9	-	0.0
Negligible	6.8	2.8	1.1	0.6	-	0.0
			Written German Skills			
Very Good	12.5	12.3	19.5	19.4	-	51.5
Good	22.1	26.6	16.6	18.2	-	32.4
Fair	15.8	19.6	15.0	20.7	-	12.5
Poor	21.3	21.2	23.4	24.8	-	3.7
Negligible	28.2	20.3	25.6	16.9	-	0.0

Source: SOEP data 1991, 1997, own presentation.

[1] 1991 results for the second generation in could not be shown due to the small size of the group.

In comparing the groups, clear differences become apparent especially between Turks and the second generation: in the area of written skills in particular, second generation migrants' abilities seem to have improved markedly. While about 50% of Turks stated that they could write only a little or no German, as many as 85% of second-generation migrant interviewees described their writing skills in German as "good" or "very good". This extremely positive development can be explained by the second generation's socialisation in German schools.

The results of the EFFNATIS survey represent another important source on second-generation migrants' language skills. Youths in this category were asked to assess their own linguistic competence in German and in their parents' native language. The results of this self-assessment among youth with Turkish and Yugoslav backgrounds are shown in Table 12.

Table 12: EFFNATIS: Self-Assessment of Linguistic Competence by Second-Generation Youth With Turkish and Yugoslav Backgrounds

How do you assess your ability to write in German?	
- very good	39.5%
- good	48.4%
- average	11.1%
- poor or non-existent	1.0%
How do you assess your ability to write in your parents' native language?	
- very good	22.5%
- good	37.9%
- average	28.1%
- poor or non-existent	11.5%
How do you assess your ability to speak in your parents' native language?	
- very good	34.0%
- good	45.7%
- average	17.4%
- poor or non-existent	2.9%

Source: EFFNATIS-Survey, 2000.

As demonstrated in the results, approximately 90% of interviewees assessed their written German competence as very good or good. Interestingly, in the course of the face-to-face situations, interviewers were able to give their own assessment of respondents' answers. On the whole, interviewers tended to think more highly of interviewees' oral abilities than they assessed their own written abilities[32]. Despite the different scales of responses in the EFFNATIS and SOEP evaluations, the results are quite comparable; both studies conclude that most second generation migrants' written skills had clearly improved. The question on respondents' ability to write in the parents' native language, on the other hand, was answered positively in only about 60% of cases. And, as for oral competence in the native language, approximately 80% of interviewees said it was very good or good.

An overall look at all these indicators based on the EFFNATIS results indicates that the linguistic integration of the second generation with regards to pure linguistic competence in German has obviously progressed quite well, at least in migrants'

[31] 19991 results for the second generation in could not be shown due to the small size of the group.

[32] Interviewers were asked about their interviewees' oral communication and linguistic competence. In over 90% of cases interviewers said that their respondents' abilities were "good" for both categories, although they sometimes qualified them merely as "mediocre" or "poor".

own estimation. Interviewers' statements confirm this. In contrast, there are deficits in the parents' native tongue especially when it comes to writing skills.

A survey conducted in 1997 by the German Youth Institute (DJI) collected data on these youths' language skills via self-assessments. The results showed the existence of a clear correlation between the length of socialization in Germany and the level of language skills: Youth who were born in Germany or moved to Germany before the age of six considered their German language skills to be very good or good; only 36% (Greeks) to 40% (Italians) of them stated that they had good competence in both languages. Furthermore, the results of the study showed that most young adults with no school-leaving certificate only had good competence in their mother tongue: about 80% of this group could only communicate properly in the language of their country of origin. Beside linguistic competency, the choice of language used in social interactions is another important indicator of integration. The 1997 DJI study showed that migrant youth with very good competence in German tend to talk to their brothers and sisters primarily in German. Italian youth said they did so more frequently (61%) than Greeks (55%) and Turks (43%) (:85). However, in terms of the language used to communicate with parents, a different picture emerges: 77% of Italians and 88% of Turks said they spoke with their parents primarily in the mother tongue.

The DJI "At home in Germany" study concluded that the migrant youth interviewed showed clear integration deficits in various areas. The study revealed the existence of a high number of migrant youth (of all national backgrounds) who have good or very good German language skills, as measured in self-assessments and assessments by interviewers. The methodology employed for this DJI study, however, means that the findings on linguistic skills cannot be corroborated (or disproved) by more objective criteria, for example by the results of academic tests or school grades. A differentiated analysis of the results according to respondents' national background shows that young Turkish adults, more than the others, differ greatly from the two German control groups and that they are far less integrated into German society than either Italians or Greeks (:87).

The Representative Study by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (2002) included the following question as part of a self-assessment on German language skills: "How do you assess your German language competence?" [own translation]. It is worth noticing that answers to this question indicated a higher level of German language competency among EU foreigners than among third country nationals. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that Turks and former Yugoslavians are very heterogeneous migrant groups.

The Representative Study also subdivided results according to age and nationality. Among the youngest age group (under 25 years of age), most interviewees stated that their German language skills were "very good". As their age increased, migrants tended to assess their German language skills as "good" and then as "in between". In some cases, the results differed greatly from age group to age group, so that, for example, 44% of 15-24 year-old Italians said that their German language skills were "very good" but only 30.5% of Italians in the 25-29 age category gave the same assessment (Ibid: 53). As mentioned above, migrants from EU member states gave a better assessment of their German language skills than third country nationals did, and this held true across all age groups. In sum, the results of the Representative Study describe a positive development in migrants' linguistic integration in Germany: from one generation to the next, German language skills seem to improve rapidly within a decade (:54).

The available sources concerning migrants' linguistic competence and their use of language point to the "good" or "very good" linguistic integration of second-generation migrants. In particular, they point to the significant advantage experienced by migrants who are born and raised in Germany as opposed to those who come at a later age: a definite gap seems to the opening up between older and younger migrants in this regard. It is notable, however, that parents' native language continues to play a considerable role, especially as a means of communication between the generations.

3.4.2 Interest in Politics

In the EFFNATIS survey, three items refer to young people's interest in politics: the first concerns German politics (the question was directed at migrants and Germans); the second concerns politics in the parents' country of origin (the question was only directed at young migrants); and the third concerns knowledge of heads of government in Germany and in the parents' country of origin (this question too was only directed at migrant youth). (Table 14)

Interest in German politics is not very pronounced among young migrants and young Germans alike: a clear majority, around 60%, reports a "moderate" interest while only about 15% report a "strong" interest. The results are roughly the same for the question on interest in the politics of the parents' country of origin. Finally, a very large majority of young migrants were able to name the heads of government and presidents correctly for both countries, which indicates – if not a pronounced interest in politics – then at least a certain fundamental "knowledge". There are differences between Turks and Yugoslavs, with 33.5% of the former group stating that they are not at all interested in German politics, while 21.2% of the latter said the same. Tellingly, a larger proportion of Turkish interviewees said they "did not know" the answer to the question on the head of the German government/ Germany's president.

Table 14: EFFNATIS: Interest in German politics and in the Politics of the Parents' Country of Origin

How strong is your interest in German politics?	2nd Generation Migrants	Germans
- very strong	14.9%	16.2%
- moderate	57.9%	63.3%
- not interested at all	27.2%	20.5%
How strong is your interest in the politics of your parents' country of origin?		
- very strong	19.8%	-
- moderate	51.9%	-
- not interested at all	28.4%	-
What are the names of the current heads of government or presidents of the following countries?		
Germany		
- right answer	86.7%	-
- partly right answer/special case*	1.5%	-
- incorrect answer	7.4%	-
- do not know	4.4%	-
Parents' country of origin		
- right answer	87.1%	-
- partly right answer/special case*	1.9%	-
- incorrect answer	8.8%	-
- do not know	2.2%	-

* covers, for example, answers such as "Gerhard Schröder/ Roman Herzog" (the latter was no longer president at the time of the survey) or "Rugova/ Thaci" as the political leaders of Kosovar Albanians.
Source: EFFNATIS-Survey, 2000.

The evaluation of the 1996 SOEP data carried out by Diehl and Urbahn (1998) found that all migrant groups interviewed (Turks, Yugoslavians, Greeks, Italians, Spaniards) showed much less interest in politics compared with Germans (Diehl and Urbahn, 1998: 33f) and that migrant youth showed a weaker preference for specific political parties in Germany (Ibid: 37). In this study, the younger migrants (those aged 16-25) were even less interested in politics than the older groups. On the other hand, the study also revealed a positive connection between individuals' level of qualification and their interest in politics. Unlike the EFFNATIS survey, however, the SOEP data did not include information on migrant youths' interest in the politics of their parents' country of origin.

Figure 5: Interest in German Politics (2002)



Source: SOEP data 2002, own presentation.

However, it was possible to do a comparison of several migrant and generational groups according to their interest in politics. As with the results of the EFFNATIS survey, the majority of all groups interviewed by the SOEP expressed a low level of interest in politics (cf. Figure 5): under 38% of the German study group and only 14.7% of Turks declared they were "very interested" or "fairly interested" in political topics in Germany.

All the available sources indicate a relatively low interest in German politics among migrants (younger and older alike) and that younger immigrants show even less interest than their German peers. Several authors have emphasised the connection between educational qualification and a relatively elevated interest in politics, as well as the fact that EU citizens' ability to participate in German politics (albeit only at the local level) seems to have hardly any effect on their level of interest in politics in general (e.g. Diehl and Urbahn, 1998: 36).

3.4.3 Identification With German Society

In attempting to find out the extent to which migrant youth identify with German society, the EFFNATIS survey asked questions on the degree to which various groups felt a sense of national belonging. These questions were directed at migrant and German youth, although the latter did not answer the question "How strongly do you feel yourself to belong to your parents' country of origin?"

Table 15: Identification With German society

How strongly do you feel …	2nd Generation Migrants	Germans
...German?		
- strongly or very strongly	11.4%	36.4%
- fairly strongly	27.7%	23.8%
- not very strongly or very little	25.6%	10.6%
- not at all	17.7%	1.6%
- I don't think about it	17.7%	27.7%
... to belong to your parents' country of origin?		
- strongly or very strongly	54.2%	
- fairly strongly	28.2%	
- not very strongly or very little	9.3%	
- not at all	1.4%	
- I don't think about it	6.9%	
... to be a citizen of Nuremberg?		
- strongly or very strongly	56.2%	58.0%
- fairly strongly	21.9%	17.1%
- not very strongly or very little	11.5%	12.1%
- not at all	2.9%	3.5%
- I don't think about it	7.4%	9.3%
...European?		
- strongly or very strongly	39.9%	33.1%
- fairly strongly	23.8%	23.3%
- not very strongly or very little	13.8%	16.0%
- not at all	6.7%	4.7%
- I don't think about it	15.7%	23.0%

Source: EFFNATIS 2000.

The results show that second generation migrants feel little sense of identification as Germans and a relatively strong sense of identification with their parents' country of origin. What is remarkable, however, is that both migrant and German youth identified most strongly with the local entity of Nuremberg[33] and that both groups also felt, quite clearly, "European". As in other areas, a significant, if not overriding, difference emerged in the answers given by Turks and Yugoslavs: more often than Yugoslavs, Turks perceived themselves to belong to their parents' country of origin more than they felt German.

Table 16: Identification as German (1991, 1997), in %

How strongly do you feel German?	1991		1997		
	Turks	Italians	Turks	Italians	2nd Generation
Completely	1.3	6.5	2.1	4.7	8.1
Mostly	6.0	9.2	10.9	15.6	15.4
Half and Half	26.0	31.2	27.2	34.6	41.2
Hardly	19.3	19.9	27.5	20.9	16.2
Not at all	47.5	33.3	32.3	24.3	19.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: SOEP data for 1991 and 1997, own presentation

Since the SOEP questionnaire also included the question "How strongly do you feel German?", the results can easily be compared with those of the EFFNATIS survey. The SOEP data for 1991 and 1997 found that the majority of Turkish interviewees did not feel themselves to be German: in 1991, 47.5% of them gave a completely negative answer and only a tiny minority (1.3%) said they would describe themselves as German. And although a larger percentage of migrants with an Italian background defined themselves as German (6.5%) in that same year, on the whole this group's sense of identification with Germany was also very low. Second-generation migrants' feelings are somewhat more "mixed", as 41.2% of the interviewees in this group stated that they felt German in some respect. The SOEP results show a positive development among the second generation towards a stronger identification with Germany.

[33] The EFFNATIS survey was carried out in Nuremberg.

In confirmation of the above findings, the longitudinal evaluation of the SOEP data conducted by Seifert (1995) showed that, for the entire five-year period between 1984-1989, only small proportions (8-10%) of immigrant interviewees felt either entirely German or more German than another nationality. The figures for the second generation were only marginally higher (14-17%) and while the Yugoslav sub-group demonstrated the highest degree of identification, the Turkish group continued to show the lowest values throughout. However, the fact that this is a longitudinal picture of one and the same group of people should not be overlooked.

Seifert's analysis also establishes that there is not a significant presence of people with a "double" identity or of people who feel they do not belong to any nationality (:130) among second generation migrants. In fact, in 1989, only 16% of respondents from this group stated that they often or very often had feelings of homelessness. The EFFNATIS results, on the other hand, point to comparatively more frequent feelings of biculturalism and marginality; the difference in the findings could be due to the greater number of questions included in the EFFNATIS survey on the subject.

In the survey carried out by the German Youth Institute (DJI) in 2000, information was also gathered on whether interviewees felt they belonged to a specific ethnic group within their parents' country of origin. On average, 22.6% of the respondents stated that they associated "strongly" or "very strongly" with a specific ethnic group[34]. The issue of "Identification with the country of origin" was touched upon several times in the EFFNATIS survey: in a pre-set statement (see the first question in the table), in several questions regarding visits to the parents' country of origin, and in a question about where interviewees would like to reside at the age of 30.

Table 17: Visits to the Country of Origin and Intentions to Return

Germany is for living, while my parents' country is for holidays	2nd Generation	Germans
- I agree/ agree entirely	63.2%	-
- I am unsure	13.3%	-
- I disagree/ disagree entirely	23.5%	-
How often do you visit your parents' country of origin?		
- several times a year	22.2%	-
- once a year	46.3%	-
- not every year	31.3%	-
- never	0.2%	-
Where would you like to be living when you are 30?*		
- Germany	40.3%	33.5%
- Turkey	3.3%	-
- (Former) Yugoslavia	3.6%	-
- It depends/ It doesn't matter/ I'm undecided	46.7%	56.8%
- Other	7.9%	11.3%

** The percentages shown cover all the replies that the particular category contained, i.e. The reply "Turkey or Spain" was counted for two categories. This is why the sum of the percentages exceeds 100%.*

The idea that "Germany is for living while my parents' country of origin is for holidays" met with broad approval among most of the second generation youths who were interviewed; nonetheless, a significant minority (just under a quarter) rejected this statement. Also interesting is the fact that Turks and Yugoslavs differ in the actual frequency with which they visit their respective countries of origin: while over 40% of Yugoslavs claimed they returned to their country of origin "several times a year", only 4.3% of Turks said the same. In over 90% of cases, respondents last visited their country of origin within the previous three years; these visits tend to last 2-6 weeks and, in approximately 60% of cases, serve the purpose of "having a holiday" or visiting family and friends and attending celebrations and family events. Motives that could be associated with a possible permanent return, such as marriage or building a house, are not statistically important.

Finally, both young migrants and young Germans were asked where they would like to be living when they are 30. Most youths in both categories replied with "it depends/ it doesn't matter/ I'm undecided" or chose Germany as the place of residence. For migrant youth, parents' countries of origin only played a secondary role (Turks and Yugoslavs concurred on this issue).

On the whole, then, the EFFNATIS results clearly show that a return to the parents' country of origin is not an alternative that young migrants consider seriously. Although many of them do perceive their parents' country of origin as home as well and although visits occur regularly, there is little indication that they plan on returning there on a permanent basis. Answers to the questions point to a relatively clear orientation towards Germany and an openness concerning where they will live in the future place (although this is certainly influenced by age).

In addition to the EFFNATIS project and the SOEP evaluation, there is a wealth of other studies that deal with identificational integration. In general, it should be pointed out that this topic is better suited to smaller-scale, qualitative

[34] The exact formulation of the question was: "It is possible to feel a sense of belonging to one of various ethnic groups living in Italy/ Greece/ Turkey. Is this true in your case? Do you feel that you have a bond to such an ethnic group?

research than it is to large-scale surveys that are necessarily superficial. There are numerous studies of this kind (e.g. Riesner, 1990; Atabay, 1994; Portera, 1995) that deal, in particular, with young immigrants' identity, identity formation, and their feelings of belonging, the details of which we cannot, however, go into here.

4. INFLUENCES OF MIGRATION ON THE HOST SOCIETY

In discussing the two-way cultural integration of German and migrant youth, the following two aspects deserve particular attention: Which structural changes have affected cultural systems? What influence has migration had on the cultural activities of the majority society's youth? It should be kept in mind that in describing and analysing these influences, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the specific impact of migration and the more general effects of globalisation, especially since migration is one facet of this universal phenomenon.

4.1. ASPECTS OF GERMAN AND MIGRANT YOUTH'S TWO-WAY CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Sport has been identified as being a factor of major significance for the integration of immigrants and, in particular, for the integration of migrant youth. Specifically, football has emerged as the sport that has facilitated the greatest number of contacts between Germans and immigrants, which is why a large body of academic work (in the field of sociology but also in social work and education) has been published on the topic. At the same time, ethnic conflicts triggered by football matches have been widely reported in the mass media, often highlighted by negative headlines. Predictably, problems of this kind are exacerbated when teams of different ethnic origin play against each other. Thus, scientific studies have not been able to confirm the general "assumption by society that sports and sporting organisations contribute toward social integration and conflict resolution", especially as far as football is concerned (Kothy and Klein, 2000).

One proposal for reducing these tensions has been to increase the level of participation of young immigrants in mainstream sports clubs. This has occurred almost by default in some large cities, where clubs have only been able to maintain their teams and organisational structures by including young migrants. It should be noted that the integration of migrant youth in mainstream sporting activities also serves to further integrate the parents who, through their children's membership, also participate more in the community life of these club[35].

Eating habits and the **restaurant scene** in Germany have fundamentally changed over the last decades due to the presence of foreigners. Non-German produce and meals have become an integral part of everyday life for almost all of Germany's residents, as testified by the wide range of articles offered in German supermarkets, the enormous number of more or less exotic cooking books in bookstores, and the restaurant recommendations in travelling guides for German cities. The large number of ethnic food stores offering non-German products, above all Turkish greengrocers and so-called "Asia Shops", also draw many customers from the majority society. According to a survey on the popularity of non-German meals among restaurant clients conducted by the Allensbach-Institut für Demoskopie (a major opinion research institute in Germany), about 50% of German customers (and over 70% of people under 30 years of age) say they prefer foreign specialities. In fact, the Turkish Döner, a kind of kebab, has become the most popular type of fast food in Germany; as of the late 1990s, it has also become the product with the highest sales figures on the German restaurant market.

In the context of food and restaurants, it is important to differentiate between two developments: on the one hand, the range of articles on offer is broadened by immigration, and immigration also leads to the development of an ethnic economy (e.g. the establishment of Turkish kebab take-aways, Italian pizza services, Vietnamese cook shops); on the other hand, the extension of the range of products offered by supermarkets, or the variety of restaurants, is also the result of economic and cultural globalisation. Tourism is one of the main factors contributing to this development, as is fashion: in recent years, there has been an increase in the marketing of "exotic" products in accordance with current ethnicity-inspired trends. In conclusion, the everyday food culture of the German majority has changed considerably due to the presence and influence of the immigrant minority.

Migration and the German **media** has been a topic widely discussed in academic publications. In order to remain within the scope of this study, the following paragraphs will focus on two aspects: 1) Immigrants as consumers and producers of media; 2) Immigrants as the subject of reports by the German media. The German media market offers a wide range of products for non-Germans, most of which are monolingual and aim at only one nationality. Over 50 foreign-language newspapers are published in Germany, the majority of which are in Turkish or in other languages of former "guest worker countries". Berlin also boasts a Turkish radio station. In response to a large inflow of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Russian-language print media has enjoyed a big boom since the mid-1990s, and since 2000, there has also been a trend towards mono- or bilingual Internet sites, often referred to as "ethno Internet portals".

[35] Largely because football is still predominately male and because it occupies such a dominant position, the role of female migrants in sports has so far been neglected in academic publications. Two of the few exceptions are studies commissioned by the Ministry for Urban Planning, Culture and Sports of the State of North-Rhine Westphalia (2001, 2004). Migrant girls and women often face the additional

This wide range of relatively autonomous, non-German media products exists in virtual isolation from German media: it is a parallel media world for a parallel society. Many studies have criticised the tendency among migrants (Turks in particular) to only consume media publications in their mother tongue, a tendency that has become all the more acute since cable and satellite TV have become more widespread. Nonetheless, surveys have also pointed out that considerable changes are occurring in media consumption patterns among second and third generation migrants (Dresbach, 2002).

Since the end of the 1990s, in fact, the kind of media being produced and consumed has become much more diverse: bilingual print media has appeared, as have bilingual and multi-lingual/ multicultural radio programmes. For example, the magazines Hayat, Etap, and Türkis (somewhere between being a lifestyle and a pop music magazine that targets young, consumer-oriented German Turks), which are mainly in German, appeared in 1999. Recently, there have also been plans for setting up a German-Turkish TV channel, and German-Turkish film and television companies are staring to play an increasingly important role in the German media market (Becker and Behnisch, 2002).

As for how immigrants are represented in the German media, divergent developments have made it impossible to draw general conclusions. While tabloid newspapers in particular often present a distorted, undifferentiated and, in many cases, negative picture of migrants, so that media researchers have criticised the sensationalism or lack of normality in such reporting (Meier-Braun, 2001; Schorb, 2003), quality newspapers and other kinds of media have long been sensitized to discrimination issues. Their approach to reporting on migration-related topics is cautious and, in some cases, characterised by just the right amount of political correctness. Nonetheless, certain images that are bound to reinforce prejudices, for example pictures of women wearing headscarves, are used persistently in all kinds of media; this contributes the ongoing transmission of concepts of foreignness and backwardness.

It is a fact that migrant "media workers" – journalists, TV presenters, and hosts – have not yet become a "normal" presence in German media corporations[36]. The entertainment sector is a notable exception to this general rule, both in a negative and positive sense. A trend for exotic artists has meant that foreign-looking (mostly dark-skinned) musicians, dancers, entertainers, and soap-opera actors have become a regular feature on German television. Unfortunately, the unthinking consumption of "artificial exotic foreignness" (Terkessidis, 2000) can lead to the public's mere conformance to stereotypes that do not include the actual minorities that live in the country and that are not reflective of their realities. Counter to this somewhat bland approach, is another recent and popular development on German television that includes comedy programmes presented by Turkish TV hosts such as Kaya Yanar (presenter of "Was guckst du?" – "What are you looking at?"), Django Asül, or the Munich-based double act Erkan and Stefan, who, quite intentionally and self-confidently, satirise German-Turkish stereotypes. The latter examples attest to a greater openness to dialogue and could be evaluated as an indicator for more relaxed interethnic relations.

The relationship between music and migration in Germany has not been given much space in academic publications. As with recent changes in German eating habits, even in this area it is impossible to clearly differentiate between the effects of migration and globalisation. It is certainly true that immigrants play a major role in "ethno" and "world music" festivals, in classical and jazz performances, as well as in fashionable manifestations of foreign music like tango or other South American dance styles. However, as proven by the fact that Germans are not the only people who have become influenced by these trends and that the popularity of tango or salsa (for example) cannot be attributed to a large presence of Argentines or Brazilians in Germany, these trends must be seen as an aspect of international globalisation. There is one important exception: several young artists with a migration background – including Xavier Naidoo, Sabrina Setlur, No Angels – have recently topped the pop music charts in Germany.

Furthermore, immigration has led to the presence of a great variety of "imported" music on the market[37]. While "ethnic" music, traditional and folk music in particular, tends to be listened to within certain communities, since the 1990s some of this music, Turkish in particular, has left its "ethnic niche" and entered the mainstream. Numerous Turkish night clubs and music venues in large German cities are increasingly frequented by a mixed German-Turkish clientele with a Western orientation (Caglar 1998). Similar establishments have been opened to cater to an African, Polish, or Greek clientele. German-Turkish youth culture in large cities, especially Berlin, has spawned an oriental hip-hop and rap scene that has attracted a great deal of publicity in the German media and has, in some cases, already been commercialised on a large scale. Hip-hop culture, which has its origins in US African-American ghettoes [38] and has developed on a global scale into a popular form of expression for many marginalised groups, is particularly suited to vocalising the living conditions of young

[36] Efforts have been made to change this state of affairs: for example, a model scheme was developed by the Adolf Grimme Institute entitled "More colourful media" with the aim of offering qualification programmes for migrants in order to foster a greater intercultural mix in the media (Jungk, 1999).

[37] Music imported from migrants' home countries often undergoes modification and further development in the country of immigration (Greve, 2003; Schedtler, 1999).

[38] Because of the origins of hip-hop and rap, there are some striking similarities between German and African-American expressions used by musicians and listeners of this kind of music. German-Turkish rappers, for example, often call themselves "the blacks of Germany" or even "German niggers from the ghetto".

migrants in Germany precisely because its lyrics focus on a given group's local context. The rise of this phenomenon in Germany has resulted in hip-hop songs being performed predominantly in German, Turkish, or English.

On the subject of linguistic expression, there is no doubt that immigration has led to the speaking of a great variety of languages in Germany. Foreign languages have become a regular feature not only in the mass media but also in everyday life, with the result that they also play an increasingly important role in public life[39]. However; there is no evidence of loanwords from migrant languages being adopted by native German speakers. This can be explained by the fact that the borrowing of foreign vocabulary is an issue involving questions of prestige and power, so that loanwords tend to be borrowed from societies perceived as cultural models. The languages of immigrants to Germany, above all the Turkish language, however, have gained only little appreciation, so their influence on the German language is only marginal.

But German-Turkish youth culture has developed its own creative approach to the German language. In the 1990s, "Kanakisch" a satirized and intentionally deficient version of "Türkendeutsch" or Turkish-German developed into a new language variety, with a strong impact on German entertainment media. The term "Kanak Sprak" was coined by the Turkish-German author Feridun Zaimoglu in his book of the same title (1995). Originally, "Kanake" had been used as a swearword meaning "foreigner", but it was adopted by Turkish-German youth culture, irrespective of political correctness. This Turkish-German linguistic mixture has become a symbol for the socio-cultural identity of a social group comprising both native and migrant youngsters (Kallmeyer and Keim, 2003; aid 4/2002).

Literary studies have discussed the topic of "migration and **literature**" under the heading of "intercultural literature", but only a limited number of academic studies have, so far, been dedicated to the topic. Nonetheless, sensibilities have changed over time so that the earlier genre of "guest worker literature" has been renamed "migrant literature" and includes both migrant authors and works of literature that focus on migration.

Numerous authors of non-German origin have become quite successful on the German literary scene; most of them write both in their mother tongue and in German. Many of the literary works written by these authors do, of course, deal with issues of migration, foreignness, and with emigrants' relationship with their home countries, but that is not their exclusive focus.

In the 1990s, a new remarkable phenomenon developed that stands in clear opposition to earlier forms of so-called "cause-for-concern literature" and "garbage-collector prose". The most formative influence on the development of this new phenomenon was author Feridun Zaimoglu[40] who, in his book "Kanak Attack", developed a new idiosyncratic style of pop-literature that combined poetry and street slang. His relentless descriptions of the lives of disadvantaged groups in German society and his scathing comments regarding the German migration debate as well as against migrants have made his work very popular with German intellectuals and feature writers.

All these different forms of German-Turkish pop culture – whether they come from the musical scene of hip-hop or the literary scene of Kanak Sprak or Kanak Attack – cultivate and reinforce a self-confident and provocative language ("We are the niggers of Germany") that is used by disadvantaged groups to create a sense of identity that is valid for a whole sub-culture of youngsters of non-German origin, irrespective of their ethnic roots. In addition to Turkish-German authors, who have dominated the migrant literary milieu for a long time, authors of Russian origin have come to the forefront since the late 1990s. Wladimir Kaminer, for example, has become one of the most popular young artists in Germany, first as the organiser of a regular event called "Russendisko", or Russian disco, and later as the author of a number of books.

With reference to **fashion**, two main aspects are worth pointing out. First of all, several fashion designers with a migration background have established a name for themselves at the local level (above all in Berlin) but most of them have not managed to become well-known nationally, so it would be an exaggeration to say that they have had an impact on national German culture. As far as mass consumption is concerned, globalised fashion trends and international corporations have been the predominant players.

The second aspect concerns migrant youths' fashion preferences and the potential impact of these preferences on the majority society. Especially among young people, fashion constitutes an important means of communication and is undeniably part of individual identity. Hieronymus (2001) has shown in his international comparative study that "youngsters with a migration background, especially if they are defined as being excluded from belonging to the society they live in (…), tend to search for other ways of obtaining access to society, for example by adopting certain symbols of mainstream culture such as 'fitness' or 'brand-name clothing'". Given that so-called "street wear", for example, is very popular among young migrants and German youth alike, it is possible to conclude that fashion is not so much a way for migrants to express their own ethnic identity (and therefore their difference), but rather a means by which they provide proof that they belong to the majority society.

[39] For example, the use of foreign-language explanations in state administration buildings, in public transport facilities, and on instruction leaflets has become standard practice.

[40] Zaimoglu was born in Turkey in 1964 and has lived in Germany for over 30 years. In 2004, his bibliography included six popular German book titles.

As all these examples demonstrate, German culture has become richer and more diverse because of immigration. Migrants have managed to stake a presence in all facets of cultural life, even in the German carnival, which was once considered a typical example of German culture.[41]

[41] Examples of migrant participation include carnival princes of Turkish origin, dancers from 24 different nations, carnival floats using Turkish symbols and the carnival figure *Karagöz* (aid 4/99). Another example is the Berlin Carnival of Cultures, where numerous migrant groups participate every year (ethnological study by Frei 2003).

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are divided into two groups: listed first are those recommendations intended for use in further research and statistical elaboration; the second group aims to help improve the integration process of migrant youth into German society, in particular in so far as structural integration is concerned, since this particular dimension has been identified time and again as a key factor in the overall integration process.

5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND STATISTICS

1. Researchers should adopt "integration" as the key term in discussing the topic because, despite clarifications made by Alba and Esser, "assimilation" almost always evokes aggressive connotations and provokes misunderstandings in most audiences. Integration, on the other hand, is a word that can be used constructively in the scientific world, by the polity and the media, and among wider audiences. To speak of integration is also appropriate when carrying out complex empirical research;

2. The study of "foreigners" is becoming more and more obsolete. It has thus become obvious that, as the number of naturalized citizens in Europe increases, a new term that more accurately describes the reality of the migration phenomenon (for instance, "foreign-born") needs to be introduced. To merely distinguish between citizens and non-citizens in statistical data and survey results is not enough for conducting serious, useful research;

3. In recording the origin of migrants in the education system, the *place of birth* should be identified i addition to the nationality. This would make it possible to identify ethnic German children statistically and, in turn, make it easier to compare the educational performances of second and third generation migrants and to identify specific problems more easily, e.g. as with "newcomers entering education at a later stage" *(Seiteneinsteiger)*;

4. Migration status and migrants' origin should also be measured in the second and third generations. The success or failure of integration shows in the development of these cohorts;

5. Panel studies should be institutionalized to study integration processes with special emphasis on structural integration. The panel studies set up to monitor the educational success of immigrant children in The Netherlands and Sweden could be used as models;

6. From a European perspective, it is advisable to institutionalize internationally comparable panel studies for these cohorts of second and third generation migrants.

7. Surveys should include sections on social, cultural and identificational integration, since there is a lack of internationally comparable data particularly on these aspects of integration.

5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT YOUTH

The present analysis of the situation of migrant youth in the German education system shows that there have indeed been improvements in some areas and that there are a large number of initiatives, organizations, and projects that continue to support the integration of children and youth in education. Nonetheless, the study also shows that there are still considerable differences between German pupils and pupils with migration backgrounds, and that further assistance is urgently needed.Below are some recommendations for remedying this gap[42], some of which focus specifically on the fostering of migrants:

1. It should first be pointed out, however, that - as can be seen from the results of the PISA study - the general quality of the education system exerts a strong influence on the integration of migrant children and youth. For that reason, it is important to examine the quality of measures and educational offers, not only their availability. Moreover, the presence of targeted measures and additional instruction, as presented below, will continue to be important;

2. As migrant children entering the school system tend to have some deficits, primarily of a linguistic nature, and because of the well-founded thesis that attending kindergarten facilitates integration in school, more attention should be paid to fostering migrants in kindergarten. A more intensive cooperation between school staff and parents is therefore necessary to inform them about the possibilities and the positive effects of kindergarten attendance, and more kindergarten teachers with migration backgrounds should be recruited;

3. Migrant children should be offered the possibility of taking a language test before starting school and, should they need it, to attend language courses that would raise their linguistic capabilities to the level of their German peers. Such measures would decrease the chance of children's failure to pass on to primary school and of being sent back to kindergarten for an additional year;

[42] It should be noted here that some of these recommendations have already been implemented as part of projects or initiatives and, sometimes, at the federal state level. They have never, however, been implemented nationwide.

4. The instruction of German as a second language should not be seen as a short-term, transitional measure but, rather, as a long-term means of providing assistance that is integrated with other classes. Furthermore, lessons given in the mother tongue should be based on the curriculum and coordinated with other subjects;

5. A tutoring system should be introduced for pupils with a migration background: older pupils with a migration background who have been successful in their school career could use their experience to assist younger pupils and their parents, thus making the process of integration easier;

6. The topics of migration and integration should become part of academic educators' qualification (for teaching at all school levels and for social workers). This means offering additional training to teachers of German as a second language and integrating "intercultural education" in regular teacher-training courses. Kindergarten teachers should also be taught to be sensitive to the fact that many children grow up bilingually;

7. Intercultural Education has already been introduced into the current curriculum as a requisite for all pupils in all schools (no matter how many migrant children are actually enrolled). However, teachers and educational administrators still need to make sure that the material is actually taught and that it is implemented in a way that makes the subject real to children. This should not only be done through one-off project days or by dealing with the topic on a single occasion (for example as part of religious instruction); rather, the principle of "Intercultural Education" should become pervasive in all lessons. Such an approach also means critically reviewing existing schoolbooks and didactic material;

8. The parents of migrant children must increasingly be considered as a target group: more information and educational offers (e.g. by social workers with migration experience and relevant language skills) and opportunities for additional instruction (e.g. German language courses for mothers at their children's) should be provided. This work with parents is of considerable importance in all education sectors, from kindergarten to vocational training, and should be supplemented by home visits if need be;

9. Various studies have shown that the overall academic performance of pupils in classes with a high number of migrants is below average, with the result that migrant and German children alike suffer significant disadvantages. Thus, should it not be possible to form classes with a low number of migrant children, the size of the classes should be decreased and more teachers should be hired;

10. This paper's analysis of non-German workers' labour-market prospects has shown that youth with a migration background still constitute a disadvantaged group compared to German workers. The main problem is that non-German workers' qualification levels continue to be considerably lower than those of German workers. It is therefore of vital importance that migrant children be offered additional and timely support to prevent that disadvantages accumulate during the years they spend in school, in vocational training, and during the early years of their employment. To counter such a trend, early intervention programmes should be set up in cooperation with migrant organizations;

11. Although it has become clear that the availability of programmes supportive of disadvantaged youth (in general) are of particular significance to migrants, these programmes have often been criticized for their inability to respond to the specific needs and interests of certain individuals or groups. This deficiency, which does not only affect young migrants, is connected in part to the way in which job centres distribute their programmes. Therefore, centres should implement a distribution strategy that takes into account pedagogical continuity and quality as well as cost-effectiveness and competition.

In sum, all the measures listed above, albeit very important per se, should be coordinated into an integrated concept. Linking the individual educational measures would promote a more effective structural integration capable of offering migrant children the opportunity for a truly equal participation in the German education system.

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IOM International Organization for Migration
OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations
OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

Central European Forum
for Migration Research

European Commission Project:

"Dimensions of Integration: Migrant Youth in Central European Countries"

Country Report on Poland

By

Izabela Koryś

INDEX

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW[1]

Although successive waves of settlers from various ethnic groups have, throughout the country's long history, made a home for themselves in the Republic of Poland (Ihnatowicz et al., 1996), in more recent times Poland has been regarded as a clear supplier of emigrants. Only since 1989, when significant socio-economic changes took place in Poland, have conditions become attractive enough to encourage influxes of different categories of migrants, including: highly-qualified specialists and managers assigned to Poland by multinational corporations or institutions, petty traders, Asian entrepreneurs and illegal workers employed in the secondary labour market (Iglicka 2000; Iglicka 2003; Iglicka, Weinar 2002; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2002; Okólski 1998; Stola 1997). While the number of emigrants leaving Poland continues to outstrip the number of immigrants, temporary and settlement immigration has now become a constant phenomenon of social life, to the point of rooting itself both in the people's social consciousness and in the institutions, which have been forced to acknowledge the need for legal solutions to respond to this and associated phenomena.

The growth of immigration fluxes to Poland has raised many challenges in need of confrontation. First and foremost, adequate infrastructures and procedures for protecting large numbers of asylum-seekers have had to be established and developed; national borders have been sealed and a lot of effort has been put into curbing the trafficking of human beings and drug smuggling. Poland has also worked to harmonise its laws with EU regulations (*inter alia*, through the introduction of visas for Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Russian citizens) and with international law. Despite all these problems, the issue of the integration of immigrants is still treated as one of limited urgency that can be postponed to a later date. This low interest in integration matters is favoured by the relatively small scale of settlement migration into Poland: most migrants treat their stay in Poland as temporary, their main goals being economic (i.e. the immediate gathering of financial resources and their subsequent transfer back to the country of origin); alternatively, Poland is seen as a stepping stone on the way to further migration into Western European countries. Rarely is the country perceived as a final destination, which means that immigrants tend to avoid making "unnecessary" investments (for example, through the acquisition of language) into their stay in Poland (Koryś, 2002). As a consequence, the integration of first-generation migrants is often hindered.

Another issue that has, so far, been sidestepped due to the limited scale of immigration and to the lack of any spectacular problems winning the interest of public opinion, is the integration of the so-called "second generation" (immigrants' children born in the host country) or of the "1.5 generation" (immigrants' children born in the country of origin, but raised in the host country cf. Rumbaut, 2000). The importance of these groups is expected to grow, as statistical evidence suggests that more and more immigrants will settle in Poland with their children over the next few years. For example, it would seem that some illegal migrants from the former Soviet Union who have been circulating between Poland and their country of origin are now seeking to regularize their residence in Poland[2]; the decision to bring their children and family with them would probably be the next step towards a definitive transition of their migrant status.

Luckily, attitudes towards immigrants in Polish society are generally neutral, something that is also reflected in the ways migrants are depicted in public discourse (Mrozowski, 2003). To date, there have been no serious social frictions or any other conflicts between the native and foreign populations; this means that, in the general population's consciousness, immigrants are not defined in terms of the problems that their presence could be associated with. This is, therefore, an ideal time to systematize and describe the adaptation strategies that are taking shape among different categories of immigrants. It is also a great time to analyse the actions that the authorities have taken towards immigrants to date so as to assess prospects for integration and to identify potential barriers to that process.

1.1. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

It is difficult to know the exact number of immigrants currently residing in Poland because different sources give different data: they tend to either underestimate the actual number of foreign residents (which is what happened with the 2002 census) or to refer to numbers quoted in administrative decisions, e.g. the number of temporary settlement or residency permissions issued by the Office for Repatriation and Aliens, which does not, of course, have to correspond to the real number of migrants present in Poland (for more on sources of data on migration in Poland, cf. Koryś, 2004; Sakson, 2002). Despite its shortcomings, the data provided by the census is relatively useful for analysing the number of immigrants and their integration prospects. While it is hereby assumed that some of the foreigners residing in Poland were not enumerated in the census, and that many of these were in an illegal position and therefore afraid of contacts with representatives of state institutions, it is equally clear that those who were recorded fall within a group of more or

[1] The author gives her greatest thanks and acknowledgments to Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Piotr Kruszko, Paweł Korczewski, Nguyen Duc Ha, Tomasz Marciniak, and Prof. Joanna Kurczewska and her research team for their great help in conducting this study.

[2] Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians outnumber other migrant groups applying for fixed term residence permits (which is the first step in obtaining permanent residency and settle in Poland) cf. Table , Section 2.

less integrated foreigners, at least as far as the institutions are concerned: they were in the country legally, grasped the purpose of the census, and were able to make themselves understood by the census-takers, etc.

Table 1: Total Number of Foreigners Resident in Poland, by Sex and Place of Origin

Country of Origin	Foreign Residents (residents without Polish citizenship)			
	Total	**Males**	**Females**	**Share of women**
Total number of Foreign Residents	49,221	24,562	24,659	50%
Born in Poland	5,079	2,591	2,488	49%
Born Abroad	43,435	21,628	21,807	50%
Born in:				
Europe	**28,463**	**12,649**	**15,814**	**56%**
of which selected countries:				
Ukraine	9,339	2,933	6,406	69%
Belarus	2,685	827	1,858	69%
Russian Federation	4,264	1,221	3,043	71%
Germany	2,096	1,334	762	36%
France	887	604	283	32%
United Kingdom	904	697	207	23%
Italy	635	513	122	19%
Netherlands	422	339	83	20%
Asia	**7,200**	**4,458**	**2,742**	**38%**
North America	**1,172**	**767**	**405**	**35%**
South America	**310**	**207**	**103**	**33%**
Africa	**1,274**	**1,077**	**197**	**15%**
Oceania	**74**	**52**	**22**	**30%**
Unknown Country	4,942	2,418	2,524	51%
Unknown Place of Birth	707	343	364	51%

Source: Census 2002

According to the census data (cf. Table 1), the total number of foreign citizens (i.e. persons without Polish citizenship) was 49,221; of these, 5,079 were Polish-born[3]. When set against the overall national population of 37.6 million, the proportion of foreigners (c.0.1%) is perceived as vanishingly small. The data also shows that, except in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation, men, who are often the "pioneers" of migration chains, generally prevail among migrants (Sakson, 2001). (Table 2)

Almost 25% of all enumerated foreigners (22% of permanent residents and 30% of residents with a restricted permit) live in Mazowieckie (Mazowsze) voivodship (cf. Table 2, Map 1) and most of them are within the greater Warsaw area. Several factors contribute to this degree of concentration: first, Mazowieckie voivodship provides an absorbing labour market that offers employment opportunities to both highly-qualified experts and unqualified domestic and blue- collar workers; second, transnational environments and migrant networks are already well-established in the city; third, the area offers migrants better access to institutions such as embassies, international schools for children, places of worship for various faiths and religious persuasions, and a better service infrastructure. It is for similar reasons that refugees also choose to settle specifically within the confined of Warsaw, even though the costs of living are markedly higher than in other regions of the country. Apart from Mazowsze, it is the Opole, Lower Silesian, Western Pomeranian, Lubuskie and Silesian regions that report the highest shares of foreign residents in Poland. **(**Map 1)

Where age structure is concerned, it is obvious that the majority of immigrants fall within the most economically productive age bracket (25-55), thereby confirming the already-mentioned thesis that foreigners are motivated to migrate for work reasons. The largest groups of migrants aged 0-14 are from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Germany, Belarus, Vietnam, Armenia, and the United States. Knowledge about the direction that emigration flows took in the past -- from Poland to countries like Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Austria -- calls for treating data on foreign residents coming from these same countries with great caution. In fact, some individuals recorded by the census as immigrants and foreign residents may actually be former Polish citizens who were born and raised in Poland but who subsequently emigrated, renounced Polish citizenship, and adopted another citizenship before returning to Poland later on in life. Moreover, they may now be in Poland with their foreign-born children[4]. Return migration might also account for the decidedly above-average proportion of foreign residents from these countries of post-productive age (55 years and over).

[3] Among foreign citizens born in Poland there are those of the so-called second generation, i.e. the children of immigrants settled in Poland. Equally there may be Polish citizens whose emigrations led them to renounce Polish citizenship but are now in Poland once again.
[4] For more on the current return migration to Poland, see Iglicka, 2002.

Table 2: Foreign Residents in Total Population in Poland (by Voivodship), 2002

Voivodship	Total Resident Population	Foreign Residents			
		Total	Per 100th. of Total Resident Population	Permanent Residents	Temporary Residents (12 mounts and more)
POLAND	**37,620,085**	**49,221**	**130.8**	**29,782**	**19,439**
Dolnośląskie	2,856,862	4,261	149.1	2,650	1,611
Kujawsko-pomorskie	2,052,650	1,660	80.9	1,164	496
Lubelskie	2,191,019	2,069	94.4	965	1,104
Lubuskie	998,007	1,421	142.4	849	572
Łódzkie	2,600,883	3,366	129.4	2,250	1,116
Małopolskie	3,157,057	3,478	110.2	1,965	1,513
Mazowieckie	**5,069,524**	**12,262**	**241.9**	**6,481**	**5,781**
Opolskie	971,930	1,616	166.3	1,220	396
Podkarpackie	2,061,005	1,624	78.8	952	672
Podlaskie	1,173,125	1,608	137.1	900	708
Pomorskie	2,137,476	2,303	107.7	1,376	927
Śląskie	4,630,323	6,278	135.6	4840	1,438
Świętokrzyskie	1,295,813	1,030	79.5	690	340
Warmińsko-mazurskie	1,411,139	1,403	99.4	802	601
Wielkopolskie	3,331,459	2,352	70.6	1,198	1,154
Zachodniopomorskie	1,681,813	2,490	148.1	1,480	1,010

Source: Census 2002

Map 1: Number of Foreigners by Residence Permit and Share of Foreign Residents per 100,000 of Native Population



Table 3: Foreign Residents by Age and Citizenship, 2002

Country of Citizenship	Total	of whom born in Poland *	Age Bracket						
			0-14 lat	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
TOTAL	**49,221**	**5,079**	**6,414**	**6,751**	**11,685**	**10,095**	**6,525**	**3,555**	**4,177**
Selected countries:									
Ukraine	9,881	542	1,15	1,682	3,156	2,048	1,053	383	409
Russian Federation	4,325	61	500	518	895	966	528	305	613
Germany	3,711	1,615	633	232	361	594	511	595	784
Belarus	2,852	167	323	587	908	467	264	140	163
Vietnam	2,093	226	366	302	507	545	315	45	12
Armenia	1,642	15	319	217	496	334	207	54	15
United States	1,321	426	295	94	193	254	160	83	240
Bulgaria	1,058	35	76	141	219	213	237	107	64
United Kingdom	1,025	121	126	46	250	298	150	92	63
France	989	102	166	69	250	195	154	67	88
Lithuania	860	18	56	258	273	110	63	44	54
Czech Republic	831	5	91	142	220	119	139	73	47
Italy	719	84	90	31	120	159	128	107	84
Greece **	532	121	24	11	31	100	119	78	169
Kazakhstan	508	0	39	206	108	75	51	15	14
Netherlands	490	68	75	17	95	129	80	57	36
Slovakia	482	53	56	97	156	89	59	20	5
Sweden	475	276	33	44	54	67	109	102	66
Serbia and Montenegro	452	0	38	36	96	126	80	48	28
Hungary	452	65	50	85	69	81	89	54	24
Mongolia	348	13	69	82	62	97	35	2	1
Austria	328	139	62	34	41	72	68	24	27
Turkey	312	28	16	29	120	107	27	12	1
China	296	43	37	24	82	99	30	14	10
India	289	10	29	21	132	73	21	11	2
Romania	275	2	31	48	99	47	23	16	10
Syria	258	0	14	23	83	104	22	10	2
Algeria	231	0	4	4	64	96	48	14	1
Spain	225	61	25	29	62	44	29	14	22
Belgium	215	30	27	8	41	41	35	31	30
Moldova	205	0	22	49	74	35	18	2	5
Japan	204	8	22	8	52	54	51	10	7
Norway	198	27	13	62	43	29	17	24	10
Croatia	189	30	7	14	51	49	36	21	11
Canada	177	38	38	7	21	39	25	8	39
Denmark	173	0	33	6	29	48	25	25	7
Georgia	168	0	15	29	44	42	27	6	5
Libya	141	11	43	8	26	56	7	1	-
Nigeria	130	3	3	21	47	50	9	-	-
Jordan	125	47	4	12	65	30	10	3	1
Yemen	117	8	21	6	59	30	1	-	-
Latvia	116	0	9	28	42	25	5	2	5
Macedonia	115	15	4	11	30	37	22	6	4
Azerbaijan	106	0	14	15	29	27	14	3	4
Iraq	105	0	7	8	16	33	27	12	2
Others	9,477	566	1,339	1,35	1,814	1,762	1,397	815	993

** Own calculation based on Census 2002*

*** Greek residents also include the offspring of political refugees who settled in Poland in the 1950s. Source: Census 2002*

Source: Census 2002

The small number of immigrant children in Poland revealed by the census is confirmed by data from the Ministry of National Education (MEN) (cf. Table 4). The total number of children of foreign residents attending school in Poland in

the 2003/2004 school year was 3,437, of which 60% were at primary schools, 20% at lower secondary schools and the remaining 20% at secondary schools or in further education. As with the overall population of foreign residents, these children are also concentrated in the area of Mazowsze. Ministry of National Education data indicates that relatively few children from one of the 15 EU Member States (before the accession of 10 additional countries on 1 May 2004) are enrolled in one of the schools subordinated to that Ministry: there were only 191 such children in primary school, 90 in junior high, and 53 in secondary and post-secondary school – while the stock of EU citizens calculated by the 2002 Census data amounted to 9,091 (of which at least 1,300 were children aged 0-14; cf. Table 3). The absence of EU citizens' children in Polish schools may reflect either the fact that most of the children are still of pre-school age or that their parents are striving to place their children within embassy-run schools (which are not taken into account by the MEN statistics.

Map 2. Number of Foreign Pupils by Voivodship and Level of Education



Table 4: Foreign Pupils in Polish Schools in 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 Academic Years

Type of school	Foreigners		
	Total Number	**Of which Permanent Residents**	**Of which Foreigners of EU Member States***
Primary schools	2,028	973	191
Gymnasium (Lower secondary school) I	714	378	90
General Secondary school	439	257	45
Basic vocational School	19	14	1
Vocational secondary schools	89	55	5
Post-secondary schools	133	51	2
Of which in Teacher training college	12	6	1
Fine Art Schools	15	9	0
Total	**3,437**	**1,737**	**334**

** EU Member States before 1 May 2004.*

Source: Ministry of National Education

Although the stock of migrants (children and young people included) is relatively small, the years 2000-2003 brought a marked increase in the number of permanent and restricted residence permits issued to minors (c.f. Table 5). The best-represented group in this regard were immigrants from the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, and the Russian Federation), which seems to confirm the above-mentioned hypothesis that these groups are tending towards a greater degree of stability and permanence in the host country: the pioneers of immigration are moving away from the initial phase of the migration process -- which is subordinated mostly to the need to accumulate economic, social and cultural capital (Portes, 1998) -- towards phases associated with settlement and family reunion.

Table 5: Number and Percentage of Minors Accompanying Foreign Adults Claiming Permanent and Temporary Residence Permits by Age and Selected Country of Origin

	2001		2002		2003	
	No.	**%**	**No.**	**%**	**No.**	**%**
	Permanent Residence Permit by Age					
Total 0-17	**49**	**100**	**40**	**100**	**115**	**100**
0-4	9	18	6	15	10	9
5-9	18	37	13	33	38	33
10-14	16	33	17	43	50	43
15-17	6	12	4	10	17	15
	Permanent Residence Permit by Country of Origin -- selected countries					
Ukraine	16	33	7	18	31	27
Russian Federation	9	18	10	25	10	9
Belarus	4	8	0	0	14	12
Armenia	8	16	8	20	18	16
Vietnam	5	10	9	23	18	16
	Temporary Residence Permit by Age					
Total 0-17	**1,667**	**100**	**1,807**	**100**	**1,823**	**100**
0-4	526	32	537	30	478	26
5-9	567	34	623	34	661	36
10-14	461	28	511	28	512	28
15-17	113	7	136	8	172	9
	Temporary Residence Permit by Country of Origin -- selected countries					
Ukraine	511	31	643	30	716	39
Russian Federation	259	16	249	14	221	12
Belarus	57	3	86	5	119	7
Armenia	52	3	77	4	110	6
Vietnam	81	5	73	4	62	3
France	86	5	119	7	94	5
Germany	38	2	23	1	29	2

Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens

Available data also points to an increase in the proportion of young asylum seekers, both in absolute numbers (cf. Table 6) and in proportion to the total number of applicants. The majority of asylum seekers who are minors are citizens of the Russian Federation, and most of them are Chechens fleeing the civil war in the region. It should be noted that refugees' children are in a special situation because they have often been through harrowing experiences and, therefore, usually require a greater amount of care from school teachers and pedagogues. As the size of this special population increases, it is inevitable that there will also be a greater need for adjustments within the country's educational system. (Table 6)

1.2. RELEVANT MIGRANT GROUPS

Legal status and the reason for migrating are the two most important criteria for differentiating groups of migrants in Poland. In reference to these two dimensions, the following groups may be listed:

Humanitarian Migrants: asylum seekers, refugees, and persons granted tolerated stay The number of asylum seekers applying for refugee status in Poland is growing systematically, as is the number of children accompanying them. And although the overall number of successful applicants is fairly small, the number of acknowledged refugees or persons granted tolerated stay has also increased. The most numerous and distinctive group of refugees is composed by Chechens; this group is followed by citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (most of whom returned to their home country or left for yet another other country following the resolution of the Kosovo conflict), Afghanistan, Somalia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. It is worth mentioning that the integration process of asylum seekers encounters many

Table 6: Number and Percentage of Minors Among Asylum Seekers, by Country of Origin and Age

	2001		2002		2003	
	No.	**%**	**No.**	**%**	**No.**	**%**
Total Asylum Applications	4,529	100	5,170	100	6,909	100
Minors Among Asylum Seekers	897	20	1,646	32	2,610	38
	SELECTED COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN					
Russian Federation	606	68	1,340	81	2,501	96
Afghanistan	114	13	88	5	22	1
Armenia	76	8	37	2	26	1
Ukraine	32	4	21	1	16	0.6
Vietnam	16	2	3	0.2	0	0
Belarus	8	1	17	1	7	0.3
	AGE					
0-4	413	46	608	37	1,012	39
5-9	344	38	502	30	802	31
10-14	60	6	402	24	622	24
15-17	80	9	134	8	174	7

Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens

difficulties, particularly as many refugees typically prefer to leave Poland for even richer countries in Western Europe. Furthermore, very little is done to promote asylum seekers' integration into Polish society during the lengthy procedure of granting successful applicants refugee status (e.g., by teaching the Polish language). Finally, empirical evidence provided by interviewees have underscored that the quality of education offered to the children of asylum seekers requires improvement.

Economic Migrants The European Union's enlargement on 1 May 2004 to 10 additional Member States has granted EU citizens residing in Poland much greater benefits and legal entitlement than other economic migrants who work or reside in Poland. EU citizens, as well as citizens of the United States and Canada, usually enjoy high economic status since they are commonly employed as experts, managers, or run their own enterprises. This group of migrants rarely becomes an object of social research despite some evidence (Szwąder, 2002) that it integrates poorly and does not mix very much with the local population; this situation does not seem to be influenced by the relatively favourable conditions provided by easy access to crucial institutions of public life, large amounts of transferable human and financial capital, and the positive attitudes of the host society.

Although the number of all sorts of economic migrants from the former Soviet republics (especially Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation) is estimated at approximately 100,000 (Iglicka, 2003), only a tiny portion of these may be described as residents or settlers: most of them are seasonal or circular migrants who come to Poland on tourist visas and then undertake short-term or irregular employment (in construction, agriculture or domestic services). Since lots of them keep coming every year, they learn Polish language quickly and establish good personal relations with their Polish employees, landlords, etc. All of this facilitates a kind of 'spontaneous' (i.e. unstructured) integration into Polish society. While the children of these economic migrants are usually left in the home country to be looked after by spouses or older relatives, they are certainly affected by their parents' seasonal migration to Poland, in both positive and negative ways.

Vietnamese and Armenians residing in Poland constitute the most integrated and visible diasporas of third country nationals. The Vietnamese community is estimated at 20-50,000 individuals (Halik, Nowicka, 2002), while it has been estimated that there are approximately 50,000 Armenians (Miecik 2004). Both of these ethnic groups have managed to carve out economic niches, with the Vietnamese specializing in gastronomy and the textile trade and the Armenians monopolizing the (mostly pirate) CD-market and dealing in general trade. Both groups also have in common a serious concern for giving their children a proper education[5], they loyally support their community's members, and are given to developing so-called "parallel societies"[6]. Interestingly, Armenians are one of oldest ethnic minorities to have settled on Polish territory (in the 14th Century). They constitute a historical example of "successful integration" long before the concept of integration was even conceived: numerous Armenians were included into the Polish gentry, successfully climbed the social ladder, and held high offices within the structures of the Polish Kingdom while also retaining their cultural identity and religion, at least until more recent times (Pełczyński, 1997). The so-called "new" wave of Armenian immigrants that arrived in Poland (and Central Europe) in the early 1990s (mostly as asylum seekers fleeing the Caucasian conflicts) now benefits from the assistance of "old" diaspora members who, for example, substantially help in the running of ethnic school for the children of Armenian immigrants in Warsaw. Since a number of Vietnamese

[5] Considerable respect towards education is deeply rooted in ancient and contemporary Vietnamese culture (Halik, 2004)
[6] In-depth interview with the Officer of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.
[7] Data of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens:

and Armenian migrants were known to be living in Poland illegally (either because they overstayed their visas or because they were smuggled into Poland), the Polish government launched a regularization programme in 2003 with the aim of fully integrating those persons (and other foreigners in a similar position) who were resident in Poland since at least 1997 (Iglicka, Okólski 2003).

Repatriates Although not numerous (c.5,000 persons[7]), this group constitutes an interesting case study for analyzing factors contributing to integration processes. Repatriates are the offspring of Polish citizens who stayed in the Soviet Union after World War II or who were forcibly deported to one of the Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union and were not able to return during previous repatriation waves. Facilitating the "return" of repatriates is regarded as a "moral obligation" of the Polish nation towards those members who were "left aside" during World War II; for this reason, sentimental motives often became intertwined with economic ones when decisions on resettlement were taken (Najda, 2003). However, many repatriates felt disappointed and embittered when they returned to Poland, for the living conditions and the requirements of a capitalist economy appeared not to have matched their expectations. Despite the relatively substantial economic assistance provided by the Polish state to repatriates, their reintegration into Polish society has proven to be difficult in many cases (Weinar, 2003; Hut, 2002, Kozłowski, 1999).

2. THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

According to Friedrich Heckmann and Dominique Schnapper, no European country has ever developed a "pro-active" and consciously planned "national integration strategy," or a "systematic and goal-minded action undertaken on a national level". Integration policies implemented in European countries usually take the shape of a "politically promoted process" that "sets conditions and gives opportunities and incentives for individual choices and decisions" to individuals who, in struggling to improve their social situation, adapt to the explicit and implicit rules of the "social order" (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003:10-11). In order to achieve upward social and economic mobility (in a legal and acceptable way), individuals must comply with the host society's institutions and, at the same time, be granted the possibility of accessing and participating in existing social structures. In other words, integration is about guaranteeing rights to migrants as much as it is about their duties as responsible members of their adopted country.

In the case of Poland, the scope of the incentives and opportunities provided to immigrants differs significantly depending on their legal status. Officially, integration policies implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs are still aimed at only one group of migrants, a group that is, moreover, small in absolute terms: the refugees acknowledged by the Geneva Conventions[8]. In practice, however, certain legislative norms that have been enacted in Poland might be regarded as "indirect integration measures" (Hammar, 1985), for they do influence the scope of opportunities available to all migrants (and to his/her descendants) and, by the same token, can either facilitate or impede their inclusion in the host society's key institutions. For this reason, a reconstruction of the logic that determines the degree of access that immigrants have to public goods commonly available to Polish citizens will help to identify the "general integration praxis" that has been developed alongside the "official" integration policy addressed to refugees only.

2.1. MIGRANTS AND THEIR LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS

Polish law distinguishes between different categories of migrants, with each group being entitled to different rights. The categories are the following: humanitarian migrants (refugees and tolerated stay), economic migrants (EU nationals and third country nationals), and repatriates. In line with EU directives, the legal entitlements of refugees and holders of tolerated stay permits are similar to those offered to migrants with a permanent residence permit.

Humanitarian Migrants As already mentioned, refugees are the group of migrants officially entitled to the largest amounts of benefits from the Polish state; the most significant of these benefits is the so-called "integration programme". Assistance provided through the integration programme, which can last up to 12 months and is implemented by the *Powiatowe Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie*[9] (PCPR), includes "expert counselling", reimbursement for health insurance, and direct financial support[10] in the form of a monthly allowance[11] (for 12 months) that covers basic expenses (like accommodation, food, and clothing) and classes in Polish. The head of the PCPR assigns a social worker, charged with providing individual assistance and "mentorship", to a refugee; the social worker is expected to "cooperate with the refugee and support him/her in relating to the local social environment", help in securing

[8] Hopefully, this position will change in the very near future, as the new concept of complex integration policy is being prepared by the Ministry of Social Policy.

[9] County Centers for Family Assistance

[10] The amount of financial allowance depends on the size of a refugee household. It ranges from 1,149 PLN (for a one-person household), to 420 PLN per month (Social Security Act of 12 March 2004, Art 92).

[11] The mutual obligations of a *Powiatowe Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie* and a refugee participating in integration programs, as well as the regulations concerning the size of financial allowances, are as listed in the Ordinance of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs dated 1 December 2000.

appropriate accommodation, and undertake individually-designed actions aimed at the economic activation and social orientation of the refugee. In turn, the newly-arrived refugee is obliged to register as unemployed with the Labour Office and to then seek employment. Besides, he/she should attend Polish language classes and fulfil certain commitments agreed upon, on an individual basis, with the social worker, and meet with him/her at least twice a month. Should refugees not meet their obligations or leave the region where the integration program was implemented, they run the risk of forfeiting their right to receive individual help or/ and financial assistance[12].

Although integration programmes were invented and proclaimed as personalized and custom-designed schemes based on a careful assessment of migrants' needs, skills, and qualifications, the outcomes remain less than satisfactory in some cases. Inclusion in the labour market, a crucial factor for promoting integration, is proving to be the most problematic element. The main barrier to finding a job is refugees' weak proficiency in the Polish language and their inability to meet the qualifications required by local employers. Some challenges (for example, illiteracy or chronic illness), simply cannot be confronted adequately within a 12-month period. Those refugees who do not manage to find employment usually become regular beneficiaries of state social security services (c.f. Koryś, 2004: 54-57).

In fact, asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status have access to a wide range of rights and privileges, including the right to social and unemployment benefits[13], the right to run a business on the same terms as Polish citizens[14], as well as other entitlements, some of which cover their offspring (free education at any level[15] and health insurance). Another important advantage of having refugee status is that it opens up the chance of being offered a cheap, council-owned apartment (currently, this is a scarce commodity rarely available even to Polish citizens), thus significantly improving living conditions and alleviating pressures on the household budget[16].

However, the number of immigrants enjoying such privileged integration conditions is relatively small: between 1991 (when the Polish government signed the Geneva Conventions) and the end of 2003, only 1,764 people were granted refugee status in Poland[17], and 901 of them only became refugees after 1 January 1998. Polish law offers asylum seekers two other forms of migrant protection. The first one, known as "tolerated stay", was introduced as a means to safeguard that relatively large group of migrants who were denied refugee status (because they failed to meet the criteria set out by the Geneva Conventions), but whose right to life, freedom, and personal security might be endangered in their country of origin. Some of these may also risk being subjected to torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment or to some other form of unacceptably harsh punishment[18]. Currently, this form of protection is granted mostly to Chechens who have fled to Poland.

The second form is called "temporary protection" and was intended as an immediate solution for foreigners "coming to Poland *en masse*" after having left their country of origin or a particular geographical region because "of alien invasion, war, civil war, ethnic conflicts, or serious human rights violations"[19]. Since its introduction in 2003, however, "temporary protection" status has not yet been granted to any asylum-seeker.

Recent changes in Polish law have broadened the entitlements available to "tolerated stay" holders so that this group of persons now enjoys almost the same privileges as refugees. However, tolerated stay holders are not guaranteed freedom of movement within the European Union and receive smaller financial contributions from state or local authorities. The maximum financial allowance available to migrants with "tolerated stay" status without other forms of economic resources amounts to approximately 100€ per month (420 PLN)[20]. Moreover, although this group of migrants does have free access to the Polish labour market, it cannot register as unemployed with the local Labour Office/ job centre (they can register as "employment seekers", which gives them access to a rather narrow range of services, traineeships, and other forms of relevant assistance programmes). On the other hand, these "protected" migrants are given free access to the Polish labour market (they do not need to apply for a work permit and are able to establish and run a business on the same terms as Poles and refugees) and their children can attend school under the same conditions as Polish citizens[21] (this is something that is offered to permanent residents and nationals of EU Member States working in Poland and their families, as well as to humanitarian migrants).

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[12] The Social Security Act of 12 March 2004, Art. 93-95.
[13] The Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions of 20 April 2004.
[14] The Act on the Freedom of Entrepreneurship of 2 July2004.
[15] The Act on the Educational System of 7 September 1991 and The Act on Higher Education of 12 September 1990.
[16] As the number of available council flats is far below demand, some refugees must rent their apartment on the free market.
[17] Approximately 30,000 asylum seekers submitted applications between 1993-2003.
[18] Act on the Protection of Aliens on the Territory of Poland issued 13 June 2003, Art. 97.
[19] Ibidem (Art. 106).
[20] The Ordinance of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, 16 April 2003
[21] The Act on Higher Education does not grant recipients of a "tolerated stay" status to free university education (while it does to refugees and "temporary protection" immigrants). What looks, at first sight, like a loophole, might in fact be a conscious decision (prompted by the fact that migrants residing in Poland on the grounds of a "tolerated stay" status are likely to be much more numerous than those granted "temporary protection").

Another privilege granted to all types of humanitarian migrants (and permanent residents) is the right to social welfare and all types of social benefits (as long as the predefined criteria are met). The importance of this entitlement stems from the fact that customary beneficiaries of social security are covered by health insurance while other migrant groups, including permanent residents, are only entitled to health insurance if they are working or studying in Poland. Additionally, migrants with "temporary protection" status are to be provided with accommodation and board[22].

Economic Migrants Among migrants arriving in Poland for reasons other than humanitarian ones, a particularly privileged group are EU nationals as well as the citizens of countries in the European Economic Area (EEA)[23]. Not only are they given access to social benefits, but they are also entitled to assistance in entering the labour market[24] and the educational system (including university-level programmes).

The situation of third country nationals in Poland is more disadvantaged. First of all, in order to receive a restricted visa (issued with a restricted residence permit and valid for a maximum of two years), these individuals are required to prove that they are either: "engaged in [a] business activity […] profitable to the national economy"; in the process of gaining a work permit (something that is quite complicated, c.f. section on the Labour Market); be a "recognised, established artist" intending to "continue […] artistic activities on the territory of Poland"; or in Poland on the grounds of family reunification. Needless to say, only a few labour migrants from the former Soviet Union can meet these criteria, for they are usually employed in badly-paid jobs in the secondary labour market. For this reason, they sometimes resort to other means of legalising their residence: for example, by seeking admission into public and non-public universities (Koryś, 2004) or by marrying a Polish citizen (Kępińska, 2001).

In applying for restricted residency, migrants must show proof of possessing sufficient financial means to cover living expenses in Poland. If applicants are so much as suspected of becoming a burden on the Polish welfare state, their requests are liable to be refused, which means that, until the necessary conditions are met, they must "rely on their own resources" while seeking employment, for example, and pay for services, like secondary and higher education, that are available to Polish citizens free of charge. As before, these requirements are not demanded of EU and EEA nationals. The acquisition of a permanent residence permit (in Polish law termed a "permission for settlement") marks a turning point in the legal status of foreigners and their access to key institutions in Polish society, for permanent residents enjoy the same rights as Polish citizens (and refugees), except for in the realm of voting rights.

Immigrants can apply for a permanent residence permit if they have lived on Polish territory for at least three years (as residents) or for at least five years (in the case of refugees or appropriate visa holders) and if they are able to point to the "existence of durable family bonds or economic ties with the Republic of Poland"; they must also document the possession of "accommodation and economic means" (in other words, they must prove that they are earning a fixed income and have secure lodging)[25]. The outcome of this regulation is quite paradoxical: migrants only gain legal access to social security and/or unemployment benefits once they can prove that they do not need it[26]. The criteria that must be met for applying for permanent residency are demanding. In fact, only about two thirds of applications for a permanent residence permit were accepted in 2001-2003; in the case of restricted residence permits, however, only one out of twenty applications were refused (the ratio of refusals varied according to nationality -- c.f. Table 1)[27].

Naturalization The acquisition of citizenship might be regarded as the final stage on the path to social inclusion. Although the Polish legal system complies with the principle of ius sanguinis (whereby citizenship is granted on the basis of family ties as opposed to place of birth), Polish citizenship is also available to foreigners who are in no way related to Poles, as long as they fulfil some prerequisite: applicants must have lived in Poland for at least five years with a permanent residence permit[28] and, in some cases, must renounce their previous (foreign) citizenship. Under very special circumstances, the President of the Republic of Poland has the power to grant citizenship regardless of non-compliance with these requirements. Although detailed data on the granting of Polish citizenship to foreigners is not published annually, it is possible to estimate that approximately 10,000 people became Polish citizens in the years 1990-2003 (most probably, this number also includes the restoration of Polish citizenship to individuals who had previously lost their citizenship as children or who had given it up through marriage to a foreigner).

[22] Act on the Protection of Aliens on the Territory of Poland (Art. 111)
[23] These include all EU countries, as well as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
[24] EU nationals can register as unemployed and are entitled to unemployment allowance if they have worked in Poland for 18 months before becoming unemployed.
[25] The Act on Aliens of 13 June 2003, Art.65
[26] Witnessing the moral panic of "scroungers who are seeking social benefits" and "living at the taxpayer's expense" that burst out in the UK after the EU enlargement, this regulation might be regarded as a far-sighted.
[27] Own calculations based on statistics of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.
[28] An exception is made for the foreign spouses of Polish citizens – they can apply for citizenship after three years of living in Poland with a permanent residence permit.

Table 7: Decisions on Permanent Residence Permits and Restricted Residence Permits Issued by The Office for Repatriation and Aliens, 2000-2003 (selected countries)

Country of Citizenship	Permanent				Restricted			
	Positive	Negative	Discontinue	**Total**	Positive	Negative	Discontinue	**Total**
Armenia	198	163	27	**388**	2,127	425	81	**2,633**
Belarus	183	75	15	**273**	6,316	151	61	**6,528**
China	100	32	2	**134**	1,177	48	24	**1,249**
Czech Republic	23	8	2	**33**	660	3	11	**674**
Denmark	5	7	1	**13**	706	4	7	**717**
France	23	6	1	**30**	3,492	16	65	**3,573**
Georgia	25	13	0	**38**	268	28	4	**300**
Germany	68	22	7	**97**	4,086	74	69	**4,229**
Hungary	8	2	0	**10**	291	1	5	**297**
India	58	21	0	**79**	1,469	68	23	**1,560**
Iraq	7	8	0	**15**	117	14	2	**133**
Italy	36	8	2	**46**	1,238	12	24	**1,274**
Japan	10	3	0	**13**	758	3	20	**781**
Jordan	15	8	0	**23**	224	13	3	**240**
Kazakhstan	32	12	1	**45**	1,358	17	32	**1,407**
Latvia	2	2	1	**5**	203	5	2	**210**
Lebanon	12	6	1	**19**	129	8	5	**142**
Lithuania	26	6	1	**33**	886	12	13	**911**
Moldova	16	2	0	**18**	697	25	6	**728**
Mongolia	41	48	7	**96**	776	81	20	**876**
Netherlands	21	5	2	**28**	1,029	10	17	**1,056**
Nigeria	10	5	3	**18**	332	28	9	**369**
Russian Federation	305	87	11	**403**	5,367	240	82	**5,689**
Serbia and Montenegro	32	22	1	**55**	672	13	22	**707**
Slovak Republic	10	1	0	**11**	547	3	10	**587**
South Africa	2	4	0	**6**	135	0	1	**136**
Spain	7	1	0	**8**	436	1	6	**443**
Sudan	9	10	0	**19**	56	4	1	**61**
Sweden	19	5	2	**26**	1,086	6	10	**1,102**
Syria	24	16	3	**43**	439	37	7	**438**
Tajikistan	6	7	1	**14**	32	1	1	**34**
Turkey	31	18	4	**53**	1,454	106	40	**1,600**
Ukraine	686	229	39	**954**	19,461	709	237	**20,407**
United Kingdom	41	19	3	**63**	2,809	21	66	**2,896**
United States of America	45	15	6	**66**	2,875	11	65	**2,951**
Vietnam	436	210	14	**660**	3,141	402	69	**3,612**
TOTAL	**3,016**	**1,253**	**172**	**4,441**	**79,002**	**3,095**	**1,376**	**83,473**

Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens

Repatriates Unlike the other groups of migrants discussed in this chapter, repatriates[29] (descendants of Polish citizens who were forcibly resettled to one of the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union under Stalin's rule) can acquire Polish citizenship (and all rights and privileges linked to this status) at the very beginning of their integration process. Once they obtain an entry visa for repatriation issued by a Polish consulate and have arrived in Poland, they automatically acquire Polish citizenship (foreign spouses who of non-Polish origin are granted permanent residency); at the same time, they are defined as a separate group from other Polish citizens and are thereby entitled to certain extra benefits.

Although it is essential to maintain a certain degree of "Polish-ness" is one of the prerequisites for obtaining a repatriation visa (for example through the preservation of the Polish language, of traditions and folk customs), almost

[29] The current repatriation wave concerns those Polish citizens (or their descendants) whose repatriation was not possible under the previous waves in 1944-1949 and 1955-1959.

all repatriates suffer from serious *acculturative stress* [30] and need some assistance to help them reintegrate into the host society. In recognition of this "particularity", legal regulations[31] setting conditions for repatriation also define the scope and various forms of institutional assistance available to repatriates. By virtue of these, repatriates are provided with Polish language courses and orientation training (basic information on Polish culture, the legal system, employment and living conditions). Even more advantageous for repatriates is a guarantee of accommodation and maintenance (for at least 12 months) by the local authority of the *gmina* (commune) that issued an invitation to the repatriate's family. Repatriates are the only immigrants who are provided with their own apartment upon arrival in Poland, who can apply reimbursement of travel expenses, who may receive a special "settlement allowance" (up to 1,000€ per family member, for undertaking necessary renovations and equipping the apartment), and who are also entitled to a "school allowance" (equal to the average wage) for each child of school age.

Compared to those regulations that concern other groups of migrants (and, indeed, even Polish citizens), the set of norms that deals with promoting individuals' entrance into the workforce is very well developed. In accordance with these norms, the number of years of employment in the previous country of stay are taken into account when calculating the right to unemployment benefits and pension entitlements[32]. In addition, if a repatriate "has no possibility of taking up work independently", the *starosta* (the County Governor) of a given *poviat* (county-level administration) may refund part of the costs borne by a repatriate who seeks to raise his or her professional qualifications, as well as the costs incurred by employers who create job opportunities, offer appropriate re-training and "remuneration, awards and social insurance contributions"[33].

A consequence of the very favourable integration measures offered to repatriates (above all, the fact that they are ensured a place to live and means of upkeep as soon as they enter Poland) has been that the number of individuals waiting to be repatriated exceeds the willingness of *gminas* to invite them (Kozłowski, 1999). In 2003, the 2000 Repatriation Act was amended to include the allocation of special grants from the central budget to local authorities as compensation for the cost of accommodating repatriates. However, a lack of data makes it difficult to assess whether this amendment has or will exert a significant influence in increasing the numbers of *gminas* willing to invite and then reintegrate the families of repatriates into their communities.

2.2. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE HOST SOCIETY

As the above review of entitlements extended to different categories of immigrant makes clear, there are basically two main kinds of integration policy. The first ensures that repatriates, refugees, and EU nationals are given access to all (or most) municipal services during the initial phase of their integration. In contrast, the remaining migrant groups only earn the right to participate in certain social institutions, as well as to take advantage of certain services (like welfare payments and unemployment benefit), at an advanced stage of their integration process. Not only are the latter groups expected to demonstrate the "existence of durable family bonds or economic ties with the Republic of Poland", but they are also required to possess a considerable ability to "adapt" in the field of legal employment.

In general, immigrants' access to certain social institutions and to the scarce common goods distributed among the Polish population is limited. Notable exceptions to this rule are those groups of migrants that enjoy a "special" status because of their historical ties to Poland (as with repatriates), because of international law provisions (such as humanitarian migrants and refugees), or because of EU legal norms (affecting EU citizens). This somewhat "selective" approach has been adopted in most Central European countries: due to a limited resources and a high number of competing priorities, specific groups of immigrants are targeted so that assistance can be granted on a small scale and at relatively low cost (Iglicka, Okólski, 2004).

Principles that affect access to the labour market, the educational system, welfare payments, and political participation are discussed in the sections below.

2.2.1 The Labour Market

Access to the labour market is one of the most highly protected and regulated privileges, and, for most immigrants, an essential means for legalising their residence status and for obtaining assistance from the social services (for education, health insurance, etc.). A foreigner wishing to work in Poland is obliged to obtain a work permit[34], which is issued by

[30] Psychological, sociological and physical health consequences of acculturation (see Berry 1992).
[31] The Act on Repatriation was passed in 2000 and amended in 2003.
[32] Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions, Arts. 72.4 and 86.2
[33] Act on Repatriation – consolidated text, Art. 23
[34] Exempt from this obligation are: refugees, those with the "tolerated stay" and "temporary protection" statuses, permanent residents, foreign spouses of Polish citizens, citizens of the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and Sweden (i.e. those EU countries that have opened their labour markets to Polish citizens) and their relatives, foreign students undertaking professional training, and members of certain professions like medical staff and athletics or football coaches.

the *voivod* in which the employer is located. In fact, it is the employer who applies for the permit, not the immigrant (it does not matter whether the employer is Polish or foreign, for the same principle applies to foreigners employed in foreign firms operating on Polish territory). There is a two-stage procedure by which an employer first obtains a pledge regarding the issue of a permit, on the basis of which the potential employee applies for a work visa or for a fixed-term residence permit[35]. In deciding whether to then issue a permit, the *voivod* (Governor of a Province) is bound to evaluating the situation of the local labour market -- in other words, to assessing whether there are other people among the registered unemployed who meet the qualifications of the foreigner in question. Only after the foreigner has obtained all the relevant documentation necessary for legalising his/her status can the *voivod* finally issue the work permit. It should be noted that these permits are issued for a set period of time, to a particular individual foreigner, for a defined post and type of work. The permit is valid for a maximum period of two years (i.e. the same amount of time as a one-off restricted residence permit). The cost of issuing the permit – borne by the employer – corresponds to the minimum work wage[36] or to half of that in the case of a permit's extension.

Confronted with a stubbornly high unemployment rate (c.20%) and relatively ineffective employment promotion programmes, most immigrants find it impossible to obtain unemployment and other welfare benefits. Unemployment benefits are set aside for repatriates, refugees, "permanent residents", EU nationals, and foreign relatives of Poles – on condition that they have worked for at least 18 months prior to application at an income level equal to or above the minimum wage and that they have made the necessary payments to the Labour Fund[37]. These, relatively privileged immigrants, may also register as unemployed and thereby gain access to job offers collected at employment centres, to training sessions run by the centres (with a view to improving professional qualifications), and to on-the-job training. Other groups of legal migrants (i.e. migrants granted "tolerated stay" and "temporary protection" status, holders of temporary residence permits, and relatives of EU nationals) can register as "jobseekers", which also allows them to take advantage of job offers at employment centres and to access different kinds of support services.

The situation for young people (including young migrants) entering the labour market is exceptionally difficult. Suffice it to note that youths aged 25 or under account for 25.4%[38] of the registered unemployed. In principle, no school-leaver or recent graduate is entitled to unemployment benefits (unless he or she has somehow worked for the required 18-month period – which is unlikely in the case of pupils and students). Although job centres and employers are prohibited from discriminating against anyone on the grounds of gender, age, disability, race, nationality, sexual orientation, political conviction, religious faith, or trade-union allegiances, it would seem that – in the face of such high levels of unemployment and fierce competition for posts – young migrants are going to find it very difficult to gain access to the primary labour market. And it is very likely that youths from certain well-defined ethnic groups are going to face even greater obstacles.

2.2.2 The Education System

Primary Education Gaining access to the Polish education system is of great importance when it comes to the integration of migrants' children, and is bound to gain even more importance when the time comes for these children to confront an extremely competitive labour market (as discussed above). In order to fulfil the so-called "educational obligation"[39], all children who remain on Polish territory are obliged to attend an educational institution regardless of their legal status. This legal provision is significant on account of the considerable role that educational institutions play in integrating foreign children (especially through the procurement of linguistic and cultural competence), and because of the negative effects on the development of children's intellect and personality occasioned by their non-attendance in school. Therefore, even the children of parents whose status has become "irregular" (for example through the overstaying of visas, or a failure to prolong a permit, or overdue tax payments, etc.) are able to enrol in public primary schools without any obstacles.

Despite these regulations, recent evidence suggests that some heads of schools have been reluctant to enrol immigrant children -- in particular, the children of refugees and of irregular migrants -- because, whether due to educational gaps, traumatic experiences, or a poor command of the Polish language, they probably require a lot of additional effort from teachers. To solve this problem, special funding has been secured at the local level for supplementary lessons in the Polish language. Following an Ordinance of the Ministry of Education[40], foreign pupils are now entitled to two hours of additional language courses per week (for a maximum period of one year); these are to be provided by the schools but

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[35] The Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions of 20 April 2004, Art. 88
[36] As of October 2004: 820 PLN (ca. 200).
[37] Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions, Art. 77 par. 2.
[38] Data of Central Statistical Office October 2004
[39] The Act on the Education System issued 7 September 1991
[40] The Ordinance of the Minister of a National Education issued 4th October 2001, Art. 6.

Graphic 1: The Education System in Poland



Source: Ministry of Education

funded by the local authority. Interestingly, the situation of immigrant children in schools has also improved due to current demographic shifts: the dropping birth rate and the movement of people away from the city-centre to the suburbs has meant that classes have been reduced and full-time teaching positions have been cut; consequently, schools in Warsaw have become very willing to take in foreigners' children[41]. A similar process is probably taking place in other urban agglomerations.

Secondary Education Attendance in primary school and in the *gymnasium* (lower secondary school) is free of charge. In addition, humanitarian migrants, EU nationals, and permanent residents can choose to attend any other level or type of educational institution, while other kinds of residents are required to pay a tuition fee of 1,200€ per year for attending public secondary schools and 1,500€ per year for post-secondary schools. Some types of school (like art schools, for example) charge higher rates: 3,000€ per year[42]. These fees are defined by the Minister of Education, as are the charges

[41] Interview with the head of a city-centre Warsaw primary school.
[42] cf. the Ordinance of The Minister of Education, Art. 3.

for attending public secondary and post-secondary schools. It is important to note that migrants are also permitted to attend private schools but that, should they choose to do so, they must pay the same fee as everyone else.

In theory, economic hardship should not constitute a barrier to education for immigrant children. In fact, migrant households that cannot afford the annual school fees may submit a claim for a waiver. Upon receipt of such a request, a school's governing authority (in most cases, a local authority) decides on whether to reduce the tuition fee, to split it into two payments, to allow for the payment to be deferred, or whether to waive the fee entirely[43]. In case of need, foreign and migrant pupils can also apply for a scholarship that is paid out monthly by the Ministry of Education[44].

Despite these possibilities, legal criteria for determining who is entitled to receive financial aid (whether in the form of fee reductions or scholarships) have not been defined clearly. Therefore, the kind of help granted (or denied) to applicants often depends on the decision of individual local authority officials, who may be influenced by unforeseen external factors like personal prejudice or budget shortages. Furthermore, immigrants might not be able to access financial aid either because they lack information (not all migrants are aware that they can ask for tuition fees to be reduced or waived) or because they lack "institutional competences" such as the ability to fill in the appropriate documents and deal with public administrative procedures. Unfortunately, no statistical data is available on the numbers of foreign pupils entitled to free secondary education, on those who do pay tuition fees, or on those who take part in additional language lessons[45].

Tertiary Education Access to tertiary education is available to the following categories of immigrants under the same conditions as it is to Polish citizens: refugees; holders of "temporary protection" status; permanent residents; EU nationals (and their children) who are employed and pay taxes in Poland; and EU nationals studying in Poland, as long as they are able to cover their living expenses for the duration of their stay. Other kinds of foreigners can undertake university education in Poland if they have been awarded an inter-governmental scholarship (the yearly quota for this category is determined by the Ministry of Education), if they can pay for their own tuition fees, or, as for secondary schools, if their fees have been waived by the Ministry of Education, the dean of a university, or the head of an academic department.

The first group's right to study on the same legal basis as Polish citizens does not necessarily mean that education at public universities is free. In fact, only those students who pass the entrance exams with high grades are entitled to attend so-called "day studies"; students with less satisfactory academic achievements, on the other hand, are offered so-called "evening studies". Although the curricula available via these two educational routes are usually similar, the latter must be paid for by all students, regardless of nationality, and might be regarded as less prestigious -- a detail that is important when the time comes to look for a job.

Given that large numbers of students compete for "day studies" (which have the double advantage of being free and more prestigious), criteria for entrance is highly selective. With regards to migrant children, especially those who arrive in Poland as teenagers with considerable educational gaps and linguistic insufficiencies, such competition may deny them the opportunity to pass exams and thus take actual advantage of the entitlement to free tertiary education (unless special measures like the granting of individual scholarships or free tuition are instituted). Interestingly, it is not only immigrants who face disadvantages in gaining free access to university courses: even prospective students from the Polish provinces encounter the same kinds of problems when it comes to finding a place in the prestigious, better-known academic centres. This situation is not really an indicator of discrimination, but, rather, it uncovers the severity of selection criteria applied (Bourdieu, Passeron, 1990) as well as differences in performance levels between the best secondary schools, usually located in large, academic urban centres, and those in the rest of the country.

Additional options are available in the wide and diverse range of tertiary education offered by private establishments. Notwithstanding the fact that these courses have to be paid for, private universities do provide some advantages to certain groups of foreign students: notably, through the provision of classes in English.

Teaching the Language and Culture of the Country of Origin The children of immigrants residing in Poland have the right to be taught the language and culture of their country of origin, as long as these courses are organised by a diplomatic institution or cultural/ educational association. If 15 or more children wish to attend these courses, then school directors are obliged, by law, to make classrooms available free of charge[46] and to designate a time and a day for the language/ culture lessons to take place (for a total of no more than five 45-minute lessons per week)[47]. Since the law only obliges schools to provide the premises, it is up to the relevant ethnic/ minority communities and/ or diplomatic missions to organise the actual teaching of the classes.

[43] Ibidem, Art. 5.
[44] Ibidem, Art.8.
[45] Although these data should be reported to the Ministry of Education (under Art. 10 of the Ordinance)
[46] The Act on the Educational System, Art. 5.
[47] The Ordinance of the Minister of Education, Art. 7.

In this sense, immigrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Germany are in a relatively favourable situation because the law states that Polish citizens who are at the same time representatives of ethnic minorities[48] are entitled to keep up their language, culture and national identity, including through classes in primary and secondary schools. The children of immigrants who settled in Poland in the 1990s may also attend these schools[49], although there are only a few such schools and they are not spread evenly throughout the country.

2.3 SOCIAL BENEFITS

Compared to the more developed countries of Western Europe, Poland is able to offer only a relatively modest range of benefits and resources to both Polish citizens and resident foreigners. The Polish welfare state's rarest and most desirable prize is the council-owned flat, something that is difficult even for Poles to obtain; thus, in the great majority of cases, citizens and foreigners alike are forced to compete for housing in the free market. As mentioned above, repatriates are the only group that is guaranteed such accommodation, although in practice they are often also made available to refugees (depending on whether the *gmina* in question has such housing resources at its disposal).

The right to health insurance and free medical care is extended to refugees, to asylum-seekers, to legally employed migrants and to migrants who are entitled to register as unemployed[50] and receive welfare benefits[51]. Welfare benefits (quite often the only livelihood resources available to refugees, repatriates, or individuals on "tolerated stay" who have failed to find employment) are very meagre and only barely sufficient to cover basic needs.

2.4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Only repatriates (on account of their being Polish citizens) enjoy the right to vote in presidential elections, in elections for the two houses of parliament (the *Sejm* and the Senate), and in local elections. Unfortunately, there is not enough data to establish the extent to which these rights are taken advantage of. All other migrants are denied voting rights until they assume Polish citizenship. Since 1 May 2004, EU citizens resident in Poland have been entitled to vote in elections for the European Parliament.

Like all citizens of the Republic of Poland, migrants enjoy the legal right to freedom of conscience, association, establishment, and peaceful assembly[52]. The degree to which different ethnic groups organise themselves, participate in civil society, and get involved in political activities varies quite markedly. The Vietnamese and Armenian diasporas are considered to be the best-organised groups, while also being the most closed to the host society. Of the other migrants, political refugees have, unsurprisingly, demonstrated the keenest interest in political activity (often by keeping up the "dissident" activity that forced them to leave their country of origin in the first place[53]). Some migrant organisations take advantage of the assistance and backup provided by Polish political organisations and political parties[54]; some of them even include Polish sympathisers among their ranks[55].

2.5. BODIES ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTEGRATION

Measures for the promotion of integration (i.e. the range of entitlements and financial resources made available to particular groups of migrants) are determined at the central level. The actual implementation of these measures, however, is carried out at the local level and is, in some cases, subsidized by local authority budgets. The scope and quality of benefits available to migrants may exceed the minimum requirements set out by the law: for example, some *gminas* may – at the request of schools – provide psychotherapy for the children of migrants from Chechnya, buy additional equipment for schools, or supply warm winter clothing in addition to merely giving language classes[56].

Assistance and integration activities carried out by Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are, in general, limited to humanitarian migrants and repatriates, although this approach has changed and other migrants groups are being gradually included[57]; they too are usually commissioned and funded by local authorities. The help they give is, first and foremost, connected to the provision of free legal assistance[58] and moral support, the organisation of Polish-language courses, the supply of accommodation, and the issuing of brochures and guides in a variety of languages aimed at improving living conditions by explaining the institutional setup and legal framework in Poland[59].

[48] Ethnic minority status is afforded to those ethnic groups who have lived on the territory of present-day Poland for at least 200 years. By law, therefore, Polish citizens of Vietnamese origin, for example, do not enjoy the entitlements connected to ethnic minority status.
[49] Interview with a Ukrainian parish priest in Warsaw.
[50] Permanent residents, refugees, EU nationals and foreign relatives of Polish citizens.
[51] Refugees, holders of "tolerated stay" or "temporary protection" status, and permanent residents.
[52] As stated in the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland
[53] Two examples are: the Association of Belarussian Political Refugees and the Chechen Government in Exile.
[54] Political Party *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* is known for its support to Chechen Government in Exile.
[55] Fore example, the Polish-Vietnamese Friendship Society
[56] In interview with a worker of NGO running refugee shelter.

Another type of integration initiative is addressed at Polish citizens, the assumption being that a positive influence can be exerted on Polish attitudes towards immigrants, thereby facilitating foreigners' acceptance into the host society. Often, these initiatives take the shape of open-air "celebratory" events (for example: Refugee Day or Multi-cultural Week) where a certain culture or the traditions of a given group of migrants residing in Poland are exposed. These events typically include musical performances, samples of traditional dishes, and panel discussions on migration-related issues. They generally take place in large cities and academic centres, in part because NGOs working in favour of migrants' integration are located in big urban areas; migrants who live in more provincial regions, on the other hand, are mainly left to find their own way to integrate into the local community.

3. IDENTIFICATION OF FACTORS AND INDICATORS RELEVANT TO THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT YOUTHS

3.1. METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON MIGRANT YOUTHS

Certain difficulties and limitations were encountered in the course of this research project, due to the early stage of settlement of immigrants in Poland. The fact that most migrants have not been in the country on a permanent basis for very long has meant that it is difficult to seriously speak of, let alone study, the 1.5 and 2nd generations of migrants: foreign children born in Poland are, at most, only 10-12 years old at the time of writing, while most of the children born prior to the family's migration to Poland are only just completing their education and entering the labour market. Thus, it will be difficult to make an objective assessment of the degree of these youths' structural integration (or lack thereof) before they have been working for a few years. It is equally problematic, in the case of children, to measure their integration in terms of cultural and social dimensions since cultural adjustment and linguistic competence, as well as intensity of contacts with representatives of the host society may depend less on the children than on the actions of their parents. Finally, it is even more difficult to draw conclusions about the identificational dimension, since the period of most intensive identity formation and definition still lies ahead for many members of the group in question. A separate but connected issue concerns the ethical dimensions of studying children: there is, in fact, the danger that psychological 'wounds' may be reopened by questions that refer to traumatic past experiences.

A further barrier to research results from the need to conduct research from the standpoint of 'outsiders' (cf. Gans, 1999) since immigrant groups in Poland do not yet have their 'own' researchers: in other words, researchers whose ties to the community might allow them to better describe and analyse the group's specific behaviour (as has happened in the United States and in Western European countries). The picture that an 'outsider' is able to draw of a given group's functioning and integration is necessarily very different from the one that an 'insider', who has access to additional insight, is able to give. Unsurprisingly, the two perspectives may give very disparate images. The existing difficulties of studying immigrants from the standpoint of 'outsiders' is often exacerbated by the language barrier and/or by the interviewees' poor comprehension of the idea of social studies; unfortunately, this results in distrust in the researcher.

Despite all these obstacles, a methodology was devised that aimed at interviewing 'key experts' (adults in daily contact with migrant children, such as teachers, education counsellors, and parents) instead of the children themselves (see methodological note at the end of the report).

3.2. INDICATORS OF MIGRANTS' INTEGRATION

It is commonly agreed that the integration of migrants requires providing them with an equal chance to fully participate in the economic, social, and political life of the country, offering them the opportunity to benefit from the same living standards as the native population, and guaranteeing them the same freedoms, including the freedom to retain and develop their cultural and religious identity. The concept of full (or at last fair) participation presumes that if immigrants were not discriminated against and if they did not suffer the burden of additional disadvantages (such as a lack of fluency in the receiving country's language or inadequate education/ training), the degree of their access to crucial areas like the labour market, education, housing, benefits and services would reflect their presence in the population (Coussey, Christensen, 1997).

It is surprisingly difficult to assess the success and effectiveness of various integration policies and implemented measures. Despite numerous attempts at formulating a comprehensive list of integration indicators (see, for example: European Commission, 2004; Council of Europe, 1997; Cagiano de Azevedo et al., 1992), the results of such efforts remain questionable, both in terms of content and objectivity, mainly because even seemingly obvious indicators pose

[57] Caritas Poland offer its assistance to all migrants who address its Information Centres. The newly-established NGO ‘Proxenia’ also claims to undertake initiatives aimed at the integration of all migrant groups.
[58] Provided by Helsinki Watch Foundation and the Halina Nieć Foundation
[59] Polish Humanitarian Organisation

certain problems. For example: can the high unemployment rates recorded among migrants in many European countries really be considered as indicators of poor integration? Could this data not be considered merely as an indicator of insufficient qualifications? In other words, it is not wholly clear whether the high unemployment rate of immigrants is due to inadequate integration efforts or to poor skills (Werth et al., 1997). Bauböck (1994) claims that it is almost impossible to identify truly objective measures of integration because as any such assessment involves "normative background assumptions" about a desirable social order. As a result, discussion on integration usually dwells on "clashes about different political norms" rather than on the straightforward interpretation of social facts.

It has proven even more problematic to accurately assess the progress of integration and to identify factors that hinder and/ or promote that process in Poland because of the relatively small number of immigrants registered in statistical records and because of the "freshness" of the immigration phenomenon in the country. In particular, there is a clear lack of longitudinal data. Nevertheless, existing resources do allow for some comparisons between immigrants and the native population to be made; these concern employment, school enrolment, and crime rates.

Employment The few data sources that are available, like the 2002 Census, show that although immigrants' education level is, in general, much higher than that of the Polish population (35% of foreign residents have completed tertiary education, compared to only 9.9% of the general population), their ratio of economic activity was lower (38%) than that of Poles (54.8%). This source also reveals that the employment rate (36%) of long-term immigrants (i.e. foreigners who have resided in Poland 12 months or more) is higher than that of short-term immigrants (21%) (i.e. foreigners who have resided in Poland 2-12 months) (Kostrzewa et al., 2003);and that the employment rate of the total Polish population is higher than that of either of these two groups (c. 44%) (Central Statistical Office, MRS, 2003). The 2002 Census also recorded that while over 64% of employed migrants were males, in the total population the male employment rate was of 50% and the female employment rate 38%. Almost 19% of migrants declared a source of income that was not work-related and 42% of them claimed they were sustained by other family members (approximately one third of males and one half of females in immigrant households claimed they did not participate in the labour market and were supported by another member of the household). The overall picture concerning the economic activities of immigrants in Poland would probably be different if a larger group of resident foreigners has been reached by the census officers (Kostrzewa et al., 2003). Unfortunately, data on the average income or on the housing and health conditions of immigrants compared to the total population has not been gathered or published yet.

Education An analysis of the educational choices made by immigrant parents for their children points to a relatively good economic situation among foreign families (c.f. Table 4, Section 1) : the vast majority (80%) of children eligible for secondary education attend general secondary schools (compared to 49% among the general population), which also means that they are more likely to continue their education to the tertiary level. Basic vocational schools were chosen by 3% of all immigrant children and by 13% of the total population, while secondary vocational schools were picked by 16% of immigrant youths and 38% of youths in the total population. Since both socio-economic position and average income are positively correlated with educational achievements, the overrepresentation of immigrant children in general secondary schools (assuming they will continue their education) means that for many of them upward mobility is possible and that they have good chances of becoming active in the Polish economy.

Crime Rate Existing sources on crime rates indicate that although the there has been an increase in the share of crimes committed by foreigners in the 1990s, this figure continues to remain below 2% of the all crimes committed in Poland (Rzeplińska, 2000). Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the increase in crimes that was registered in 1990s is mostly due to the rapid growth of cross-border traffic in the form of tourism, not to immigration. In fact, over 40% of all registered offences involved the smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes into Polish territory and almost 80% of all foreigners apprehended for such activities came from the neighbouring countries of Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Lithuania. In line with this trend, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Russians, and Armenians also feature prominently among foreigners convicted for more serious crimes like robbery or theft. Thus, it should be emphasized that the majority of foreigners who commit crimes in Poland are not immigrants but rather "visitors" who stay for only a few days (rarely do they remain for more that 30 days). The extent of criminal activities committed by foreigners in Poland should also be evaluated in a broader context: in Germany, for example, as many as 35% of all people suspected of having committed a crime are foreigners (Albreht, 1997) in Sweden, the crime rate for immigrants is 2.5 times higher that in the whole population (Matrens, 1997)[60].

3.3. DIMENSIONS OF MIGRANTS' INTEGRATION

According to the theoretical structure devised by Friedrich Heckmann (Heckmann, 1999), the process of integration that individuals and groups undergo can be analysed through four basic dimensions: institutional, cultural, social, and identificational. Although these dimensions can be clearly identified and concern different facets of life, they are also

[60] Both references quoted in Rzeplińska, 2000.

inextricably intertwined. This means that progress in one dimension can be either promoted or hindered by progress (or lack thereof) in another dimension: for example, obtaining a job in the primary labour market (institutional dimension) depends on language competencies (cultural dimension), which may, in turn, depend on the scope of an individual's social contacts and on the available opportunities to learn and practice the host society's language (social dimension). By the same token, insufficient language skills limit social contacts and may contribute to increasing one's sense of isolation and lead to ghettoisation and marginalization within an ethnic niche (identificational dimension).

The Institutional Dimension As mentioned in Section 2, it is very difficult for the majority of migrants (asylum seekers and EU nationals being exempt) to prove that they possess the sufficient means of subsistence, in other words employment and accommodation, that is the basic prerequisite for legal residence in Poland. This requirement limits the number of non-humanitarian migrants who can cope with the host society's basic institutions (like the labour market) or who might seek assistance from Poland's welfare state structure as soon as they arrive. Such a policy also overlooks the existence of a vast group of irregular workers who are, in fact, self-sufficient and who often integrate into Polish society spontaneously. Since obtaining a labour permit requires the direct involvement of a future employer, migrants who do not have the support of a migrant-based network (as the Vietnamese do, for example), or who are not recruited by international enterprises, have little chance of getting legal employment in Poland upon arrival in the country. Which is why migrants who come to Poland looking for unskilled work usually undertake these posts illegally; this then excludes them from participating in the key institutions of Polish society.

Once they are illegal, it is difficult for people like domestic servants to regularise their residence status by seeking a legal work permit with an appropriate visa or a temporary residence permit. The Ukrainian women who were interviewed for this research reported that they were engaged in irregular employment for an average of three years before they found a family that was ready to arrange a work permit for them or before they had gained sufficient "institutional competence" and had generated enough savings to enable them to undertake self-employment in Poland. Since arranging legal employment for a foreign baby sitter or nurse is quite costly (in addition to the wage, employers must pay a monthly social security fee), there are very few chances of finding legal employment, even despite the considerable demand for this type of services.

Unlike economic migrants, refugees and repatriates have shown a tendency to remain dependant on assistance provided by the host society for a long time, with some of them becoming customary "clients" with few opportunities to overcome their difficulties and regain self-sufficiency. One reason why so many of them encounter serious problems in finding regular employment in Poland is that they do not have transferable skills (c.f. following sections). Another is that a high national unemployment rate results in an extremely competitive labour market. While it is true that seasonal irregular migrants also lack transferable skills, they are more competitive than refugees and repatriates because they tend to be more flexible and to work for lower wages; understandably, this "unfair competition" creates a situation that does not satisfy refugees and repatriates. Income gained from jobs typically offered to temporary/ seasonal immigrants might be attractive to Ukrainians and Belarussians because of the difference in purchasing power parity between Poland and their own countries, but they are hardly sufficient to cover basic expenses for someone living in Poland.

The Cultural Dimension Gaining linguistic competence is crucial for progress in this dimension. Given the difficulties that many foreigners have in learning the Polish language, migrants from the neighbouring countries to the east -- Ukraine, Belarus, the Russia Federation -- are in favourable position: the similarity between Slavonic languages means that citizens of these countries find it relatively easy to achieve passive understanding of Polish. Migrants from this group usually learn Polish easily, and some of them may know the basics of the language and may be acquainted with Polish reality even before their first visit in Poland through Polish TV Channels. In addition, oral communication is often possible because older generations of Poles were taught Russian in public schools and still remember basic vocabulary. As the priest of a Greek Catholic Parish in Warsaw attended by Ukrainian migrants testified:

> Usually, those who come from western Ukraine understand pretty well. And they are able to get into close contact [with Poles]. They do not speak impeccable Polish, they make many mistakes while speaking, but they understand correctly and do not encounter serious communication problems[61].

Predictably, Russian citizens whose mother tongue belongs to another language group do not enjoy the same advantages: refugees and migrants from Chechnya, Georgia, or Armenia, for example, encounter greater difficulties in learning and understanding Polish, despite the fact that many of them also know Russian[62].

Knowledge of Polish sharply differentiates the Vietnamese diaspora in Poland. Usually, Vietnamese immigrants who posses a good command of Polish have studied at Polish universities and belong to a first wave of Vietnamese migration to Poland (Halik, Nowicka, 2003). Regarded as an 'elite' among their community, many of them have been able to establish legal enterprises and often represent their compatriots who do not speak Polish in relations between the Vietnamese

[61] From an in-depth interview with the priest of a Greek Catholic Parish in Warsaw attended by Ukrainian migrants.
[62] Poor knowledge and comprehension of Polish among Chechen refugees is often mentioned by Polish social workers implementing individual integration programmes.

community and Polish authorities and society. There are also many Vietnamese in Poland who have not acquired a working knowledge of Polish and who are able to make a living and survive in the new country thanks to the support provided by the Vietnamese diaspora. For example, there are Vietnamese-language presses printed and distributed in Poland that serve the community by informing them of important events and instructing them on how to deal with Polish regulations. Despite this support mechanism, a lack of linguistic competence (often combined with illegality) does marginalize some Vietnamese migrants in Poland and makes them more vulnerable to abuse by both their fellow citizens and by Poles[63].

Interestingly, the degree of linguistic competence achieved by men and women within the Vietnamese community in Poland (this is probably true of other migrant groups too) differs significantly: since women tend to work within households and Vietnamese-owned firms, they have fewer opportunities to practice Polish than men; consequently, women tend to have a weaker grasp of the language. Competency also varies according to age and, unsurprisingly, length of stay in Poland: Vietnamese children who were raised in Poland and attend Polish schools speak Polish fluently and often become interpreters for their parents in relations with members of the host society (for example, with school teachers). As the head of a lower secondary school in Warsaw commented, this can raise some difficulties:

> We tried to reach Vietnamese parents to discuss their children's problems, but those contacts were difficult. In many cases, the only possible interpreter was the Vietnamese child who was directly interested in the content of our conversation. It has sometimes happened that the Vietnamese community has come in support of the parents by providing an adult interpreter, but it is uncomfortable to talk about family problems in the presence of a third party. In general, it is difficult to talk about this with interpreters.

The existence of these kinds of problems were confirmed by the observations of an expert on the Vietnamese diaspora in Poland who was interviewed for this study:

> Teachers complain that Vietnamese parents rarely contact them. In theory, there are few problems with children, so there is no urgent need for frequent contacts, but … teachers find Vietnamese parents to be unwilling to maintain the contact. Of course, they are ready to help, to provide class events with Vietnamese foods, etc, but there are problems with their personal involvement, with direct contact… The Vietnamese themselves see it in a different way. For sure, the language barrier is a problem: Vietnamese mothers come to parents' evenings with their children as interpreters, which is a source of difficulties, but they also often feel disrespected by teachers, treated as if "There is no point in explaining anything to her, she would not understand anyhow". This is not only simply a communication problem…

Similarly, migrants from Western countries (especially those who do not intend to stay in Poland permanently) have not shown much interest in investing time and effort into learning Polish or in getting acquainted with Polish culture (Szwąder, 2002) . Hence, they tend to send their children to private schools where classes are taught in English or French, thus limiting contacts with Polish society and language.

The Social Dimension There is no doubt that insufficient language competencies seriously limit the scope and intensity of relationships between immigrants (and refugees) and host society members. The distance that this creates between the communities can be passed on from generation to generation: teachers and educational councillors who were interviewed in the framework of this research confirmed that Vietnamese and Polish children often interact only within the school environment and that this might be due to Vietnamese parents' wishes:

> A: In fact, Vietnamese children do not invite Polish peers to their homes.
> Q: But are they invited by Polish children?
> A: Yes
> Q: Do they accept these invitations?
> A: It depends. I realised some time ago that there is a 'secret line [of behaviour]', and that this line is set by parents (…) but, probably, as they grow roots here, peer groups will become increasingly important, more important even than [the line of behaviour demanded by] a mother or a father...

Low economic status may also affect the frequency and extent of personal contacts between members of a given ethnic community and people outside this community. One school psychologist, for example, described the case of a Ukrainian girl who joined the last class of primary school: since the girl's mother was working as a cleaner and could only afford basic necessities, the girl was not able to participate in a classroom 'vanity fair', where pupils showed off with trendy clothes and gadgets. Consequently, the girl's sense of isolation increased. With regard to difficulties in compensating for academic differences between the Ukrainian curriculum (which she had been following before coming to Poland) and the Polish curriculum (which she was obliged to adapt to), and in overcoming communication problems, the girl's classmates found her socially unattractive and excluded her from informal social life.

Other teachers have noticed, however, that some Vietnamese pupils have tried to restore out-of-school contacts with their Polish classmates as their families achieve a better financial position:

[63] Vietnamese representatives often complain that their compatriots are harassed by Polish officials like policemen, public transport controllers, etc. but due to lack of communication skills are not able to submit any claims.

> That is a new phenomenon [among] the Vietnamese who have settled here, who no longer rent one studio per two families, are starting to drive nice cars, are doing well, have achieved something, have large comfortable apartments or houses in the suburbs; that is when the mutual contacts, the invitations begin (…) at the begging they are probably ashamed of their poverty, of improvised arrangements, of cardboard boxes instead of furniture, but once their economic situation improves, then it changes…

The tendency towards collective living and forming large networks, typical of the Vietnamese and Armenians, have had a double-edged effect on the social functioning of these migrants. On the one hand, these networks provide the kind of support and resources that facilitate cultural orientation and adaptation in the host country; for example, they impart knowledge of legal regulations or the availability of financial loans (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Moreover, migrant organisations formally and informally animate various forms of social life by providing multiple opportunities for meetings among compatriots, information exchange, the maintenance of a collective identity and cultural heritage, the celebration of national holidays etc. Obviously, immigrants from officially acknowledged ethnic minorities like the Ukrainians and Armenians are in a particularly privileged position because, although contacts between 'old' and 'new' diaspora members are rarely close and intense, newcomers can take advantage of the ethnic community's structures and institutions. For example, Ukrainian migrants may attend the social meetings organised by the Warsaw Greek Catholic Parish, as well as profit from the 'institutional competences' gained by compatriots who have been in Poland some time. And then there is the case of the Polish Armenians who, upon request of their newly-arrived fellow citizens, organised an ethnic school for Armenian pupils. As respected Polish citizens who were well-acquainted with Polish law and local institutional procedures, they were able to negotiate more favourable terms (such as free classroom space) than the Vietnamese ethnic school.

Charity football match between Polish actors and Vietnamese residents in Poland organized in Warsaw to celebrate the Vietnamese Independence Day.

Photo by Izabela Koryś

On the other hand, the existence of well-developed networks decreases new immigrants' motivation to establish relations with host society members and often 'punishes' community members who try to emancipate themselves from the network's influence:

> Vietnamese, Armenians, and Chechens start to develop something like… [to call it a] ghetto would be too much, but they do develop a closed social structure. […] This closed social structure is ruled by its own internal regulations. Within the structure, especially the Vietnamese and Chechen ones, there is an informal judiciary system, an informal leadership, an informal socio-political life. […] These groups are not aiming to integrate quickly into Polish society. Within these groups, there have even been cases of persecution of those countrymen who did not subordinate to dominant behaviour patterns or who started to integrate into Polish society. […] We are aware of such cases, we know about murders that have been committed within these groups, but it is very hard, practically impossible, to identify the killer. The group is so hermetic that, beside the corpses, nothing could be found[64].

The Identificational Dimension Because this dimension is the most 'subjective', it is also the most difficult to assess. However, it can be said that, in general, immigrants do not neatly change from identifying with their country of origin to identifying with their adopted country: rather, with time, they develop a new, dynamic, multi-cultural identity. A similar tendency has been observed in other European countries: here too, the children of immigrants develop bicultural, hybrid identities instead of adopting the majority identity (Curl, Vermeulen, 2003). This is all the more true for children and

[64] Interview with a High Official of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

adolescents, who, precisely because of their young age, feel the influences of both countries in the process of self-construction most acutely. One Vietnamese teacher described a group of Vietnamese pupils as follows:

> I call them banana children because they have yellow skin but are white inside. […] Vietnamese children must not be treated as Vietnamese nationals but as Polish children of Vietnamese origin. Above all, because they speak Polish and think in Polish. They speak Polish with their Polish baby sitters. They prefer to communicate in Polish because it is easier for them […] And they see Aleje Jerozolimskie and Marszałkowska [main streets in Warsaw] as more friendly places than a meadow in Hanoi. They consider visiting their homeland just as they would a trip to Venice or Tunisia: [Vietnam is] just another exotic place…[65]

Polish teachers have also confirmed that Vietnamese children[66] and youths who were raised in Poland seem to incorporate Polish elements into their identificational structure. Nonetheless, the extent to which these children include elements of Polish culture into their identity differs widely among various groups and depends greatly on the orientations and attitudes of their parents:

> As a community, they [the Vietnamese] have to struggle to maintain their children's national identity. […] I have observed those slant-eyed toddlers run down corridors and play in Polish, even though their companions are also Vietnamese. All these children have Vietnamese parents but they play among themselves in Polish. You cannot tell the difference between the way a nine or 10-year-old Pole plays and the way Vietnamese children play. So I think that the problem of their integration will be secondary to the problem of preserving their Vietnamese identity.
>
> […]
>
> I think that much depends on the atmosphere at home. [In other words, on] whether Poland is regarded as a transit country, a country for making money, or as a new homeland. That's the main factor that impinges on their identification. There are children who function perfectly in society, are fluent in Polish language, but [who continue to] say "that is yours, ours is different". Those children who have great ambitions and plan their future in other countries, or are going to study abroad, function completely differently…[67]

An important factor that influences the identificational process is the level of inclusiveness and the attitudes held by the host society and its members towards immigrants. If immigrants are constantly reminded by host society members that they are "different" from the rest of society (and that their "otherness" is regarded as a social stigma), or if they are persecuted or insulted because of visible minority racial features, it is much less likely that they will take on a new identity. For example, almost half (42.4%) of repatriates participating in orientation trainings have complained that they were rudely "reminded" that they were "second-class Polish citizens" by their acquaintances or employers. It comes as no surprise, then, that only 44.4% identified strongly as Poles and that 45.1 % felt they were "somewhat" Polish, while others claimed other identifications (Sochocki, 2003).

Although cases of racial persecution in Poland have, so far, been sporadic and involved relatively few people[68], non-European migrants, especially Vietnamese migrants or African refugees, are sometimes exposed to mistreatment by Polish citizens. On the contrary, migrants who can easily disguise themselves among the majority population because they lack distinctive racial traits are less likely to be targeted by xenophobic prejudices; the identificational shift towards the host society is thus facilitated. This mainly concerns migrants from the neighbouring countries of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation).

> I think that the Ukrainians who settle down here and who get married with Polish citizens end up integrating into Polish society so well that they lose contact with their Ukrainian roots… Last year, I received a call from the Warsaw Catholic parish about some Ukrainian parents who wanted their child to do his or her First Communion in a Catholic church, with other children, but who did not know the rules of the Greek Catholic Church. I answered that, according to Church law, the child should do the First Communion here, but the parents did not agree to that: they wanted to immerse [themselves into Polish society] to the greatest extent possible, to lose their distinctive features, to no longer be described as Ukrainians…[69]

Although, in some cases, it may be impossible to rid oneself of these 'distinctive features' completely, research shows that immigrant youths do try to adjust to the majority:

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[65] Interview with a head of a Vietnamese ethnic school in Warsaw.

[66] Since Vietnamese children are the only relatively large and visible group of immigrants in Polish schools, teachers were not able to provide general observations concerning the assumed identificational affiliations of other ethnic groups.

[67] Interview with a teacher of lower secondary schools attended by numerous Vietnamese students

[68] Hillman (2001) reports that in the 1990s Vietnamese migrants living in former East Germany "stopped using public transport and had to fear racist attacks when in public or searching for housing". In 1995, half of this Vietnamese community stated that it had had contacts with hostile natives and that they had met with discrimination in housing and employment matters. In Poland, the scale of racist attacks has never reached such levels; in fact, the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) and officials from the Office for Repatriation and Aliens have confirmed that Polish rates are lower that in other CEE countries.

> Why do Vietnamese pupils fit perfectly into the Polish educational system? Because they do not ask questions, are polite, say good morning, wear neat clothes, obey teachers' orders, do not raise any questions or doubts. Given that Vietnamese children do not have any questions or doubts -- but this is just my own interpretation -- I think that they simply do not want to make themselves visible. Their anthropological characteristics are strong enough to discourage them from emphasizing [additional] differences. They do not want this. They avoid speaking about their homeland culture or language, they do this really reluctantly[70].

Another widespread method adopted by Vietnamese children to 'melt into' the majority group is that of adopting a typically Polish first name, a practice that is also picked up by Polish teachers and classmates because they often have problems pronouncing the Vietnamese name correctly. Interestingly, however, the head of one of Warsaw's secondary lower schools prohibited this practice by insisting that all immigrant children be called by their legal names. Hopefully, this kind of regulation will become more popular as the number of migrant children in Polish schools grows.

Migrants from EU countries do not have to struggle to lose their 'distinctive features' because Poles do not, in general, regard these features to be inferior to their own.

3.4. FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS

Integration is a complex and long-lasting process that requires commitment and effort from both immigrants and the receiving society. Therefore, the outcome and the timing of that process depend on factors related immigrants' personal and group characteristics as much as they are on factors related to the institutional and social environment of the host country. Concerning immigrants' personal characteristics and the particular features of the group she/ he belongs to, the following factors can be identified:

The Extent to Which Human Capital can be Transferred From the Country of Origin to the Host Country According to economic approaches to migration theories, integration (hereby measured in terms of labour market adjustments in the receiving country and the wage gap between the native and immigrant populations) depends on the international transferability of human capital. The extent to which human capital can be transferred between two countries depends on the types of skills possessed by individuals, on the similarities between the sending and receiving countries (with regards to language, culture, labour market structure, and institutional setting), and the reason for migration (i.e. economic or non-economic).

This theory assumes that economic migrants plan their movement and invest, in advance, in the transferability of their human capital by adjusting it to the specific needs of the receiving country's labour market. On the other hand, it is assumed that non-economic migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees do not, typically, plan their migration and therefore do not invest in advance in the transferability of their human capital. Consequently, asylum seekers and refugees are likely to exhibit greater earnings disparities than economic migrants do in comparison to natives (Bauer, Lofstrom Zimmerman, 2000). This theoretical assumption is confirmed in Poland, where refugees seem to suffer from the greatest 'devaluation' of human capital: educated refugees encounter considerable difficulties in having their professional qualifications acknowledged and few of them ever manage to find employment in their field. As a result, at least at the beginning of their occupational career in Poland, they tend to earn considerably less than Poles. Similar difficulties are encountered by repatriates: some of them have had to accept posts far below their previous occupational position (Najda, 2003; Sochocki, 2003) because no vacancies matching their skills and professional qualifications were available in the *gminas* where they settled.

Age of Immigrants Another factor that influences the economic integration of immigrants is their age. As the economic theory outlined above predicts, older immigrants tend to invest less in honing their skills to meet the human capital needs of a specific country than younger immigrants do, primarily because they have a shorter working lifespan in which to collect the returns from these investments (Bauer, Lofstrom Zimmerman, 2000). As mentioned in Part One (c.f. statistical overview), most migrants coming to Poland are between 25-55 years old. The influx of older migrants usually results from family reunification, return migration, and repatriation. It is worthwhile mentioning that, due repatriates' severe difficulties in adapting socially and, above all, economically, into Polish life (Hut, 2002), some academics have suggested limiting repatriation possibilities to younger people and assisting older would-be repatriates in their country of residence instead of resettling them (Okólski, 1998).

Planned Length of Stay This theoretical model also assumes that temporary migrants will have fewer incentives to make human capital investments in the receiving country than permanent migrants, because their expected life-time returns from these investments will be lower due to a shorter stay (Dustman, 1993). This assumption holds true for refugees and asylum seekers in Poland, a majority of whom would like to move to Western European countries, whether legally or illegally.

[69] Interview with the priest of a Greek Catholic Parish in Warsaw
[70] Interview with an expert on the Vietnamese ethnic group residing in Poland

Since they plan on continuing their journey, most of them do not 'waste' their time, money, and energy on learning Polish or even on monitoring their children's education in Polish schools.

As mentioned in previous sections, some migrants might find temporary, circular migration to be the only way of entering and working in a given country. Although circular forms of migration may appear as 'an easy and accessible option' for economic migrants from neighbouring countries, in the long run this usually leads to social marginalization in both the sending and receiving communities (Osipowicz, 2001).

The Existence of Ethnic Enclaves Theoretical and empirical evidence collected in a number of countries confirms the negative effect on integration of large ethnic enclaves: the larger the ethnic enclave in the receiving country, the lower the returns from country-specific human capital investments and the lower the level of assimilation with the natives (Borjas, 2000). The inclusion of immigrant children and youths into the local education system seems to counterbalance the 'isolationist' effect caused by large ethnic enclaves.

Cultural Patterns Cultural patterns that identify which values are desirable and which goals are to be achieved by an individual within a certain immigrant group necessarily also shape interpersonal relations between the 'in-group' and the 'out-group' and influence economic performance and integration level. The tendency for a group to privilege individualistic over collective values, for example, affect all areas of social and economic life; similarly, social rules regarding the acceptability (or non-acceptability) of certain interpersonal relations may either facilitate or impede the establishment of contacts between the two groups:

> I observed one Ukrainian family [in a refugee reception centre] that immediately established personal contacts [with Poles]. They went somewhere and instantly made friends with the people they met, while the refugees from Chechnya did not. Chechens stick to one other and prefer their own companionship. They do not exhibit the same ease in approaching unknown people and in establishing personal relations that Ukrainians do[71].

Also, culturally-determined attitudes towards children's education profoundly influence young migrants' educational achievements:

> We had a Chechen girl, [she was] a very bright pupil. One day, she came to me and announced that she would not go to school because her parents were expecting guests and she had to clean up the house. This means that, since she was the oldest girl in the family, her mother was using her as an assistant for doing the house work. It is part of the tradition and culture of this nation for girls to help at home, it is considered more important to bake cakes and to cook some dishes than it is to attend school. […] Residents in our reception centres give different excuses for staying off school. For example, that they do not have proper shoes, or that it is raining. For them, these are sufficient reasons not to send their children to school[72].

The most influential factors currently affecting the integration process of immigrants into Polish society seem to be: the educational system and the host society's dominant attitudes towards immigrants.

The Educational System The extreme importance of effectively incorporating immigrants' children into the educational systems is obvious: by attending schools, children learn Polish, gain cultural competencies, and obtain skills that they will later be able to utilise in the labour market. Moreover, going to school enables immigrant children to establish direct personal contacts with members of the host society. And, last but not least, it should be stressed that good academic results are strongly correlated with economic self-sufficiency and generational upward mobility.

Perhaps due to the small proportion of migrant children compared to the native population, no problems have emerged from the presence of foreign children in schools. Since there are rarely more that 20 foreign children enrolled in any one school (on average, there are 0-5 foreign students enrolled per school in the Warsaw area), the danger of the informal segregation of schools attended by immigrants from those targeted exclusively to the native population is low. Quite to the contrary, it would seem that a higher concentration of migrant students promotes the development of good practices that facilitate migrant pupils' integration. As a result, immigrant parents tend to send their children to schools known for their friendly and welcoming environment and for their active promotion of tolerant attitudes towards immigrants by teachers and native students alike[73].

It is common practice to assign one migrant child per class. Although this may prove stressful for children with poor Polish-language communication skills, the dispersion of migrant children does fasten the establishment of personal relations between all classmates and accelerates the learning of Polish.

This latter aspect is all the more important in the light of the widely-recognised fact that poor language skills severely and negatively affects academic performance in all fields. While migrant children from mixed marriages who have been

[71] Interview with the worker of the refugee shelter.
[72] Interview with the worker of refugee shelter.
[73] Interview with the head of a consortium of private lower and upper secondary schools in Warsaw

brought up in Poland or have attended Polish primary schools rarely face any problems in following the curriculum, students who join the educational system at an advanced stage without good command of Polish encounter serious difficulties in keeping up with the rest of the class. For this latter group of students, the initial language barrier limits their comprehension and participation in lessons, thus obstructing their process of adjustment to the new environment. Even when provided with additional language lessons, these children are not able to make up for their insufficiencies quickly enough to keep up with the curriculum. While teachers are often more lenient because they are aware of the difficulties, final scores in standardized tests at the end of primary school, in the gymnasium (secondary lower school), and in entrance tests to the lyceum (secondary upper school) are lower. It should be noted that since Polish schools are rated according to their pupils' final test results, some headmasters might avoid enrolling 'potentially troublesome' children into their schools.

From the perspective of local education staff, the children of refugees and asylum seekers are the most 'troublesome', which is why they may encounter the most problems in successfully incorporating into the educational system. Apart from the language barrier and the sometimes vast educational gaps occasioned by travels and lengthy asylum application procedures, the children of asylum seekers located in reception shelters can hardly afford all the expenses connected with school, including textbooks and stationary items. Given that many asylum-seeking parents are only vaguely interested in their children's academic progress (especially for as long as their applications are still being processed), it is hardly surprising that refugee pupils experience an uncommonly high dropout rate. In some schools, teachers who 'anticipating' a low level of interest by children and their parents in school attendance do not pay much attention to those children's achievements and even write down their names in pencil, so they can be easily removed from official documents if the children abandon the school.

Additional challenges are raised by the distressing experiences that refugee children have often been through: children who have suffered through shock and trauma require a proper diagnosis and the kind of psychological therapy that often overextends the capacities of an average public school:

> We had a girl from Chechnya, she had been through some nerve-racking experiences. She witnessed terrible things over there in Chechnya, so she was seriously ill, she was losing weight - it was apparently post-traumatic stress disorder, a common problem. The whole family was affected by the same stress. She had looked on, with her own eyes, as Russian soldiers swung a boy her age and thrown him into a burning school.

> Ahmed did not attend primary school in Chechnya because his parents were wealthy and were afraid that Russians would kidnap the children of Chechens for ransom. So, in fact, he did not know what it meant 'to go to school' and he is still unable to concentrate during a lesson. He and his brother are so careless… They have changed a little, but when they were in their first year of gymnasium they behaved as if they were in their first year of primary school. They were just physically unable to sit at a desk for 45 minutes[74].

Even when municipal authorities are ready, upon the request of the school, to cover additional psychological therapy costs, children's parents sometimes neglect its importance and do not cooperate with the assigned therapist, or even fail to take their children to the appointments[75].

Attitudes of the Host Society Both sociological research studies (Nowicka, Łodziński, 2004) and polls carried out in Poland document a gradual change in the way in which Polish citizens think of foreigners and immigrants. This shift towards less xenophobic and more tolerant attitudes results, most probably, from a growth in the number of direct personal contacts between Poles and immigrants, and from the positive portrayal of immigrants in the media[76]. As an expert in press discourse noticed in 2002, foreigners who received coverage in the media were largely presented in a very positive light (this was true in 63% of all articles): they were depicted as "ambitious", "creative" people whose contributions to society were deemed valuable. This study showed that, in describing immigrants, journalists tended to emphasise personal features and qualifications that are highly appreciated by Poles and that they omitted characteristics or facts that might be disapproved of by readers (Mrozowski, 2002: 231; Mrozowski, 1996).

Concerning the increase in personal contacts between the "native" and the "foreign" population: in 2004, almost one third of all Poles (30%) declared that they personally knew at least one foreigner residing in Poland, while only one quarter (25%) could say the same in 1999. The level of contacts is most intense in the country's large cities and among young, highly educated persons (CBOS, 2004). Despite an overall increase in tolerance, however, it is clear that not all nationalities are treated with equal amounts of sympathy. Poles demonstrate the greatest degree of acceptance towards foreign residents who are perceived as benefiting their economy, in other words citizens of 'developed' countries and, to some extent, citizens of the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Nonetheless, the percentage of Poles who consider economic factors -- above all,

[74] Interview with the teacher of the private lower secondary school in Warsaw.
[75] Interview with the employee of an NGO running a shelter for asylum seekers.
[76] For discussion see: Grzymała-Kazłowska, Okólski, 2003.

foreign investments and job creation -- as important in evaluating the benefits brought by foreigners has decreased in recent years, from 59% in 1999 to 46% in 2004. Interviewed Poles declared that they appreciated the wide range of cheap goods available thanks to migrant trading and that they valued the positive role played by foreign specialists in modernising the Polish economy, in transferring know-how, and in improving the country's corporate culture. Some recognized the value of cash inflows and of a competitive supply of foreign labour. Notable is the increase in the percentage of Poles who welcome foreigners' cultural input (27% in 2004 compared to 13% in 1999), particularly in the areas of tradition, cooking, and customs. More and more Poles also value diversity as a chance to open up to other cultures and nations, and as "an opportunity to learn tolerance and overcome prejudices" (CBOS, 2004).

As for the major threat associated with the inflow of immigrants, 36% of interviewees identified the increase in competition on the labour market caused by irregular workers, 20% pointed to the spread of organised international criminal networks (including drug dealing but also begging, etc.), and 5% were worried by the additional expense to the state budget associated with welfare benefits (CBOS 2004).

Table 8: Acceptance of Foreign Workers in the Polish Labour Market, Selected Years

Should foreigners be allowed to take up employment in Poland?	Oct. 1992 (%)	Sep. 1999 (%)	Aug. 2004 (%)
Yes, they should be allowed to take up any type of employment.	9	18	31
Yes, but they should only be allowed to take up certain types of employment.	39	46	42
No, they should be forbidden from taking up employment in Poland.	42	31	22
I do not know.	10	5	5

Source: CBOS 2004

With regard to the first point, i.e. to the fear of increased competition for employment, Poles appear to have become more accepting of foreigners finding work in their country over the last 12 years. As Table 8 demonstrates, in 1992 only 9% of the population agreed that all foreigners should be allowed to work in Poland, 39% accepted the presence of foreigners in a limited range of occupations, and as many as 42% called for a complete ban on the employment of foreigners. By 2004, this situation had changed: 31% of Poles accepted the unrestricted employment of foreigners in the Polish economy, 42% would prefer some restrictions to be imposed on migrants' access to work, and only 22% said they would like to deny migrants employment. Interestingly, despite the fact that migrant workers may compete with the native labour force, acceptance of their employment is higher among Polish employees than it is in the overall population (c.f. Table 9).

Table 9: Acceptance of Foreign Workers in the Polish Labour Market in 2004, by Occupational Status of Respondents

Should foreigners be allowed to take up employment in Poland?	Whole Sample (%)	Employees Only (%)
Yes, they should be allowed to take up any type of employment.	31	43
Yes, but they should only be allowed to take up certain types of employment.	42	41
No, they should be forbidden from taking up employment in Poland.	22	11
I do not know.	5	5

Source: CBOS 2004

4. THE IMPACT OF MIGRANT YOUTHS ON THE HOST SOCIETY AND VICE VERSA

Undoubtedly, the temporary and circular migration of Polish citizens to Western countries constitutes the most important channel for the international exchange of money (mainly through remittances); of know-how and technological/ expert knowledge; as well as of cultural patterns. It is mainly through such exchanges that Poles have been exposed to the capitalist work ethos needed to strengthen a market-based economy and democratic institutions in Poland.

Although the number of immigrants who have settled in Poland is still too small to have made a systematic and visible impact on Polish society, the recent introduction of new foods, of oriental sports, of meditation practices, and of the use of natural medicines may well be due to the presence of foreigners. In actual fact, however, it is impossible to accurately state

whether these new factors come from an influx of Asian immigrants or whether they result from a global trend that is receptive to oriental philosophies and lifestyles.

4.1. THE IMPACT OF MIGRANTS ON THE HOST SOCIETY

Although not the most numerous, the group of migrants that has been most influential in bringing about socio-economic changes to Poland is the one composed by highly qualified Western specialists (most of whom are either managers or technical experts). These specialists have brought with them the principles of a new, global, economic order as well as practical knowledge on how to implement relevant policies. Proof of the fact that Western experts have managed to transfer economic knowledge and corporate culture to the Polish labour force lies in the decision taken by some global concerns to locate their Central European offices in Poland, having found Polish branches to be the most productive in the region. Moreover, as demanding consumers, EU migrants contribute to the constant development of services and the improvement of standards. As the teacher of a lower secondary school in Warsaw testified:

> The people who come to work here are often well educated and very demanding, so they are sometimes troublesome for the education system. Public education may not meet their expectations. My friend from Zabrze [a medium-sized town in Silesia] told me of a Japanese man who managed a large enterprise there and who brought his daughter to the kindergarten she [the friend] worked in. She was surprised at what an incredibly demanding parent he appeared to be. He visited the kindergarten every day; he walked through the kindergarten and watched everything; he was very nice and polite, but he asked about everything. "Why," he asked, "do children not talk to one another when they play together? Children should be taught how to enter into a dialogue." None of the Polish parents ever visited the classrooms or complained that the children were not talking to each other. His suggestions were reasonable but he was a very difficult client, and the Polish education system will have more and more clients of this type. In fact, the education system should take advantage of them, since there are so many things one can learn from a parent like him.

The supply of a cheap migrant labour force has changed the shape of households in large cities: migrant domestic workers now make up for an insufficient number of nurseries, kindergartens, and elderly care centres while seasonal agriculture workers improve the competitiveness of farms. In many cases, migrants and their Polish employees establish long-lasting relationships that can lead to the legalization of the immigrants' status in Poland and to receiving substantial help in meeting all official requirements for the acquisition of necessary permits.

The temporary migration of language teachers has undoubtedly improved the knowledge of foreign languages among Poles: for example, the presence of language teachers from Ukraine in rural and small-city schools makes it possible for students who would otherwise be deprived of this opportunity to learn Western languages, thus also helping somewhat to assuage the imbalance in the quality of education provided in urban and rural regions.

Other migrant groups have found and expanded other economic niches: for example, the Asian and Turkish communities have become known for their cheap fast-food joints and restaurants, or for importing cheap textiles etc. What is worth noticing is that, by operating in ethnic niches, these migrants do not compete for regular positions on the primary labour market, but create additional jobs and contribute to the enlargement of the whole market.

While the influence of immigrants on the Polish economy is relatively easy to identify, it is a little harder to gauge the extent to which culture has been affected. While it is true that, ever since World War II Poland has been a rather homogeneous nation with regards to language and religion, the influx and settlement of Vietnamese and Chechen migrants (among others) will certainly contribute to diversifying Polish society.

4.2. THE IMPACT OF THE HOST SOCIETY ON MIGRANTS

Temporary and circulatory migration flows to Poland probably play a similar role to that of Polish migrations to Western countries: through remittances, they improve the living conditions of households in the country of origin; they allow migrants to gain know-how and accumulate the capital necessary for the establishment of an enterprise in the country of origin; they substitute or assist underdeveloped banking systems. At the same time, Ukrainian and Belarussian migrants are able to see Poland as a country that has made the change from socialism to a capitalist, free-market economy; this may, in turn, promote the idea of democratization in Ukraine and Belarus. In fact (although it is rather impossible to prove without the shadow of a doubt), the temporary migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland, which will have exposed them directly to the advantages of living in a free-market economy, may have contributed to the spread of pro-European and pro-democratic attitudes that have played such an important role in the so-called 'Orange Revolution' that led to the election of pro-democratic and Western-oriented president Victor Yushchenko.

The impact that the host society has on migrants is bound to be multidimensional and to involve both disadvantages and benefits. For example, Vietnamese youths who have been raised and socialized in Poland run the serious risk of being

marginalized when and should they return to their country of origin. Language is a clear problem area: children must learn Vietnamese very young (some Vietnamese teachers claim they must do so before they are seven years old), or they will not lose their foreigner's accent. Immigrant children, however, are often looked after by Polish caregivers and therefore learn Polish as their first language. Furthermore, Vietnamese children who are raised away from their country of origin are not able to benefit from the social network that is so important for social integration into Vietnamese society and that is absolutely essential in looking for employment. Since migration breaks this net of informal connections, Vietnamese migrant youths brought up in Poland have little chance of finding satisfactory, well-paid jobs in Vietnam or of achieving high social standing.

> Life in Vietnam is tough; because of the climate but, above all, because of the different interpersonal relations: you need personal connections, like in China. If you do not have proper connections, you will not achieve considerable success, because the finding of a good job depends primarily on your connections. The country is poor and [rates of] foreign investment are insignificant. Besides, there are so many young, talented people over there. I would have great difficulties in finding a job there. I mean a good job: I could find just any job, but I am not interested in washing dishes at a restaurant. It is very difficult for a person from abroad to find a position, especially without the support of relatives or parents' acquaintances. And those who left Vietnam have already lost their social connections[77]…

With regard to the high rate of unemployment in Poland and the still limited chances that Vietnamese youth have of entering the primary labour market, it is highly probable that the next generation of Vietnamese youth will try to migrate to Western countries, after having been 'pushed out' by the 'glass ceiling' encountered in Poland. As a Vietnamese migrant who graduated from university but then failed to find a job in Polish firms or public sector stated:

> You know, Polish society does not accept strangers. And if they really have to choose, they prefer a German over a Vietnamese. […] Vietnamese parents pay large amounts of money to send their children to the United States, to the United Kingdom, or to Denmark because they [the children] are not able to find a job here. I also had big problems in finding a job here.

The difficulties encountered by Vietnamese youths who wish to operate outside their ethnic community's economic niche and enter the primary labour sector do not, however, result purely from race discrimination or ethnic prejudices in Polish society (although these might, of course, play a role). The fact is that a constantly high unemployment rate, especially among educated youths, makes competition for attractive positions extremely intense; worse-paid and less prestigious jobs, on the other hand, tend not to meet the aspirations of Vietnamese youths or their parents. This sentiment of relative deprivation that is felt by the Vietnamese (and by other migrant youths who are socialised and educated in Polish schools but whose upward mobility is then blocked) might be a significant "push" factor for motivating further migration to other countries (like the United States or "old" European Union countries) in subsequent generations.

The future problems of migrant youths currently entering the labour market and of migrant children entering the public school system will certainly grow in importance, even if it is now largely overlooked by social scientists and policy-makers in Poland and, probably, in other CEE countries. As Alejandro Portes (1999: 29-30) noted, "The long-term effects of immigration for the host society depend less on the fate of first generation immigrants than on their descendants. Patterns of adaptation of the first generation set the stage for what is to come, but issues such as the continuing dominance [of a host society's language], the growth of a welfare-dependent population, the resilience or disappearance of culturally distinct enclaves, and the decline or growth of ethnic intermarriages will be decided among its children and grandchildren."

[77] Interview with a head of a Vietnamese ethnic school in Warsaw.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Because settlement migration to Poland is still in an initial phase and relatively few migrant youths are growing up in the country, no serious challenges have been met yet. Thus, at this stage, recommendations refer primarily to: the improvement of statistical data collection; initiatives to facilitate the structural integration of particular groups of migrants; the promotion of multicultural education; and the recognition of migrant youths' participation in the Polish educational system.

5.1. DATA COLLECTION

Reliable data is a prerequisite for analyzing the dynamics of integration (especially in its long-term, cross-generational aspects) and for objectively evaluating the outcomes of policies and initiatives that are implemented to facilitate the process. One way of building on the data resources would be to include a sub-sample of immigrant households into existing panel studies like the BAEL (Labour Force Survey) or the PGSS (Polish General Social Survey): doing so would provide valuable insight without having to allocate large amounts of additional funding. Moreover, the already-mentioned panel studies and other surveys should include questions to identify immigrants (ideally, by generational status), find out how long they have been in Poland and whether there have been any changes in their migrant status (for example, from restricted residency to naturalisation).

Another means of gaining additional information could be to take advantage of the data gathered by administrative bodies during their official activities. This data that relates, among other things, to the number of: implemented integration programmes, the share of long-term unemployed persons and beneficiaries of the social welfare system among migrants, and foreign students whose fees are waived by public schools should be reported to the Central Statistical Office and made widely available to researchers.

5.2. STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION

The possession of legal residency and employment permits is a key aspect of migrants' structural integration that greatly facilitates further integration. However, since the unemployment rate among the native Polish population remains alarmingly high (up to 28% among 25-35 year-olds[78]), any attempts to increase the share of immigrants in the primary labour market through administrative decisions or quotas might provoke social conflict and cause host society members to adopt hostile attitude towards foreigners and immigrants.

Given these dangers, more attention should be paid to promoting forms of self-employment and the expansion of the SME[79] sector among immigrants (especially among humanitarian migrants and repatriates). For example, the vast number of immigrant babysitters and domestic sector workers currently working in Poland should be permitted to exit the shadow economy and enter the regular market as self-employed individuals; this would allow them to legalise their residence, increase their chances of integrating into the host society, and also reunify with their spouses and children, which might even contribute to improving the age structure of the Polish population. With regards to expanding the SME sector, other forms of economic mobilisation should include training courses in Polish legal and tax procedures and in the basics of accounting, as well as the provision of assistance and/ or consultancy during the initial phases of business development. Since repatriates, refugees, and people with "tolerated stay" status are rarely eligible for bank loans, there should be greater flexibility in awarding start-up loans to small businesses. In fact, the promotion of entrepreneurship, in all its forms, might well contribute to the creation of new jobs and alleviate competition for existing ones.

5.3. RAISING AWARENESS OF DIVERSITY

As this study has already mentioned, Poland is a culturally and ethnically homogenous country. Due to a relative lack of knowledge about 'exotic' cultures, the recent increase in diversity might lead to confusion and misunderstandings between the foreign and host societies and, eventually, to the social isolation of the "alien group". One group that could, potentially, risk such isolation is the Chechen one, for the general level of awareness of Islamic culture and religion is rather superficial and largely driven by stereotypes.

Clearly, greater efforts are needed to avoid the build-up of negative social tensions. Besides "orientation training courses" and the development of bilingual guides with basic information on Polish law, society, and culture (which should certainly be made available to migrants in need), professional assistance on cross-cultural competences should be extended to experts (social workers, teachers, police officers, public administration employees, etc.) who work directly with immigrants. The general public should also be targeted by awareness-raising initiatives.

[78] Central Statistical Office: *http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/praca_ludnosc/mies_inf_bezrobocie/2004/1204.htm*
[79] Small and Medium Enterprises

5.4. MULITCULTURALISM IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

Special curricula promoting ideas of tolerance and multiculturalism have already been prepared, but they have not been sufficiently propagated due to a lack of interest among teachers. In fact, interviews with teachers have proven that only in a few schools have foreign pupils been regarded as individuals who "enrich" the whole class and whose different cultural background is used to stimulate other pupils interested in learning about cultural diversity. It would therefore be useful to create incentives that promote the inclusion of multiculturalism in classes and the exchange of best-practices in dealing with foreign students in public schools (including on how to introduce them appropriately into the school environment); this would help teachers and educational counsellors to better understand the importance of the issue.

The school attendance and educational achievements of the children of refugees and of people with the "tolerated stay" status should be ensured by the social welfare system that assists them. Therefore, they should be supervised by social workers charged with the individual integration programs or with managing the allowances paid by the Social Assistance authorities. It would also be strongly advisable to secure the funds to purchase school books and the necessary equipment for the children of the poorest migrants and for asylum seekers in refugees shelters.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

As already mentioned in the report (see Section 3.1), the fact that there is only a small number of immigrant children residing in Poland with their parents[80], coupled with the fact that they are widely dispersed in schools throughout the country, constituted a serious methodological challenge. A further problem lay in the fact that most migrant youths are very young (they are only now entering the first classes of elementary school) and interviewing them raised many doubts: for example, young children lack the necessary reflective ability to asses their own position relative to "in-groups or "out-groups", and questions concerning experiences of social exclusion or racial discrimination may be more psychologically unsettling for them than for adults.

To interview migrant parents instead of children presented other problems and was not really feasible. From a logistical point of view, it should be noted that addresses (including those of migrants) are protected by regulations on the privacy of personal data. Moreover, school staff were very reluctant to arrange interviews with migrant parents because many immigrants confuse scientific research methods with interrogations carried out by the police and other administrative bodies. Teachers and school directors felt that involving parents in the research might lead to increased distrust in the schools. Besides, it appeared that in most cases migrant parents only had occasional contacts with the school authorities.

Because of these difficulties, the main focus of the empirical research shifted to interviews with "key informants" like teachers and school counselors, as well as with other adult "contacts" such as priests, heads of ethnic schools, and social workers. These people are in a position to observe migrant children's relations with native children, assess their educational achievements, and identify factors hindering integration, among other things.

The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. Although they resembled spontaneous conversation and were open to all issues and problems introduced by the interviewee, a common set of topics (slightly different for different groups of experts) was discussed during the talk. In most cases, the interviews were recorded and transcribed, but if the respondent did not allow for recording, detailed notes were taken shortly after the conversation.

As a methodological experiment, Vietnamese youths were asked to fill in a specially-designed online questionnaire; in fact, interviews had confirmed that the Internet is very popular among Vietnamese youth in Poland, as supported by the existence of a number of portals serving Vietnamese residents in Poland and of ethnic Internet cafes/ stations. The questionnaire included a number of open-ended questions (intended, in part, to evaluate written Polish skills) that dealt with many issues, such as school, relationships with Polish classmates, leisure time, employment prospects in Polish firms, and even questions that referred to respondents' ethnic/ cultural identification and future projections. Unfortunately, Vietnamese internet portals and Vietnamese magazines refused to disseminate information on the online questionnaire either by establishing a link on their webpage or by publishing the web address. Similar difficulties were encountered in attempting to arrange in-depth interviews. Although names, phone numbers and email addresses were provided by two Vietnamese youths who were interviewed (in accordance with the "snow-ball method"), the Vietnamese youth contacted by the researcher refused to participate in the study.

INTERVIEWS

Ukrainians Two priests of the Greek-Catholic parish in Warsaw were interviewed and a focus group interview was conducted with Ukrainian immigrants at the Greek-Catholic Parish Social Club (10 participants).

[80] The categories of unaccompanied minors and of foreign students enrolled in Polish universities were excluded from the study because their situation differs substantially from that of second generation migrant youth who are socialized in Polish society and attend educational institutions.

Armenians Two Armenian teachers were interviewed, as was the head of an Armenian ethnic school. A questionnaire was filled in by 12 Armenian children.

Vietnamese The head of a Vietnamese ethnic school in Warsaw was interviewed, as were two Vietnamese students (both girls). These interviews were supported by field observation activities at the Vietnamese Independence Day celebrations and at the Charity Football Match between Polish actors and Vietnamese migrants living in Poland. In addition, an online questionnaire was filled in by two Vietnamese youths.

The Educational Sector The following interviews were conducted: two interviews with elementary-school educational counselors; one interview with an educational counselor in lower secondary school; three interviews with heads of elementary schools; two interviews with the heads of lower secondary schools; and one interview with an officer from the Mazovian Education Office.

Other interviews The worker of an NGO that runs a shelter for asylum seekers was interviewed, as was a return migrant enrolled in secondary school.

OTHER PRIMARY DATA SOURCES

Use was made of four in-depth interviews on a similar subject conducted, at the same time, by the research team of Prof. Joanna Kurczewska. These interviews were with: a teacher from a private lower secondary school in Warsaw; a worker in a refugee shelter; an expert from a Vietnamese ethnic group; and an officer from the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

The current country study also relied on the information that was gathered through expert interviews conducted by the author during the previous European Commission project entitled *Sharing Experience: Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries and Lessons Learned from the 'New Countries of Immigration' in the EU and Austria* (Koryś, 2004).

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GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the specificity of the migration situation in each of the countries that were researched for this publication, it is clear that in all cases there is an increasing need to deal with the integration of new and old communities. Policy makers at all levels should certainly confront the issue as a way of responding to national/ local requirements and economic realities, but also keep firmly in mind a European Union framework that rejects the discrimination and marginalisation of foreigners. Such an attitude is enshrined in numerous EU documents and in the EU *acquis* on matters of immigration, integration, and non-discrimination.

The following recommendations are drawn from the conclusions reached by the Austrian, Czech, German, and Polish country teams and are the result of careful research into the situation of migrant youth in their respective countries.

1. Government and non-government **sources of information on immigrants and integration should be strengthened** so as to allow for an accurate assessment of the situation in each country (and each region) and for the implementation of appropriate, effective policies. As this publication has shown, even in countries with a wealth of information on integration (see the German and Austrian reports), significant problems in the way that such data is collected remain. For example, it is clear that the size of the immigrant population is underestimated when census data ignores naturalised citizens and return migrants who often have the same problems in adapting to their new country as newly-arrived individuals. Where they already exist, these and other similar distortions should be rectified; where integration data collection mechanisms have not become as systematic yet, every effort should be made to avoid such misrepresentations.

2. Further on the issue of data collection, thought should go into the **harmonisation of terms and methodologies** throughout the European Union. This would undoubtedly facilitate comparisons and relevant exchanges of information and expertise. This is all the more important in view of the Union's ongoing studies into the viability of establishing common immigration policies.

3. As this project has stressed, it is especially crucial that **integration policies target young people** with a migration background. The idea is to avoid marginalisation, the build-up of disadvantages for whole groups of people, widespread discontent, and social inequity. As the Austrian team pointed out in its country report, "integration work should be prevention-oriented" (Section 5).

4. All policies that aim to promote **integration should not be based on the assumption that integration is the sole responsibility of "foreigners"**: as the country reports in this publication have shown, in fact, it is a process that requires the active participation of host society members. It is essential that xenophobia and all forms of prejudice be tackled forcefully. One way of doing so (that would be especially beneficial to youths) could be by incorporating topics related to migration, integration, and multiculturalism into the school system and by requiring all children to attend such classes. At the same time, resources should be directed to providing teachers with guidance and refresher courses, as well as with appropriate didactic materials (such as textbooks and other teaching aids).

5. Another school-based initiative that was underscored by all the researchers as being of crucial importance concerned youths' **proficiency in the language of the host country**. All four studies identified language as a prerequisite for facilitating migrant children's successful integration into school, for achieving good academic results, and for eventually finding a position in the nation's labour market. Although linguistic fluency alone does not guarantee integration (structural or other), it is essential for establishing relationships with the local community and for increasing one's sense of identification with the adopted country. As such, it is essential that migrant children be assisted in acquiring the necessary language skills -- for the duration of their school-life, if need be.

6. In addition to providing widespread access to classes in the language of the host country, **efforts should be made to encourage and support migrant children's knowledge of their mother tongue**: reinforcing the value of this skill could contribute to strengthening children's ability to learn other languages and subjects (intellectual development) and increase the frequency and quality of communication within the migrant family/ community.

7. The timing of such efforts is as important as their content: language-learning (and other kinds of pro-integration) **initiatives should be implemented as early as possible**. In the Czech case, for example, experts identified "children over 10 with little or no knowledge of the Czech language as the most problematic group" (Section 3.6.1.). Ideally, children from foreign families should have access to assistance even before they enrol in elementary school: pre-school activities, in fact, have proven extremely effective. Moreover, there should be no difference in the availability or cost of such classes for EU and third country nationals. In all four country studies, third country citizens compose a sizeable if not the most numerous portion of the immigrant population and often have to deal with the greatest barriers to integration.

8. The **involvement of parents and other relatives** is extremely important, especially for very young children. School staff, social workers, local authority representatives, and workers in the field of integration should try to establish regular communication with children's families and even attempt to include them in initiatives. Although some projects have been designed specifically to include both generations[81], these should become more widespread.

9. **Integration strategies need to be targeted.** As the reports have shown, there are differences in the way that different ethnic groups behave and it is therefore reasonable to assume that there will be differences in how they respond to policies. But strategies should not only be targeted in terms of ethnicity: a whole variety of factors need to be taken into consideration in order to maximize the impact of projects, including race, religion, language, generational status, immigration status (whether the migrants are asylum seekers or return migrants, for example), etc. One aspect that is often neglected is that of gender: as with people from different ethnic groups, it is clear that boys' and girls' experiences are not always the same, largely because of the diverging ways in which young men and women are socialised (both in the sending and receiving countries). As the Polish report pointed out, "social rules regarding the acceptability (or non-acceptability) of certain interpersonal relations may either facilitate or impede the establishment of contacts" between migrants and host society members; furthermore, "culturally-determined attitudes towards children's education profoundly influence young migrants' educational achievements" (Section 3.4, sub-heading Cultural Patterns).

10. **Strategies need to be comprehensive**. Given that integration is a multilayered process that must be tackled from a variety of angles simultaneously, policy makers (national or local) and people working with migrants should expect and plan for long-term, complex, and comprehensive strategies.

11. In addition to being comprehensive and targeted, **efforts should be cooperative** and involve all levels of government, as well as migrant organisations and NGOs. In addition to benefiting from shared human and financial resources, cooperative endeavours are more likely to enjoy broad-based support and a degree of institutional backing that individual, ad-hoc initiatives may not have.

12. Finally, careful attention should be paid to the **quality** of policies, not only to their availability. As the country report on Germany highlighted, while it is important that programmes for migrants exist and are accessible, they "have often been criticized for their inability to respond to the specific needs and interests of certain individuals or groups" (German country report, Section 5: Recommendations). A similar complaint was voiced by individuals interviewed for the Polish country study, in which it was found "that the quality of education offered to the children of asylum seekers requires improvement" (Polish country report, Section 1.2). One very specific criticism was highlighted by the Czech study, which revealed that "teachers and directors in schools (outside of the large cities of Prague and Brno) have severely criticised the lack of quality textbooks" (Czech country report, Section 3.6.1.4.). As governments accept the need and urgency for implementing pro-integration measures, and as regional/ local authorities are required to show their commitment to integration, there may be the tendency to fill the gaps with mediocre projects. Policy-makers should be aware of this risk and try, as much as possible, to avoid it by making quality a central criterion and by including monitoring and value-assessment mechanisms into the projects.

[81] See, for example, the "Children's Multiethnic Group" run by the Centre for Migration Studies (Czech Report, Section 2.3.1.) and the "10-week pilot programme for facilitating kindergarten entrance for children and their mothers (parents)" (Austrian Report, Section 1.2.2., sub-heading Language Training, paragraph 3). Also worth mentioning are those initiatives that have been initiated by parents, such as the Parents' Initiative for Aussiedler (German Report, Section 2.2.1., sub-heading Measures for the Integration of Immigrants in Schools, paragraph 3).

Research, has been carried out in direction of migrant youth in four Central European countries, namely Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Austria. Along the present EU border, newly arriving migrants are confronted with countries with a strongly varying history in terms of migration. Migration itself, and more particularly integration are concepts with substantially different meaning to the local population.

Ideally but not unlikely, impulses for integration policy and practice may result from this project. Information on a subject completely new for the new EU member states will provide an innovative contribution to EU scientific base.

EVALUATION FORM ON THE PUBLICATION

DIMENSIONS OF INTEGRATION : MIGRANT YOUTH IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Please fill in this evaluation form and kindly send it back to Ms Claire Potaux (IOM Vienna), e-mail: cpotaux@iom.int , fax: +43 1 585 33 22 30, Address: Nibelungengasse 13/4- 1010 Vienna- Austria

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